




Corporate Social Responsibility Performance-Based Incentives: Investigations Through the Lens 


























Presented in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements  
For the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy (Business Administration - Accountancy)  
at the John Molson School of Business at Concordia University 












© Leanne Keddie, 2020 
  
CONCORDIA UNIVERSITY 




This is to certify that the thesis prepared 
 
By:  Leanne Keddie 
 
Entitled: Corporate Social Responsibility Performance-Based Incentives: Investigations 
Through the Lens of Corporate Governance 
 
and submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of  
 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY (Accountancy) 
 
complies with the regulations of the University and meets the accepted standards with respect to 
originality and quality. 
 
Signed by the final examining committee: 
 
 
  _________________________________________________Chair 
  Dr. Caroline Roux 
 
_________________________________________________External Examiner 
  Dr. Thomas Schneider 
 
_________________________________________________External to Program 
  Dr. Bryan Campbell 
 
_________________________________________________Examiner 
  Dr. Emilio Boulianne 
 
_________________________________________________Examiner 
  Dr. Denis Cormier 
 
_________________________________________________Thesis Supervisor 
  Dr. Michel Magnan 
 
 Approved by   ____________________________________________________ 
                                   Dr. Cedric Lesage, Graduate Program Director 
 
 Month/day/year ____________________________________________________ 
                                                Dr. Anne-Marie Croteau 





Corporate Social Responsibility Performance-Based Incentives: Investigations Through the 
Lens of Corporate Governance 
 
 
Sara Leanne Keddie, Ph. D. 
Concordia University, 2020 
 
 
 Structured around three essays, this dissertation investigates the use of Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) performance-based incentives through the lens of corporate governance.  
Toward that end, it relies on both quantitative and qualitative research methodologies.  The key 
data was hand collected from the proxy statements of S&P 500 firms for the fiscal year 2014 while 
the remaining data was obtained from various databases.  Semi-structured interviews were also 
conducted with key executives and directors and add context to the quantitative results reported in 
the first paper.  Findings reported in the first essay suggest that short-term view institutional 
shareholders are associated with less use of CSR performance-based incentives while long-term 
view institutional shareholders, according to the qualitative data only, appear to be working 
towards greater use.  Furthermore, imitation appears to underlie greater use of CSR performance-
based incentives.  Within the second essay,  results are consistent with the notion that when the 
top management team has power, the use of these incentives is associated with excess 
compensation beyond what they would normally be expected to receive.  Finally, in the third essay, 
knowledge transfer vis-à-vis directors’ experience on CSR committees as well as in 
environmentally sensitive industries appears to induce firms to expand their use of particular sub-
categories of quantitative CSR performance-based incentives.  This work contributes to the 
literatures in executive compensation, CSR, knowledge transfer and to the emerging literature on 
CSR-driven corporate governance.  It will be of interest to boards of directors, regulators, 
shareholders and other stakeholders interested in understanding more about who is influencing the 

















Dedication and Acknowledgements 
 
This thesis is dedicated to my Mom.  She may not have lived to see this day, but she inspired my 
love of learning as a child and that directly lead me here.  From teaching me to read to pushing 
me to question the rules of our society, her love and support are enduring. 
 
This thesis is dedicated to my Grandma.  Without her, I would not have been able to pursue my 
studies.  She lived with us after my Mom died and allowed me to take advantage of the 
opportunities ahead of me.  Her kindness and compassion often went against societal rules, but 
she did it anyways and that is a constant source of inspiration for me. 
 
This thesis is dedicated to my Dad.  Our daily chats help me to put the world into perspective and 
remind me of the blessings that I have.  You make me laugh and make sure I never forget where 
I came from.   
 
This thesis is dedicated to my husband, Jeff.  Your encouragement over the last many years has 
been invaluable as is your willingness to come along on this adventure.  My partner in 
everything, the person who listens to all my wild ideas and theories about the world.  Thanks for 
listening and questioning and pushing me to go on.     
 
This thesis is dedicated to my children: Xavier, Ellis, Cole & Taylor.  You inspire me to work 
towards a better world.  Your innocence and pure love bring joy to my life and meaning to my 
work.  Every day you teach me love, patience and the wonder of the world.  I love you all bigger 
than the universe. 
 
This thesis is dedicated to my aunts Mary and Reynelda.  Your love, support, constant 
encouragement and positivity are bright lights for me when things are challenging. 
 
This thesis is dedicated to Fr. Jude.  You were one of the first people to suggest a PhD as a 
possible route for my future.  You truly see people and their gifts.  Thank you for the love and 
support you have shown to my family and I and for always pushing us to use our gifts to their 
fullest potential. 
 
This thesis is dedicated to my family.  My brothers, Myles, Paul and Colin, my in-laws Debbie 
and Harry, Lesley, Taryn, Vanessa, Dan, Tim and Laura, and to all my nieces and nephews 
Emily, Tyler, Ace, Sky, Callen, Linden, Isla and your new brother to arrive soon.  A special 
thank you to Sarah, William and Delilah for all your incredible support, simplifying my life on 
way too many occasions.  Thank you to all my friends and family who have supported us 
throughout the years, providing words of encouragement, a smile, a laugh, even a question or a 
puzzled look as I talked about my work as you politely tolerated me talking about my research.  I 
appreciate your love, support and especially your patience!  And to my nieces and nephews I 
hope you use your gifts to reach for the stars. 
 
This thesis is dedicated to all of my former teachers and professors.  You pushed me, you 
challenged me, you directed me here.  My love of learning was nurtured in many of your 
classrooms and the foundations you helped to build continue to nurture my curiosity today. 
 v 
This thesis is dedicated to all those who have not had the same opportunities as I have.  I will 
continue to work to open doors for those looking for more and will do my best to use my 
position of privilege to help others. 
 
I want to thank Dr. Emilio Boulianne for being the first to give me the opportunity to work on a 
‘real’ paper.  You are the most incredible cheerleader and your positive attitude, support and 
amazing feedback shape the researcher I am today. 
 
To Dr. Denis Cormier I also express thanks for your always insightful comments that continue to 
challenge me to be better.  Your work is inspiring, and I appreciate the time you have provided to 
help make my work better.     
 
I cannot express enough thanks to my supervisor Dr. Michel Magnan.  Your constant support, 
brilliant insights, patience and encouragement were critical for this dissertation.  Your insights 
are always spot on and never fail to push me to think more deeply.  I have learned so much over 
































Contribution of Authors 
 
 
All concepts, ideas, literature reviews, data collection, statistical analyses and writing for this 
dissertation come from Leanne Keddie.  Dr. Michel Magnan provided critical review, 










































Table of Contents 
 
LIST OF TABLES ..................................................................................................................................... X 
LIST OF FIGURES .................................................................................................................................. XI 
INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................................... 1 
1.1. BACKGROUND ............................................................................................................................... 1 
1.2. VALUE ........................................................................................................................................... 3 
1.3. RESEARCH AIMS AND OBJECTIVES ................................................................................................. 4 
SUCCUMBING TO THE PRESSURE?  AN INVESTIGATION OF THE INFLUENCE OF 
STAKEHOLDER POWER ON CSR PERFORMANCE-BASED INCENTIVES USE ...................... 7 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ........................................................................................................................ 7 
ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................................................. 8 
1. INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................................. 9 
2. BOARD GOVERNANCE UNDER PRESSURE ........................................................................... 11 
2.1. THE CLIMATE CRISIS .................................................................................................................... 11 
2.2. INCREASING REGULATORY PRESSURE .......................................................................................... 12 
2.3. DYNAMIC COMPETITIVE LANDSCAPE ........................................................................................... 12 
2.4. THE CHANGING SHAREHOLDER ................................................................................................... 13 
3. LITERATURE REVIEW: CSR PERFORMANCE-BASED INCENTIVES AND 
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION ........................................................................................................... 14 
3.1. PERFORMANCE METRICS AND EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION .......................................................... 14 
3.2. CSR PERFORMANCE-BASED INCENTIVES IN EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION ...................................... 15 
4. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT .................................................................... 17 
4.1. PERSPECTIVES ON EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION DETERMINATION ................................................. 17 
4.2. EFFICIENT CONTRACTING…MODIFIED ........................................................................................ 18 
4.3. CSR PERFORMANCE-BASED INCENTIVES ...................................................................................... 21 
4.4. A DESCRIPTION OF STAKEHOLDER POWER ................................................................................... 23 
5. METHOD .......................................................................................................................................... 25 
5.1. SAMPLE ....................................................................................................................................... 25 
5.2. EMPIRICAL MODEL ..................................................................................................................... 26 
5.3. VARIABLE CONSTRUCTION .......................................................................................................... 26 
6. RESULTS .......................................................................................................................................... 28 
6.1. SAMPLE AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ......................................................................................... 28 
6.2. BINARY LOGISTIC REGRESSION AND INTERVIEW RESULTS ............................................................. 29 
7. ROBUSTNESS TESTS .................................................................................................................... 34 
8. DISCUSSION .................................................................................................................................... 35 
9. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH ............................................................................ 36 
TABLES AND FIGURES ........................................................................................................................ 39 
APPENDIX 1 - ROYAL DUTCH SHELL CSR PERFORMANCE-BASED INCENTIVES 
EXAMPLE ................................................................................................................................................. 49 
 viii 
REFERENCES .......................................................................................................................................... 50 
WHO IS MORE POWERFUL: THE BOARD OR MANAGEMENT? EXPLORING THE 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CSR PERFORMANCE-BASED INCENTIVES AND EXECUTIVE 
COMPENSATION .................................................................................................................................... 55 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...................................................................................................................... 55 
ABSTRACT ............................................................................................................................................... 56 
1. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................ 57 
2. CSR PERFORMANCE-BASED INCENTIVES AND EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION ...... 60 
2.1. MANAGEMENT AND FIRMS UNDER FIRE ...................................................................................... 60 
2.2. EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION ....................................................................................................... 61 
2.3. CSR PERFORMANCE-BASED INCENTIVES IN EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION ...................................... 63 
3. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT .................................................................... 65 
4. METHOD .......................................................................................................................................... 69 
4.1. SAMPLE SELECTION .................................................................................................................... 69 
4.2. MODELS ...................................................................................................................................... 69 
4.3. VARIABLE CONSTRUCTION .......................................................................................................... 70 
5. RESULTS .......................................................................................................................................... 72 
5.1. SAMPLE AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ......................................................................................... 72 
5.2. LINEAR REGRESSION RESULTS ...................................................................................................... 73 
6. ROBUSTNESS TESTS .................................................................................................................... 75 
7. CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH ............................................... 76 
TABLES AND FIGURES ........................................................................................................................ 79 
REFERENCES .......................................................................................................................................... 88 
THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND CSR PERFORMANCE-BASED INCENTIVES: WHAT’S 
THE ‘LINK’? ............................................................................................................................................ 92 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...................................................................................................................... 92 
ABSTRACT ............................................................................................................................................... 93 
1. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................ 94 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW: CSR PERFORMANCE-BASED INCENTIVES AND 
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION ........................................................................................................... 98 
2.1. PERFORMANCE METRICS AND EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION .......................................................... 98 
2.2. CSR PERFORMANCE-BASED INCENTIVES IN EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION .................................... 100 
2.2.1. Determinants of incentive use – linking pin directors ......................................................... 102 
2.2.2. Determinants of incentive use – director experience .......................................................... 103 
3. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT .................................................................. 103 
3.1. LINKING PIN DIRECTORS AND COMMITTEE OVERLAP ................................................................ 103 
4. METHOD ........................................................................................................................................ 106 
4.1. SAMPLE ..................................................................................................................................... 106 
4.2. EMPIRICAL MODEL ................................................................................................................... 107 
 ix 
4.3. VARIABLE CONSTRUCTION ........................................................................................................ 108 
5. RESULTS ........................................................................................................................................ 111 
5.1. SAMPLE AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ....................................................................................... 111 
5.2. PEARSON CORRELATION TABLE ................................................................................................. 112 
5.3. BINARY LOGISTIC REGRESSION .................................................................................................. 112 
6. ROBUSTNESS TESTS .................................................................................................................. 116 
7. DISCUSSION .................................................................................................................................. 117 
8. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH .......................................................................... 118 
TABLES AND FIGURES ...................................................................................................................... 120 
REFERENCES ........................................................................................................................................ 136 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION .................................................................................................... 140 
1.1. FINDINGS .................................................................................................................................. 141 
1.1.1. Succumbing To The Pressure?  An Investigation Of The Influence Of Stakeholder Power On 
CSR Performance-Based Incentives Use ......................................................................................... 141 
1.1.2. Who Is More Powerful: The Board Or Management? Exploring The Relationship Between 
CSR Performance-Based Incentives And Executive Compensation ................................................. 142 
1.1.3. The Board Of Directors And CSR Performance-Based Incentives: What’s The ‘Link’? ... 143 
1.2. CONTRIBUTIONS ........................................................................................................................ 145 
1.3. IMPLICATIONS ........................................................................................................................... 147 
1.4. LIMITATIONS ............................................................................................................................. 148 
1.5. FUTURE RESEARCH ................................................................................................................... 148 


























List of Tables 
 
Table 1: Descriptive data incentive plans ................................................................................................... 39 
Table 2: Simple Statistics ............................................................................................................................ 39 
Table 3: Two Sample t-tests Split by CSR Performance-Based Incentive Use .......................................... 39 
Table 4: Pearson Correlation Table ............................................................................................................ 41 
Table 5: Model Fit Statistics – Basic model ............................................................................................... 42 
Table 6: Binary Logistic Regression Results – Basic Model, No Interactions ........................................... 43 
Table 7: Association of Predicted Probabilities and Observed Responses ................................................. 44 
Table 8: Model Fit Statistics – Interaction Model ...................................................................................... 45 
Table 9: Binary Logistic Regression Results .............................................................................................. 46 
Table 10: Association of Predicted Probabilities and Observed Responses ............................................... 47 
Table 11: Binary Logistic Regression Results – Peer Pressure and Shareholder Interaction ..................... 48 
Table 12: Descriptive data incentive plans ................................................................................................. 79 
Table 13: Simple Statistics .......................................................................................................................... 80 
Table 14: Two Sample t-tests Split by CSR Performance-Based Incentive Use ........................................ 80 
Table 15: Pearson Correlation Table .......................................................................................................... 81 
Table 16: Least Squares Regression – Determinants of Excess Bonus – H1 ............................................. 82 
Table 17: Four Distinct Groups of Firms Coefficients Results – H1 .......................................................... 83 
Table 18: Least Squares Regression Results – H2 ...................................................................................... 84 
Table 19: Least Squares Regression Results – H3a .................................................................................... 85 
Table 20: Least Squares Regression Results – H3b .................................................................................... 86 
Table 21: Descriptive data incentive plans ............................................................................................... 120 
Table 22: Descriptive data CSR performance-based incentives ............................................................... 120 
Table 23: Simple Statistics ........................................................................................................................ 121 
Table 24: Two Sample t-tests Split by CSR Performance-Based Incentive Use ...................................... 122 
Table 25: Two Sample t-tests Split by CSR Performance-Based Incentive Type .................................... 122 
Table 26: Pearson Correlation Table ........................................................................................................ 124 
Table 27: Binary Logistic Regression Results .......................................................................................... 126 
Table 28: Association of Predicted Probabilities and Observed Responses ............................................. 127 
Table 29: Binary Logistic Regression Results .......................................................................................... 128 
Table 30: Association of Predicted Probabilities and Observed Responses ............................................. 129 
Table 31: Binary Logistic Regression Results .......................................................................................... 130 
Table 32: Association of Predicted Probabilities and Observed Responses ............................................. 131 
Table 33: Binary Logistic Regression Results .......................................................................................... 132 
Table 34: Association of Predicted Probabilities and Observed Responses ............................................. 133 
Table 35: Binary Logistic Regression Results .......................................................................................... 134 














List of Figures 
 
Figure 1: The causal relationship between corporate governance and performance.  Adapted from: Jo & 
Harjoto, 2012. ............................................................................................................................................. 21 
Figure 2: Proposed model of stakeholder power influencing the executive compensation process ........... 22 
Figure 3: CSR performance-based incentive use across industry ............................................................... 40 
Figure 4: CSR performance-based incentive use across industries (reproduced from Keddie, 2019) ....... 87 







1.1.  Background 
This dissertation explores the use of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) performance-
based incentives through the lens of corporate governance. The research is motivated by a sincere 
desire to have a greater understanding of how firms can ‘be better’ in society.  As this dissertation 
was being developed, interest in CSR continued to grow.  Protests over climate change and its 
implications for the most vulnerable in society have drawn thousands into the streets (BBC, 2020).  
While human society as we know it faces some unprecedented challenges regarding its future, 
executive compensation is also at all-time highs with levels having risen from 20-30 times the 
wages of the average worker in the 1970s to between 200 and 300:1 today (Baker, Bivens & 
Scheider, 2019).  Calls are growing louder for businesses to step up and contribute more positively 
to society, essentially to improve their CSR performance as well as their sustainability.  These 
calls are no longer from the ‘fringe’. In fact, Larry Fink, CEO of BlackRock, the world’s largest 
asset manager with over $7 trillion in assets under management, has taken the opportunity in each 
of the last four years to call on businesses to contribute more to society (Centre on Executive 
Compensation, 2017; Fink, 2018; Fink, 2019; Fink, 2020).  The shareholder primacy façade is 
fading away and a broader, more inclusive and holistic view of the firm is emerging (Stout, 2012).  
As such, the intersection of these seemingly disparate areas may be colliding and pushing firms to 
innovate and deal with these pressures accordingly. 
 This dissertation draws its main inspiration from four key papers: Kolk & Perego, 2014; 
Hong, Li & Minor, 2016; Maas, 2018; and Flammer, Hong & Minor, 2019.  To the best of my 
knowledge, Kolk & Perego (2014) are the first scholars to describe the use of ‘sustainable 
bonuses’.  The authors examine four firms and provide a good introduction to the topic highlighting 
the emerging nature of these incentives as well as posing interesting possibilities for future 
research.  They note that it is too early to tell if these bonuses have a substantive impact or are just 
window dressing.  Hong, Li & Minor (2016) investigate the use of these incentives and find that 
they are associated with shareholder friendly boards. They contribute to the debate as to whether 
CSR initiatives are positive or negative for shareholders and find that CSR performance-based 
incentives are in fact positive for shareholders.  Maas (2018) delves deeper into the use of these 
incentives by exploring whether firms with past poor CSR performance are more likely to use such 
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incentives and finds they are not.  Additionally, to the best of my knowledge, Maas (2018) is the 
first scholar to break down these incentives further into what she deems to be ‘hard’ or quantitative, 
explicit metrics and ‘soft’ or qualitative metrics.  She finds that only hard, quantitative metrics are 
associated with a positive effect on CSR performance while soft, qualitative incentives are not.  
Her work heavily influences my work by considering that not all CSR performance-based 
incentives are homogenous, and that we need to break these down further to understand the 
determinants, and eventually, the performance implications.  Finally, Flammer, Hong & Minor 
(2019) consider whether these incentives are used to align executives’ preferences with 
shareholder preferences.  Specifically, they conclude that shareholders would prefer executives to 
focus on particular stakeholders and use these incentives to ensure this. 
 These four papers are some of the first to explore the use of CSR performance-based 
incentives and open the door to additional questions.  I aim to extend such seminal work on the 
issue of CSR-based incentives by examining further determinants and implications, thus 
contributing to an ongoing conversation.  Each of these papers enhances our understanding and 
pushes our knowledge further about the use of these incentives.  I continue this work here by 
exploring the use of CSR performance-based incentives from a corporate governance perspective.  
Specifically, each paper takes a different view of the use of these incentives and attempts to 
understand who is influencing their use and how this may occur.  In considering a firm’s usage of 
CSR performance-based incentives, the dissertation papers explore whether this usage may stem 
from: 1) pressure from heterogenous shareholders or peer pressure, 2) management and 3) 
knowledge transfer from the board of directors. My work directly extends the work of the 
aforementioned papers by investigating three distinct determinants for the use of CSR 
performance-based incentives. 
 To ensure mutual understanding of this dissertation, it is important to establish some 
critical terms before proceeding any further.  I take a triple bottom line approach to CSR which 
includes the social, environmental and financial aspect of the firm (Elkington, 1997).  The CSR 
performance-based incentives themselves are, for the purposes of this study, found in the short-
term incentive plan, typically paid in cash and usually paid for performance within the previous 
year. I use dummy variables for the first two papers whereby a 1(0) indicates the presence 
(absence) of some form of social and/or environmental metric in the executive compensation plan 
for the top management team.  In the third paper, I break this down further and, like Maas (2018), 
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consider whether the metrics are ‘hard’ or ‘soft’ but also what category the metric falls into.  To 
define ‘hard’ metrics I employ two definitions.  In the first, I include only those metrics where 
there is an explicit, quantitative goal in the incentive plan (e.g. 10% of the bonus is allocated to 
achieving a safety goal of less than 1 accident per 1000).  I refer to this as the restrictive ‘hard’ 
definition.  Over the course of reviewing the proxy statements for the CSR performance-based 
incentives, I noticed that there were many gradients of use.  Consequently, I use a second, more 
general definition of hard since a number of firms have what I deem to be ‘modifiers’ to the short-
term incentive plan.  For example, the main breakdown of the bonus may have been financial but 
a modifier of 10% may be added for achieving specific social and/or environmental goals.  In these 
cases, achievement of 100% of the financial goals and of the ‘modifier’ social and/or 
environmental goals, would result in a bonus of 110%.  Additionally, in the third paper, I use 
dummy variables to code whether the metric is only social in nature (e.g. diversity, safety), only 
environmental in nature (e.g. water use, greenhouse gas emission reduction) or a combination of 
both social and environmental metrics.    
 
1.2.  Value 
Firms are being increasingly called upon to address their role in climate change, growing 
inequality, and how they contribute positively to society.  The climate crisis, and its effect on 
society and the environment, is growing every day.  CPA Canada advises that it will affect all 
aspects of the firm and should not be ignored by boards of directors (Keyes & Willis, 2017).  Mark 
Carney, former Governor of the Bank of Canada, warns that various assets are at risk of becoming 
worthless as the impact of the climate crisis is felt (Thomson Reuters, 2019).  The SEC continues 
to move towards greater levels of regulation in this area requiring increasing disclosures for firms 
(SEC, 2016) while shareholders continue to move funds into Sustainable Responsible Investing 
(SRI) assets at record rates (The Forum for Sustainable and Responsible Investment, 2017).  
Shareholders continue to engage in proxy fights with social and environmental issues at the 
forefront (The Conference Board, 2014).     
Corporate governance is a critical area of current research.  While even the definition of 
corporate governance is hotly contested (Brickley & Zimmerman, 2010), a broad definition comes 
from The Cadbury Report (1992) which describes it as “the system by which companies are 
directed and controlled” (p. 15).  As such, societal demands for change must, arguably, be 
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implemented through the corporate governance system of the firm.  Here, I examine one key tool 
of the corporate governance system: executive compensation.  Additionally, I explore how other 
aspects of the corporate governance system interact with executive compensation, namely 
heterogenous shareholders and the board of directors, including its sub-committees.  Executive 
compensation itself is an area that continues to be of interest to society in light of growing 
inequality and the fast rise of executive compensation in comparison to the pay of the general 
public.  Initiatives like ‘Say on Pay’ have been put in place to help shareholders have a stronger 
voice on the compensation plans of management, but more work is left to be done.   
With so many important issues arising that affect the well-being of society, and business 
playing such a potentially large role in these issues, studying the who, what, when, where, why 
and how firms engage with these issues is critical.  A large number of firms are now providing 
CSR performance-based incentives and it is important for us as a society to understand if such 
incentives are effective, how they are being put in place within a firm, their effects, and who is 
playing a role in their use.  Optimistically, if implemented appropriately, CSR performance-based 
incentives can help firms to address their role in climate change and deal with key social and 
environmental issues and impacts caused by the firm.  Pessimistically, these incentives may be 
completely ineffective and just another exercise in greenwashing.  This dissertation attempts to 
understand who is influencing the use of CSR performance-based incentives and how they are 
coming to be in managerial incentive plans.  This contributes to the base of knowledge on such 
incentives so that, in the future, we can be more clear on the role these incentives may (or may 
not) play in dealing with these issues of great societal concern.  Given the dearth of research in 
this area, this dissertation provides significant value by greatly expanding our knowledge of CSR 
performance-based incentives.   
 
1.3.  Research Aims and Objectives  
This dissertation aims to further our understanding, in particular the determinants, of the 
use of CSR performance-based objectives.  To this end, I pursue three broad research questions:  
1. Who is influencing the use of CSR performance-based incentives? 
2. Are top management teams influencing the use of CSR performance-based incentives as a 
way to obtain excess compensation? 
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3. Does knowledge transfer from the board of directors affect a firm’s use of CSR 
performance-based incentives? 
The first question is examined in the essay entitled ‘Succumbing to the Pressure?  An 
Investigation of the Influence of Stakeholder Power on CSR Performance-Based Incentives Use’.  
Here, I use stakeholder power and efficient contracting theories to understand the question at hand.  
Stakeholder power posits that various stakeholders, such as peers, short-term view institutional 
shareholders or long-term view institutional shareholders, will influence the use of CSR 
performance-based incentives.  Efficient contracting postulates that the executive contracts are 
efficient and, consequently, there should be no effect by various stakeholders on the use of CSR 
performance-based incentives in the executive compensation contract.  The sample contains firms 
in the S&P 500 for the year 2014.  I hand collect the data from the 2015 proxy statements that 
detail the use of CSR performance-based incentives in the short-term incentive plan for the 2014 
year.  I use logistic regression with the presence or absence of the CSR performance-based 
incentives as a dummy variable (CSR_INC).  To provide further texture to the results, I interview 
six key directors and executives with knowledge of such incentives.    
The second question is examined in the essay entitled ‘Who Is More Powerful: The Board 
Or Management? Exploring The Relationship Between CSR Performance-Based Incentives And 
Executive Compensation’.  Here, I use managerial hegemony/organized hypocrisy and efficient 
contracting theories to understand the question at hand.  Managerial hegemony suggests that top 
management teams use their power to influence the executive compensation contract in order to 
obtain extra benefits for themselves.  This is consistent with organized hypocrisy which outlines 
that top management teams may undertake initiatives that appear on the surface to ‘be good’ while 
at the same time acting in a hypocritical manner.  Here, this is represented by the use of CSR 
performance-based incentives which, on the surface, appear to address the social and/or 
environmental impacts of the firm however, if top management teams are obtaining excess 
compensation, this can be seen as hypocritical.  Efficient contracting, as in the first essay, 
postulates that the compensation contracts are efficient and therefore no excess compensation 
should be obtained by the use of CSR performance-based incentives.  As with the first essay, this 
work relies on the same sample of firms from the S&P 500 for the year 2014.  The hand collected 
data from the 2015 proxy statements details the use of CSR performance-based incentives in the 
short-term incentive plan for the 2014 year.  I use linear regression with excess compensation as 
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the dependent variable (EXCESS_COMP).  Excess compensation is determined by splitting firms 
into their Fama-French industry categories (12), then splitting by quintile and determining the 
median bonus in each industry/quintile category.  The difference from the median by firm becomes 
the excess compensation when it is above the median.    
The third, and final question, is examined in the essay entitled ‘The Board of Directors and 
CSR Performance-based Incentives: What’s the ‘Link’?’  Here, I use an information asymmetry 
reduction and organized hypocrisy approach to understand the question at hand.  The information 
asymmetry reduction approach follows recent work that suggests that directors share knowledge 
across committees and through experience.  This suggests that directors sitting on board 
committees such as the CSR committee and executive compensation committee, or those with 
experience in environmentally sensitive industries, may bring this knowledge together to influence 
the use of CSR performance-based incentives in those firms.  Contrasting this perspective is 
organized hypocrisy which suggests that directors, and the associated CSR committees, may 
simply be for show.  In this case, knowledge transfer should have no effect on the use of CSR 
performance-based incentives.  As with the first two essays, this work relies on the same sample 
of firms from the S&P 500 for the year 2014.  Here however, I break down the hand collected CSR 
performance-based incentives data further into sub-categories.  Specifically, I use dummy 
variables to code the incentives used as hard or soft (quantitative and specific or qualitative and 
vague) and whether the firm uses only social performance-based incentives, only environmental 
performance-based incentives or both.  I use logistic regression with the presence or absence of 
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Many leading firms now use Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) performance-based 
incentives, i.e., bonuses tied to social and environmental metrics, in their executive compensation 
contracts. Such a practice reflects a relatively recent trend.  Broadly speaking, CSR refers to 
various voluntary initiatives targeting a firm’s different stakeholders. However, despite their 
increasing use, there is scant knowledge about CSR performance-based incentives and their 
determinants. In this study, we investigate why firms are utilizing these incentives; we hypothesize 
that firms respond to stakeholders’ pressures.  Toward that end, we rely on a conceptual framework 
that implies a causal relationship between corporate governance and CSR performance.  We hand 
collect incentive information from the Compensation, Discussion and Analysis (CD&A) sections 
in the proxy statements for firms in the S&P 500 Index.  We then examine how short-term and 
long-term view institutional shareholders as well as industry competitors affect the use of CSR 
performance-based incentives by a given firm.  Results are consistent with imitation in that firms 
feel pressure to copy their peers in adopting CSR performance-based incentives.  Conversely, those 
firms with higher levels of short-term view institutional shareholders feel pressure not to integrate 
CSR performance-based metrics into executive compensation contracts. Interviews with board 
members and executives provide further context to these findings.  To the best of our knowledge, 
this is the first paper to illustrate how stakeholder power affects the use (or not) of CSR 
performance-based incentives, thus contributing to both the executive compensation and CSR 
literatures.  
 
Keywords: Corporate social responsibility; executive compensation; annual incentive plan; 
corporate governance; stakeholders; institutional investors; shareholders. 
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1. Introduction  
 
Since the 1990’s, there is a trend toward the use of non-financial performance metrics in 
corporate executive compensation packages (inter alia Ittner et al., 1997). The rationale underlying 
the use of such metrics is their capability to serve as advanced or leading indicators of a firm’s 
future financial performance. Therefore, their integration into executive compensation contracts 
steers management’s attention toward areas and actions that will ultimately translate into enhanced 
shareholder value (Kaplan, 2009). What appears to be changing as of late is the rise of Corporate 
Social Responsibility (CSR) performance-based metrics in executive compensation contracts (here 
forth CSR performance-based incentives) by which firms indicate an explicit, causal relationship 
with CSR performance.    
Findings vary about how common CSR performance-based incentives are, with ranges 
suggesting that between 24% and 43% of firms link executive compensation to CSR performance 
(Ceres, 2018; IRRC & Sustainable Investments Institute, 2013).  In fact, of the 100 large 
sustainable firms ranked by Corporate Knights, 87% have some type of executive compensation 
based on CSR performance (Corporate Knights, 2016).  Thus, it appears, at least anecdotally, that 
the rate of use of CSR performance-based incentives is increasing over time.    
In that context, we focus on two research questions 1) why firms are utilizing CSR 
performance-based metrics in their executives’ incentive plans? and, 2) who is influencing this 
process? We hypothesize that various stakeholders exert their power to influence the outcome of 
the contracting process; this is done in an attempt to influence the firm with their own objectives 
in mind. Such an outcome is inconsistent with the efficient contracting perspective which 
dominates executive compensation theory and practice. As Murphy (2012) notes, an efficient 
contract is one that reflects market equilibrium for compensation and optimizes firm value.  
Evidence of inefficiency will be apparent if power is used to alter the contract to one or more 
stakeholder’s benefit.  It is possible that institutional shareholders are exerting power to influence 
the time horizon of management to their own self-interest: long-term institutional shareholders 
will prefer long-term time horizons while short-term institutional shareholders will prefer short-
term time horizons. Power is anticipated to be exerted through relative voting rights in these cases. 
CSR performance-based incentives serve as a motivator to focus management on longer term 
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issues.  Additionally, pressure from a firm’s peers may push them to adopt such incentives where 
many in their industry are doing so. 
The sample comprises S&P 500 firms (487 distinct firms).  The CSR performance-based 
incentives information is hand collected for the performance year 2014 from the Compensation 
Discussion & Analysis (CD&A) section of the 2015 proxy statements.  This is combined with data 
from the Bloomberg, Execucomp, FactSet, BoardEx and Compustat databases to gather 
appropriate firm, ownership and board feature information.  Additionally, interviews with key 
corporate and investor actors provide further texture to some of the findings.   
Results suggest that short-term view institutional investors pressure boards not to use CSR 
performance-based incentives.  Furthermore, the use of such incentives is significantly driven by 
imitation.  This finding adds to the growing evidence that the efficient contracting perspective on 
its own is not sufficient to understand the executive compensation setting process. Interviews 
provide some additional background in documenting that investors’ horizon preferences, as well 
as peer pressures, influence the use of CSR performance-based incentives. 
We contribute to the executive compensation and CSR literatures by examining why firms 
use CSR performance-based incentives and by exploring the underlying corporate governance 
mechanisms at work.  To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to examine the 
stakeholders’ influence on directors’ decision to use CSR performance-based incentives in 
executive compensation contracts.  This novel theoretical extension of efficient contracting 
suggests that stakeholder power influences boards’ selection of performance metrics for executive 
compensation contracts, thus moderating the executive compensation setting process.  
Specifically, we extend the recent work by Flammer, Hong & Minor (2019) who explore the use 
of CSR performance-based incentives as a way to align shareholders’ preferences with that of 
management; we do this by considering the influence of how non-homogenous shareholders and 
peer stakeholders influence the compensation setting process with regard to these incentives.  
Additionally, this work extends the research of Maas (2018), Grabner, Renders & Yang (2016), 
Hong, Li & Minor (2015) & Abdelmotaal & Abdel-Kader (2016) who have all examined some of 
the determinants of the use of such incentives.  Second, we extend the corporate governance 
literature into the determination of an emerging set of CSR-based metrics in executive incentive 
plans, particularly in the bonus plan (Guay et al., 2017).  Practically, our research provides 
evidence that could have policy implications for regulators looking to better regulate the use of 
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CSR performance-based incentives, as well as for shareholders and other stakeholders looking for 
a better understanding of why such incentives are being used and who is influencing the process. 
2. Board Governance Under Pressure   
 
A firm’s legal context affects the responsibilities that are assigned to its board of directors. 
Recent court rulings have reaffirmed that shareholder primacy and maximizing shareholder value 
need not be the sole driving factor supporting the guidance and oversight of the board of directors.  
For instance, the Supreme Court of Canada (2008) reiterated that the board of directors owes its 
duty to the corporation itself and this requires consideration of stakeholders beyond shareholders. 
In the U.S., a majority of states have also enshrined constituency statutes or director’s duties laws 
(Karpoff and Whittry, 2015) which direct the board to consider all of a firm’s stakeholders and not 
just shareholders.  Consequently, boards of directors find themselves navigating through demands 
from a variety of stakeholders.  From global warming to executive compensation scrutiny, 
directors must determine how to handle a range of stakeholders in a dynamic environment.   
 
2.1.  The climate crisis 
The climate crisis is a key risk for firms today; changes to firm strategy, operations and 
corporate governance are anticipated as a direct result.  CPA Canada advises boards of directors 
that “climate change is a pressing global issue affecting all companies, public and private, with 
wide-ranging implications for shareholder value, strategy, risk management and financial 
performance” (Keyes & Willis, 2017).  The scientific community has reached consensus: human 
activity is causing climate change, and this is a major concern for business (World Economic 
Forum, 2018). Recently, the Canadian government announced a pan-Canadian framework 
including a minimum price on carbon (Tasker, 2016).  In an end-of-year interview, Mark Carney, 
who is to step down as Governor of the Bank of England to become the United Nations envoy on 
climate change, argued that the assets of several financial institutions may become worthless in 
the medium-term future as some of their clients see their business impacted by the climate crisis 
(Thomson Reuters, 2019). Such expected consequences contribute to make the social and 
environmental implications of global warming a major issue for boards of directors. 
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Many firms had already been pricing carbon in their investment evaluations anticipating 
such a move, including Royal Dutch Shell, which advised it would conduct more active screening 
of investments to reduce its carbon footprint. To facilitate this, the firm is incorporating GHG 
emission reduction goals in its executive compensation contracts (Appendix 1) (Royal Dutch Shell, 
2016).  Its bonus plan allocates 20% of the metric weighting to sustainable development goals for 
2016 including rewards for achieving safety objectives (social), as well as minimizing 
environmental spills and reducing energy and water usage (environmental).  The bonus is 
significant, representing 29% of the CEO’s total compensation for 2016.  To understand how such 
metrics came to be in the executive compensation contract, it is critical to explore the environment 
the board finds itself in today. 
 
2.2.   Increasing regulatory pressure 
The SEC continues to press firms on global warming by requiring disclosure on climate 
change risks particularly as evidence suggests that analysts rely on this information (Cormier and 
Magnan, 2015).  For instance, in February 2010, the SEC released its guidance on the disclosure 
of climate change information (SEC, 2010).  It stated that firms must disclose material information 
related to the costs of complying with environmental laws, the risks a firm faces in relation to 
climate change or how changes in GHG regulation may affect the firm.  This guidance has resulted 
in a more than doubling of climate change disclosures by companies although there has been a 
slight drop in the last couple of years (Harrast & Olsen, 2016).  In April 2016, the SEC began 
seeking input to modernize its disclosure requirements (SEC, 2016).  It remains to be seen what, 
if any, changes will be made to the disclosures provided by firms, but climate change and the 
associated risks remain on the forefront of many investors’ minds as well as the SEC.  In Canada, 
the Canadian Securities Administrators recently reinforced and extended its guidance on 
environmental reporting to encompass climate change disclosures, highlighting the responsibilities 
of the board of directors and management in this regard (CSA, 2019). 
 
2.3.   Dynamic competitive landscape 
From advancements in artificial intelligence to disruptive new business models like UBER, 
no business is immune from sudden, dramatic change. This necessitates close monitoring of 
competitors’ activities (Birshan, Gibbs, & Strovink, 2014).  Corporations monitor their 
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competitors’ developments and change their own behaviour accordingly.  For example, Durnev 
and Mangen (2009) find that firms change their investment decisions based on their competitors’ 
restatements. This indicates that information published by firms has a tangible effect on 
competitors’ own actions. Boards need to be aware of the latest changes in their industries, 
including how firms are responding to social and environmental issues, and respond accordingly. 
 
2.4.   The changing shareholder 
It is estimated that institutional investors own upwards of ⅔ of the outstanding shares of 
U.S. listed firms (Vollmer, 2011). This affects who the board engages with on various governance 
and strategy issues.  Institutional shareholders have the means and expertise to push firms for 
specific changes in corporate governance, reducing the traditional power held by boards.  At the 
same time, investors are increasingly looking for investment options that reflect their values and 
Sustainable Responsible Investing (SRI)1 has grown dramatically in response.  It is estimated that 
$8.72 trillion, or 21.6% of all assets under management in the U.S., are invested in SRI assets (The 
Forum for Sustainable and Responsible Investment, 2017). Well aware of these trends, Laurence 
Fink, founder and Chairman of BlackRock, the world’s largest investment company, recently 
issued a letter to CEOs calling on them to address climate change and to become more sustainable 
(Fink, 2018).  Organizations need to address issues of interest to these institutional shareholders 
or risk suffering the consequences. Firms that do not will find themselves penalized: Griffin, Lont 
and Sun (2017) report evidence that investors incorporate GHG emission information into their 
valuation, imposing an equity discount on firms of roughly $79 per ton.   
McCahery, Sautner and Starks (2016) find that 63% of institutional investors engage 
directly with management about their issues while 45% engage with the board of directors without 
management present. Where private negotiations fail, public proxy fights emerge alongside the 
rise of shareholder activism.  According to The Conference Board: “proposals on social and 
environmental policy issues…represented the single most frequent subject of resolutions filed in 
the S&P 500 (249 proposals or 43 percent…) and constituted more than one-third of the total 
submitted at Russell 3000 companies (288 proposals, or 38.3 percent)” (2014, p. 5). For example, 
in 2015, the New York State Common Retirement Fund submitted a shareholder proposal to 
 
1 Schueth (2003) defines SRI as “the process of integrating personal values and societal concerns into investment decision-
making” (p. 190).   
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ExxonMobil requesting additional climate change information (DiNapoli, 2017).  ExxonMobil 
sought to omit the proposal, but the SEC rejected this request and the proposal eventually found 
support from 62.3% of shareholders in 2017.  ExxonMobil agreed to comply.   
Concurrently, there is also increasing attention being paid to executive compensation.  
From Say on Pay to pay equity and inequality, stakeholders are speaking up against what they see 
as ‘inefficient’, or unfair executive compensation contracts. For instance, Mylan’s shareholders 
voted against the firm’s executive compensation plan, and a number of its institutional 
shareholders advised their clients to vote against the re-election of directors (Nocera, 2017). 
Stakeholder values are changing, demanding greater justification of pay packages provided by the 
board and they are willing to act when their voices are not heard.   
Two areas where the board of directors can address these issues are within CSR initiatives 
and executive compensation.  Consequently, CSR performance-based incentives in the executive 
compensation contract may be the result of the convergence of these numerous pressures felt by 
the board. By integrating CSR performance-based metrics into executive compensation contracts, 
boards may be simultaneously addressing stakeholder’s CSR demands or succumbing to 
competitive pressures while also providing a palatable justification for the level of executive 
compensation provided.  
3. Literature Review: CSR Performance-Based Incentives and Executive Compensation 
 
3.1.   Performance metrics and executive compensation 
The design of most executive compensation contracts comprises the same basic elements: 
base salary, annual incentive plan (usually paid in cash), a long-term incentive plan (usually paid 
in options, stock or stock equivalents), a pension plan (either defined benefit or defined 
contribution) and other benefits and perquisites.  A key component of the annual incentive plan is 
the design of incentive targets to be achieved by management on an annual basis.  While much of 
the literature is dedicated to exploring the use of equity incentives in executive compensation, the 
incentive provided by executive bonus plans is not to be ignored.  Murphy (2012) notes that for an 
incentive to be effective, an individual must be able to reasonably connect their actions with the 
outcome that will provide the payoff; combine this with the immediacy of the cash payment of the 
annual incentive plan and you have the potential for a very strong behavioural motivator.  Edmans, 
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Gabaix and Jenter (2017) note that bonus plans have historically been dominated by financial 
metrics such as earnings per share or sales.  Focusing on financial performance measures has 
traditionally made sense given the attempts to align management behaviour with the perceived 
primary stakeholder: shareholders.  However, De Angelis and Grinstein (2015) examine the S&P 
500 for the year 2007 and find that almost 40% of firms offer some form of non-financial 
performance-based measure; these cash performance awards are typically twice the size of salary 
and typically use between two and four different metrics.  
While De Angelis and Grinstein’s work explores performance measures more generally in 
the compensation contract, our focus is the renewed attention to executive bonus plans.  While 
there is a long-line of literature examining the use of equity-based compensation within the 
executive compensation literature, interest in bonus plans has been lacklustre (Core et al., 2003).  
Guay, Kepler and Tsui (2017) re-investigate the use of bonus plans, given that much of the 
previous research dismisses it as somewhat irrelevant, and set out to ascertain why boards still 
grant cash bonuses if they serve no purpose.  The authors find that bonus plans serve an executive’s 
liquidity needs and are an important incentive particularly early in their career. However, the 
authors focus only on earnings-based metrics for their study (ibid).        
 
3.2.   CSR performance-based incentives in executive compensation  
Given the noted pressure boards face, it is perhaps not surprising that they have responded 
by incorporating CSR performance-based incentives in the executive compensation contract.  To 
date however, our knowledge of these incentives is limited.  While there is a line of literature that 
examines the use of non-financial metrics in executive compensation contracts (inter alia Ittner et 
al., 1997), these metrics are typically examined in relation to financial performance.  By providing 
executive compensation incentives with a specific tie to CSR performance, it appears that firms 
are aligning these metrics to a perceived definition of sustainability; typically this definition 
includes financial, social and environmental metrics (Elkington, 1997).   
Kolk and Perego describe sustainable bonuses as “the practice of linking (components of) 
compensation packages and incentive plans to non-financial dimensions of sustainability 
performance” (2014, p. 2).  This may be an evolution of the non-financial metrics that grew in part 
from the creation of the Balanced Scorecard, serving as a way to include causal factors into the 
incentive plans of management.  One of the key differences between the two categories of metrics, 
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strictly non-financial metrics and those relating to CSR performance, may be the consideration of 
broader stakeholder concerns.     
Maas & Rosendaal (2016) provide descriptive evidence of current international CSR 
performance-based incentives plans. They find that most of the targets relate to the social aspect 
of CSR, are short-term (less than 1-year) and are related to the energy and utility industries (ibid).  
Using a case study of four firms, Kolk & Perego (2014) examine the verifiability and 
controllability of CSR performance-based incentives plans as well as how the targets are 
categorized from short-term to long-term. They find that it is too early to tell if these incentives 
are a form of window-dressing or real initiatives to improve CSR performance (ibid).   
The literature on CSR performance-based incentives is beginning to investigate some of 
the reasons why a firm may use CSR performance-based incentives and what the determinants of 
these incentives are.  A handful of papers explore this, reasoning that: 1) firms put CSR 
performance-based incentives in place in response to previous poor CSR performance, 2) firms 
are using CSR performance-based incentives as a way to mitigate agency conflict between 
managers and shareholders, 3) CSR performance-based incentives are used as a complementary 
disclosure mechanism geared towards shareholders and 4) firms use CSR performance-based 
incentives to improve financial performance.  
Maas (2018) reasons that firms offer CSR performance-based incentives to compensate for 
previous poor sustainability performance.  However, she finds that this is not the case.  In fact, 
firms with either good or poor previous CSR performance use CSR performance-based incentives, 
effectively ruling this out as one of the reasons why firms adopt such initiatives. Flammer, Hong 
& Minor (2019) propose another reason, i.e., that shareholders’ preferences differ from 
management’s preferences when it comes to which stakeholders to focus on.  As such, the authors 
argue, this leads to an agency conflict between the managers and the shareholders as managers 
find it in their own best interest to focus on a different set of stakeholders.  As a result, CSR 
performance-based incentives are used to align the preferences of the shareholders with that of 
management.  The authors find that the adoption of such incentives reduces short-termism by 
managers and increases firm value supporting their hypothesis; they also find evidence that the 
adoption of these incentives improves CSR performance, reduces emissions and increases green 
innovations.  
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Grabner, Renders & Yang (2016) find that CSR performance-based incentives and CSR 
disclosure are complementary initiatives that serve as a communication mechanism to provide 
information to stakeholders.  They find that those firms with greater CSR disclosure are more 
likely to provide CSR performance-based incentives. Furthermore, Hong, Li & Minor (2015) find 
that firms contract with executives using CSR performance-based incentives to increase financial 
performance. Hong et al. (2015) also find that firms with short tenure directors, more block-holder 
owners and positive existing CSR performance are more likely to provide CSR performance-based 
incentives in executive compensation contracts.  In addition, research finds that the adoption of 
CSR performance-based incentives is associated with firm size, compensation committee 
independence, the presence of a sustainability committee, resource efficiency policies, presence 
on a sustainability index and a positive effect on shareholder returns (Abdelmotaal & Abdel-Kader, 
2016).   
4. Theory and Hypotheses Development 
 
4.1.   Perspectives on executive compensation determination 
There are two dominant theoretical approaches used in the executive compensation 
literature: the managerial power approach and the efficient contracting approach (Frydman and 
Jenter, 2010; Murphy, 2012).  On the one hand, it has been argued that board members are captured 
by CEOs looking to enhance their own pay: the managerial power approach.  On the other hand, 
efficient contracting argues that market forces dominate, and that executive compensation is 
designed to maximize firm value (ibid).  The literature highlights that the competing nature of the 
research using these two theories has not been productive, as neither one on its own appears 
sufficient to explain executive compensation.  Other political factors and influences are effectively 
ignored by both camps (ibid).   
Optimal or efficient contracting implies that “the observed level and composition of 
compensation reflects a competitive equilibrium in the market for managerial talent, and that 
incentives are structured to optimize firm value” (Murphy, 2012, p. 1).  This perspective is often 
adopted by financial economists as noted by Bebchuk and Fried (2006) and assumes an arms-
length approach by the board in setting the executive compensation contract for management on 
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behalf of shareholders.  This agency theory derived perspective remains popular and is widely 
applied in executive compensation research.  In this regard, Core, Guay and Larcker (2003) state:  
“we follow a traditional agency-theory framework and define an efficient contract as one 
that maximizes the net expected economic value to shareholders after transaction costs 
(such as contracting costs) and payments to employees.  An equivalent way of saying this 
is that we assume that contracts minimize agency costs” (p. 27).   
Although this perspective is widely utilized, it is not completely understood; Eisenhardt 
(1989) outlines that the principal-agent stream of research within agency theory assumes that 
“principals and agents will choose the most efficient contract, although efficiency is not directly 
tested” (p. 69). 
This idea is picked up by Martin & Magnan (2017) who discuss the lack of rigorous 
definition of ‘efficient’.  They highlight that executive compensation levels have not risen in a 
corresponding manner to GDP.  In fact, top executives have been able to obtain a greater share of 
corporate earnings without clear evidence that this has created additional value.  Thus, the 
argument of pay for performance does not appear to hold.  This is the crux of one of the key 
opponents to the efficient contracting perspective: the managerial power/hegemony arguments put 
forth by Bebchuk and Fried (2006).  This weakens the assumption that contracts are in fact efficient 
and tied directly to firm value and value creation.   
Sur, Magnan and Cordeiro (2015) attempt to understand some of these multiple levels of 
influence on the executive compensation process.  In their paper, the authors conduct a multi-level 
analysis that includes agency, managerial hegemony and institutional pressures. By considering 
that firms benchmark compensation practices to peers, the authors include this new 
institutionalization perspective finding it does indeed affect executive compensation. This finding 
helps to explain why certain executive compensation practices spread even despite a lack of 
evidence of effectiveness or specific firm-relevance (ibid).  By following their peers, firms 
succumb to institutional pressures to increase pay levels and follow the ‘latest’ compensation 
trends. 
    
4.2.   Efficient contracting…modified 
Efficient contracting, it is argued, is desired by all stakeholders as it should maximize the 
value to all parties.  Since value creation for all parties is hard to assess, the focus is typically put 
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on shareholder value creation, the explicit assumption being that value maximization for 
shareholders is ultimately consistent with value maximization for all stakeholders.  However, since 
shareholders may have different interests and time horizons, and considering it is difficult for 
shareholders to engage in collective decision-making, the effective governance of the firm is 
delegated to the board of directors. The board’s key tasks are to monitor and advise management 
so that the latter makes decisions that translate into long-term value creation (e.g., Brickley and 
Zimmerman, 2010).  In that context, a key corporate governance tool utilized by the board of 
directors to align management's interests with those of shareholders, and steer them to take 
appropriate actions, is executive compensation.   
  We propose that the compensation contracts are not ‘efficient’ but rather reflect the relative 
power held by stakeholders. As Martin and Magnan (2017) highlight, the literature lacks rigorous 
definition around what ‘efficiency’ is.  If it is maximizing shareholder returns, there is a question 
of when shareholder returns are maximized and over what period this should be.  Efficiency is an 
assumption that does not consider modern knowledge of human behaviour.  Bebchuk and Fried 
(2006) question the assumption of arms-length contracting, and Ariely’s work in behavioural 
economics (e.g. Ariely, 2010) suggests that we are all subject to influence in our decision-making. 
We propose that the board tries to achieve a contract that will serve the stakeholders it feels 
pressure from, and the resulting contract is a result of the proportionate pressure from those 
stakeholders. We postulate this happens in at least two ways: first, the shareholders remain a 
powerful force influencing the board but, even shareholders are not a homogenous group and have 
differing opinions on what the firm should be doing.  Combining these opinions with the power of 
share ownership leads the board to feel it owes some duty to those shareholders with larger 
positions in the company.  Second, boards dealing with high levels of uncertainty in how to proceed 
with CSR initiatives will mimic what other firms in their industries are doing; this is the process 
of mimetic isomorphism2 (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).  If the contract was efficient, it wouldn’t 
matter whether a shareholder has a short-term view or a long-term view or what competitors are 
doing; no differences should exist in the compensation contracts based on stakeholder power.  
Alternate theories do exist that could be used here for example legitimacy theory (e.g. Patten, 
2019); as such this could be examined from a different perspective.  We choose a power 
perspective here to explore these particular multi-stakeholder power dynamics.  Firms with short-
 
2 Because we examine a one-year sample, we consider imitation in this setting. 
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term view institutional shareholders should use CSR performance-based incentives at similar rates 
as those with long-term view institutional shareholders.  The composition of shareholders should 
not have an effect if contracts are truly ‘efficient’ as the different assemblages of shareholders 
should not affect firm value or how a board constructs an executive compensation contract. We 
argue that the executive compensation process is not ‘efficient’ because it is affected by these 
factors, such as what competitors are doing and what shareholders want them to do. This influence 
changes the use of CSR performance-based incentives in a way that shouldn’t happen if contracts 
are actually efficient. 
Ultimately, if the contract is efficient, then having stakeholders with different motivations 
and power should not affect the use of CSR performance-based incentives.  As such, stakeholder 
power will not be a moderating factor, and the inclusion of CSR performance-based incentives can 
be interpreted as part of the efficient contracting process.  However, if there is variation in the 
usage of CSR performance-based incentives in relation to different levels of stakeholder power, 
then the inclusion of CSR performance-based incentives provides additional evidence that the 
executive compensation process is not efficient. 
In a bid to ensure that executive pay is ‘performance-based’, firms tie various aspects of 
the executive compensation contract to the achievement of different targets.  Typically, incentive 
targets are not released to the public until the year following the performance at which point in 
time it is communicated in the annual proxy statement with varying levels of detail.  Dahlmann, 
Branicki and Brammer (2017) do find that incentives matter when it comes to improving 
environmental performance.  It is key that incentives reflect a variety of metrics related to the goal 
at hand and be distributed throughout the organization (ibid).  What is less clear is why firms adopt 
such incentives in the first place.  It is possible that firms adopt such incentives to formalize less 
salient objectives.  Gabel and Sinclair-Desgagné (1993) argue that such incentives formalize less 
salient goals for management.  This implies that where such goals are part of the culture and 
organized business strategy, formal incentives may not be required.  And yet, Maas (2018) finds 
that firms with poor past corporate social performance are not more likely to use CSR 
performance-based incentives.  It is possible in these cases that the incentives are simply used to 
signal to the market what the objectives are irrespective of past performance in these areas.   
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4.3.   CSR performance-based incentives 
It remains an empirical question as to what drivers underlie the use of CSR performance-
based metrics in executive incentive contracts.  Rodrigue, Magnan and Boulianne (2013) find 
evidence of stakeholders influencing the selection of environmental performance indicators for 
internal use within a firm.  We propose that stakeholders are utilizing their power to influence the 
indicators selected in the executive compensation contract as well.  Perhaps if stakeholders feel 
that management should be devoting more emphasis to such social and environmental endeavours, 
they will exert their influence to formalize management’s focus in this direction.   
If the board’s main task is to ensure the long-term success of the business, it must, consider 
the firm’s ability to attract, retain, and utilize resources to compete and succeed in the marketplace.  
While it has been traditionally argued that shareholders only desire wealth maximization, we have 
also seen the rise in the last number of years, as previously noted, of sustainable responsible 
investing (SRI) by both individual and institutional investors: two key stakeholder groups for any 
publicly traded firm.  These investors in particular may be more interested in the long-term 
performance of the firm and its social and environmental impacts.   
Jo and Harjoto (2012) recently formalized this causal model finding corporate governance 
leads to corporate social performance as well as to financial performance.  Most importantly, 
corporate social performance leads to financial performance.  This model (Figure 1) is one we 
build on here. 
 
Figure 1: The causal relationship between corporate governance and performance.  Adapted 




Given that the board of directors has the ultimate responsibility for executive compensation 
as a key influencer of management behaviour, we propose that the use of CSR performance-based 
incentives in executive compensation contracts is an attempt by the board to make the contracts 
efficient subject to the influence of stakeholder power (Figure 2).  Here we outline a model 
whereby the motivations of three stakeholders are examined: those with long-term time horizons 
(pension funds), those with shorter-term time horizons (hedge funds), and peer institutions.  We 
explore how they exert their influence on the use of CSR performance-based incentives.  We posit 
that the long-term owners will be more likely to desire the use of CSR performance-based 
incentives as, under the Jo and Harjoto (2012) model, they have the time horizon to realize the 
long-term financial rewards.  Short-term view institutional shareholders however will have less 
desire for the use of CSR performance-based incentives as their time horizon does not allow for 
the realization of the financial results that flow from better CSR performance.  At the same time, 
boards may feel pressure to follow similar practices by peer competitors through imitation (e.g. 
mimetic isomorphism, DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).  Given the dynamic challenges presented by 
the climate crisis and the pressures for firms to address and report on these issues, firms find 
themselves in uncertain times.  Monitoring the competition and making adjustments is standard 
practice (e.g. Durnev and Mangen, 2009) and copying lead firms may help to reduce such 
uncertainty or provide additional legitimacy by using CSR performance-based metrics in its 
executive compensation contracts. 
 




4.4.   A description of stakeholder power 
This research addresses why firms are utilizing CSR performance-based metrics in their 
executives’ incentive plans and, who is influencing this process.  To understand this, we explore 
how stakeholders affect various aspects of firm operations.  Spitzeck & Hansen (2010) apply a 
conceptual framework of power and scope to determine the effect different stakeholders have on 
firm decision-making.  Not surprisingly, the results vary between firms in terms of how much 
power and scope various stakeholders have on the decision-making process. Soleimani, Schneper 
& Newburry (2014) examine how differences in legal power granted to various stakeholders 
affects corporate reputation.  The authors argue moderating relationships exist between three 
stakeholder groups granted increased legal power (shareholders, creditors and employees) and 
corporate reputation, and find results to support their hypotheses.  Finally, Cobb (2016) develops 
a model based on how shareholders and executives are allocated varying levels of power by the 
corporate governance system of the firm and how this in turn affects resource allocation.  We can 
conclude from this line of research that stakeholders, including shareholders, have varying levels 
of power which can change over time.  This power has the potential to influence corporate 
governance practices and, of concern here, executive compensation practices, by moderating the 
efficient contracting process. 
We posit that stakeholder power moderates the use of CSR performance-based incentives in 
executive compensation contracts.  Prior literature finds that institutional owners vary in their time 
horizon orientations and motivations (Neubaum & Zahra, 2006; David, O’Brian, Yoshikawa & 
Delios, 2010; Connelly, Tihanyi, Certo, & Hitt, 2010); pension funds tend to have long-term 
orientations with lower turnover of share ownership while hedge funds, mutual funds or 
investment banks tend to have short-term orientations and higher turnover of share ownership.  
This causes differences in how these firms engage with management and boards at the firms where 
they are shareholders.  Utilizing Jo & Harjoto’s model (2012), that corporate governance has a 
causal relationship to corporate social responsibility performance and financial performance, we 
make the following propositions in line with this previous research: 
1. Institutional owners have differing time orientations in expectation of financial returns and 
this leads to different levels of support for CSR activities, 
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2. Long-term institutional owners who require formal incentives to promote long-term 
financial performance will be more likely to support the use of CSR performance-based 
incentives, 
3. The use of these CSR performance-based incentives will be contingent upon the long-term 
institutional owner having and exerting sufficient power to influence the executive 
compensation process. 
We propose that if stakeholder power plays a role in the efficient contracting process, this 
should be evident in the use of CSR performance-based incentives when certain stakeholders have 
power and the motivation for formal incentives.  We expect that where long-term oriented 
institutional investors hold power, and require formal incentives to promote long-term financial 
performance, we will see evidence of CSR performance-based incentives.  Additionally, we 
consider the fact that not all long-term institutional shareholders may be interested in CSR and 
more specifically consider those where CSR is formally monitored vis-à-vis a CSR committee.  
More formally, 
 
H1: CSR performance-based incentives are more likely to be used in firms where long-term 
oriented institutional investors have power and monitor CSR. 
 
Alternatively, short-term oriented institutional investors are less patient in waiting for financial 
returns.  This is due to their own desire for short-term financial results.  According to Jo & 
Harjoto’s (2012) model, the financial results will increase in response to positive CSR 
performance, however, this takes time.  In these situations, where short-term oriented institutional 
investors hold power, and require incentives to promote short-term financial performance, we 
expect to see less use of CSR performance-based incentives.  Again, we specifically consider those 
cases where CSR is formally monitored vis-à-vis a CSR committee as presumably this would make 
it more likely that CSR is important to the firm:    
 
H2: CSR performance-based incentives are less likely to be used in firms where short-term 
oriented institutional investors have power and monitor CSR. 
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There remains a third possibility, that the use of CSR performance-based incentives in this 
setting could be due to imitation.  Similar forces of mimetic isomorphism are strong and have been 
identified as a factor in the adoption of other CSR related initiatives (Amor-Esteban, Galindo-
Villardon and Garcia-Sanchez, 2018).  Such imitation is thought to be a response to uncertainty 
and given the dynamic, competitive environment and CSR-related pressures, it is possible that 
firms may succumb to the pressure of adopting similar compensation practices to their peer firms.  
Consequently, we expect: 
 
H3: CSR performance-based incentives will be more likely where peer competitors are using 
them, due to imitation. 
5. Method 
 
5.1.   Sample 
We examine S&P 500 firms.  We hand collected CSR performance-based incentive data 
from the CD&A section of the 2015 proxy statements to determine the use of such incentives for 
the previous year (2014); this results in a total sample of 505.  We use multiple methods to 
triangulate our results.  Specifically, we use ‘between-methods’ triangulation utilizing both 
quantitative and qualitative approaches (Smith, 2017). Hopper and Hoque (2006) indicate that data 
triangulation uses a variety of data sources within a study mixing both quantitative and qualitative 
methods.  This approach has the benefit of allowing the researcher to “take advantage of the strong 
points of each type of data, cross-check data collected by each method, and collect information 
that is only available through particular techniques” (ibid, p. 482).   
First, to test the hypotheses quantitatively, we use logistic logit regression analysis in SAS.  
To supplement this quantitative analysis, we conduct qualitative semi-structured interviews to gain 
insight into our findings and add depth to our understanding of the use of CSR performance-based 
incentives.  Each person interviewed is from a different firm, thus allowing a diversity of thought 





ID Role Date of Interview 
CSO Chief Sustainability Officer for large mining company 9/20/17 
VP Vice President for large energy management firm 7/3/2018 
ID Investment Director for major pension fund  7/5/2018 
BD Board Director for large pension fund 8/13/2018 
SD Senior Director for pension fund manager  8/22/2018 
HCG Head of Corporate Governance for large pension fund  9/26/2018 
 
5.2.   Empirical Model 
The following equation represents the empirical model used to assess the relationship 
between short-term view institutional shareholders, long-term view institutional shareholders, peer 
pressure and the use of CSR performance-based incentives: 
CSR_INC =  B0 + B1*LT_OWN + B2*ST_OWN + B3*FF_PEER_PRESSURE + 
B4*LT_OWN*CSR_COMM + B5*ST_OWN*CSR_COMM + B6*ESI + 
B7*LN_REV + B8*CSR_COMM + B9*ENV_SCORE_2014 + 
B10*SOC_SCORE_2014 + e 
 
5.3.   Variable Construction 
We hand collect the data regarding the use of CSR performance-based incentives from the 
Definitive Proxy Statement (DEF 14A) for all of the S&P 500 companies listed for the year 2015 
which details the previous year’s CSR performance-based incentives information.  We follow 
previous work to identify the incentives (inter alia Maas, 2018) but apply a stricter interpretation 
of what qualifies as a CSR performance-based incentive.  Specifically, we seek explicit evidence 
in the proxy statement that social and/or environmental criteria are considered in the determination 
of the annual incentive plan.  Then, we exclude those metrics that arguably can be non-financial 
metrics designed to solely improve financial performance (namely customer service scores & 
employee engagement). Following this, we collect the short-term, non-equity incentive 
compensation levels from Execucomp and a variety of CSR performance data for 2015 from 
Bloomberg.  We gather shareholder data from FactSet and, following previous studies, we use 
hedge fund shareholders to proxy for short-term view institutional shareholders and pension fund 
shareholders to proxy for long-term view institutional shareholders.  To proxy for when a firm 
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requires CSR monitoring, we use the presence or absence of a CSR committee at the board level 
which was identified with data from BoardEx. 
CSR performance-based incentives (CSR_INC) – If the use of CSR performance-based 
incentives is present, a dummy variable of 1 is used while 0 is used if no CSR performance-based 
incentives are present. 
Ownership (ST_OWN & LT_OWN) – We obtained ownership data from FactSet as the 
database gives the category of ownership and the % of shares owned.  FactSet provides ownership 
categories based on their analysis of who holds the funds; this data is collected by FactSet using 
publicly available information including both company websites as well as regulatory filings, in 
particular 13f filings to determine institutional ownership (FactSet, 2018).  We used the categories 
‘hedge fund ownership’ for our short-term institutional ownership proxy and ‘pension fund 
ownership’ was used as our proxy for long-term institutional ownership.  Power is deemed to be 
increasing as shareholder ownership increases.  To ensure accuracy, we randomly selected 10 firms 
to double check the shareholder identity and shares outstanding.  we obtained the 13f filing by 
each of those identified institutional shareholders listed as having the largest and/or smallest 
position in the firm and confirmed that the number of shares outstanding matched the figures found 
in FactSet.  We also independently confirmed that the identity of the institutional shareholder had 
been correctly assigned to the appropriate category (e.g. pension fund or hedge fund).   
Peer pressure (FF_Peer_Pressure) – We calculated peer pressure (imitation) as follows: 
first, we categorized each firm in the S&P 500 using the Fama-French 12 industry codes.  Next, 
we determined the number of firms using CSR performance-based incentives within each industry 
code and divided this by the total number of firms within that industry.  For firms that are already 
using the CSR performance-based incentives, they were subtracted from the number of users.  For 
example, 13 firms in the non-durable industry use CSR performance-based incentives out of 39 
firms in this industry.  Therefore, of all firms in this industry, 33.33% use CSR performance-based 
incentives.  If the firm does not use CSR performance-based incentives, the pressure remains at 
33.33% but if the firm uses the incentives, the subject firm is deducted leaving a figure of 30.77%.  
These percentages represent the pressure firms in the non-durable industry face to conform to their 
peers and use CSR performance-based incentives. 
Other variables – Presence in an environmentally sensitive industry (ESI) is represented 
by a dummy variable where 1 indicates presence in the ESI, the ESI was defined using 2-digit SIC 
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codes as follows: Forestry (SIC code 08), Mining (SIC codes 10, 12, 13 & 14), Paper & Allied 
Products (SIC code 26), Chemical and Allied Products (SIC code 28), Petroleum and Coal 
Products (SIC code 29), Primary and Fabricated Metal (SIC codes 33 & 34), Water Transportation 
(SIC code 44), Pipelines (SIC code 46) and Electric, Gas, & Sanitary Services (SIC code 49).  Size 
is proxied by log revenue (LN_REV).  Both SIC codes and Size are obtained from Compustat 
Capital IQ.  The presence of a CSR committee (CSR_COMM) is obtained from BoardEx.  The list 
of all committees was reviewed and classified as a CSR committee if it references “Health, Safety 
and the Environment”, “CSR” or “Corporate Social Responsibility”, or “Sustainability”.  The 
environmental and social scores (ENV_SCORE_2014 & SOC_SCORE_2014) are obtained from 
Bloomberg using their performance and disclosure score. 
6. Results 
 
6.1.   Sample and descriptive statistics 
Firms listed in the S&P 500:      505 
Less firms missing necessary proxy statement information  
and/or duplicates (e.g. two classes of shares listed):   (18) 
Final list of firms for whom CSR performance-based  
incentive information was gathered    487 
 
<Insert Table 1 about here> 
 
Table 1 provides descriptive data about the metrics found in the bonus plans for the firms 
in the S&P 500 for the year 2014.  The proportion of firms with CSR performance-based incentives 
is 32.85%.  This is slightly less than found by previous studies but expected given the stricter 
definition applied here. 
 
<Insert Tables 2 and 3 about here> 
 
Table 2 reports on the variables used in the model.  The mean level of LT_OWN is 
3.3673% while it is 5.4244% for ST_OWN.  The maximum position for LT_OWN is 10.3503% 
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of shares outstanding while for ST_OWN it is 49.3320%.  Firms show mean ENV_SCORE_2014 
and SOC_SCORE_2014 of 28.1036 and 28.0560 respectively.   
Table 3 examines the descriptive statistics by way a two-sample t-test of CSR performance-
based incentives use.  Two of the key variables, ST_OWN (dif. 1.1675, p-value 0.0181) and 
FF_Peer_Pressure (dif. -0.0238, p-value <0.0001) are significantly different between the two 
groups.  ESI (dif. -0.3499, p-value <0.0001) and CSR_COMM (dif. -0.1773, p-value <0.0001) are 
also significant with all remaining variables except LT_OWN showing significant differences 
between the two groups.  
    
<Insert Figure 3 about here> 
 
Figure 3 shows the use of CSR performance-based incentives by industry using the Fama-
French 12 industry categorization.  Unlike previous research, the current sample shows broad use 
of these incentives with all of the 12 industries showing CSR performance-based incentive use.  
Utilities, Oil, Gas, and Coal Extraction and Products as well as the Finance industry are the greatest 
users of these incentives. 
 
<Insert Table 4 about here> 
 
 Table 4 shows the correlations between the variables.  The results show a significant 
negative correlation between CSR_INC and ST_OWN (-0.09218, p-value < 0.05) but no 
correlation to LT_OWN.  Additionally, the table shows a significant positive correlation between 
the CSR_INC and FF_Peer_Pressure (0.23942, p-value < 0.01).  Presence in ESI, LN_REV, 
CSRM_COMM, ENV_SCORE_2014, SOC_SCORE_2014 all show significant positive 
correlations as well to CSR_INC.  No correlations exceed 0.8 minimizing concerns of 
multicollinearity. 
 
6.2.  Binary logistic regression and interview results 
The Hausman specification test (untabulated) indicates that a binary regression technique 
is sufficient for estimating the parameters of the equation.  As such, 2SLS is not used to estimate 
the parameters in this regard.  Logistic regression deletes observations where there are missing 
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values, consequently 141 observations were deleted leaving 346 for the analysis.  We first conduct 
an analysis using a basic model without considering any interactions with the CSR committee.   
Table 5 shows the model fit statistics which indicate a good fit for the model.  Specifically, 
the Likelihood ratio (84.22, p-value <0.0001) indicates that the model here fits significantly better 
than the null.  Additionally, the Hosmer and Lemeshow Goodness-of-Fit Test is non-significant 
(9.99, p-value 0.27) indicating that the model is a good fit.  
<Insert Table 5 about here> 
<Insert Tables 6 and 7 about here> 
 
Table 6 shows the results for the basic model logistic regression.  Neither LT_OWN nor 
ST_OWN are significant however FF_Peer_Pressure is significantly positive (10.17, p-value < 
0.00).  ESI is also significant and positive (1.33, p-value < 0.0001) as is LN_REV (0.37, p-value 
< 0.01).   Additionally, Table 7 shows that the model is robust.   
Next we consider how the monitoring of CSR vis-à-vis the CSR committee moderates this 
relationship.  Table 8 shows the model fit statistics for the interaction model which indicate a good 
fit for the model.  Specifically, the Likelihood ratio (88.22, p-value <0.0001) indicates that the 
model here fits significantly better than the null.  Additionally, the Hosmer and Lemeshow 
Goodness-of-Fit Test is non-significant (10.72, p-value 0.22) indicating that the model is a good 
fit.  
 
<Insert Table 8 about here> 
<Insert Tables 9 and 10 about here> 
 
Table 9 shows the results for the logistic regression.  H1 predicted 
LT_OWN*CSR_COMM would be significantly positive however there is no support for this 
hypothesis (0.27, p-value 0.54).  H2 predicted ST_OWN*CSR_COMM would be significantly 
negative and the results are significant and in the predicted direction (-0.14, p-value 0.05) 
indicating support for this hypothesis.  Finally, H3 predicted that FF_Peer_Pressure would be 
significant and positive, and the results are significant and positive as predicted (10.18, p-value 
<0.0001) supporting H3.  To put this in perspective, a 10% increase in peer pressure results in a 
2.32% increased use of CSR performance-based incentives.  Additionally, Table 10 shows that the 
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model is robust.   
To better understand what is going on, we turn to some of our interviews for insight.  The 
investment director for a large company responsible for multiple pension funds shares the 
following anecdote about a stake they held in a prominent transportation company: 
When they had the activist investor [prominent hedge fund], basically, … we had several 
attempts to have [the hedge fund] put health and safety in the compensation and they 
absolutely would not do it.  It wasn’t until [the hedge fund] pulled out of their position that 
we were able to then talk to some of the newer members of the board and say look, we’ve 
been pushing for this for several years. Now that the dynamics are a bit different maybe 
you could do so, and they did put it in… That was a very interesting example to me because 
it was quite immediate. As soon as [the hedge fund] was out of the picture the board 
actually followed through on our request to do that. – ID 
This anecdotally supports H1 and H2.  Long-term view institutional shareholders are pushing firms 
for a long-term focus from management but encounter short-termism from other shareholders.  
This dynamic is supported by another interviewee, the senior director, who indicates: 
“since not every investor is a long-term one or [has] the same long-term view like we do, 
they get pressure from short-term investors and hedge funds and those companies that care 
less about the long-term.” – SD 
“Sustainability issues are per se long-term, … as a long-term investor we really have a 
view of sustainability within the long-term” – SD 
Given the lack of quantitative support in the analyses for H1, this may suggest other factors 
are at play that have yet to be explored.  The interviews support the idea that long-term view 
institutional shareholders have different views than short-term view institutional shareholders and 
these are generating friction and pressure that boards must deal with.  These different stakeholders 
appear to be pressing boards to meet varying demands, and this affects the usage of CSR 
performance-based incentives.  It appears that institutional investors themselves are also feeling 
the pressure from their constituents:     
I would say [sustainability is] a priority for most of them, certainly our large pension 
clients. I mean, we do have over 30 clients but the big four or five would be the main ones 
that represent most of our clients and it is a priority for all of them… We get lots of 
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questions. They want to know our strategy, so they very much are paying attention and are 
trying to also be accountable to their stakeholders which would be their beneficiaries. – ID 
“I think when you are primarily serving pension fund clients it’s just kind of more natural 
to think: is this company going to be sustainable for the longer term?” – ID 
Lastly, for H3, we examine the FF_Peer_Pressure variable and it is significant showing 
that firms are significantly more likely to use CSR performance-based incentives when they face 
pressure from their peers: imitation.  The role of peer pressure also appears to have a channel 
through shareholders: 
“I think that you usually have leaders [in the industry] and we do a lot of research around 
the peers and what they are doing, and we do bring that up to the companies and they are 
sensitive to those arguments” - SD 
The pressure to examine the stakeholder environment and respond is one that firms appear to be 
well aware of: 
it’s really a combination of many different things, both internal and external… But at the 
same time, we’re being impacted by external events, external stakeholders.  We have 
incidents in our communities, we have grievances, we have external NGOs throwing stones 
at us, we have talent issues, we have government relations issues.  There are other external 
pressures that basically support the need for this [CSR performance-based incentives] to 
be put in place.  It’s a combination of a whole suite of things.  Investors ask us.  It’s not a 
single driver or a single factor that influences this, it’s a multitude of factors, as you would 
expect in any complex organisation, especially one that works around the world in difficult 
environments and whatnot. – CSO 
In terms of understanding both why firms are adopting CSR incentives and who is influencing the 
process, interviewees reiterated that stakeholders are increasingly holding firms more accountable 
and pressing for changes: 
I think institutional shareholders are finding that their constituents, their investor base is 
very interested in being socially responsible.  So, you get to some of the university 
endowment funds and you see some of them take dramatic action as to what they’ll invest 
in and not invest in.  The pension funds clearly find it important, and you and I investing 
in mutual funds want to invest in something that’s socially responsible, so I think it’s the 
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demand for more verification around ESG is coming from the shareholders or stakeholders. 
– BD 
a lot of mainstream institutional investors like Blackrock, Vanguard, State Street, etc., are 
now hiring their own analysts to cover ESG issues for them.  As part of their obligations 
under the principles for responsible investing, they probably are signatories to that and 
would then have obligations under those, their commitments to PRI.  We’re seeing more 
and more of that…  We have more calls with those types of investors, that traditionally we 
wouldn’t have those ESG investors or analysts and therefore they typically wouldn’t talk 
to us that much. But now they are.  My phone rings off the hook. - CSO 
Interviewees also suggest that stakeholders are actively engaging with both the board and 
management indicating multiple points of pressure on firm activities: 
So just taking the executive compensation aspects, where we did not support a company’s 
compensation plan, we would write them a letter explaining why we don’t do that or why 
we don’t support it. That would be a letter directly to the board and that would often be a 
conversation with the board. So, in terms of ongoing, kind of day to day conversations, it 
is more with management. We also do interact quite a bit at the board level. - ID 
A firm has many different tools they can use to address what stakeholders are looking for, 
but firms appear to be responding, in part, with the use of CSR performance-based incentives.  
Digging deeper with interviewees on why this might the tool of choice, the interviewees revealed 
the following: 
we are moving away from more of a pure CSR type of approach to an integrated, you know, 
these are the issues that drive our business and create shareholder value and therefore they 
belong in the compensation plan. They’re not just, kind of, a nice to have corporate 
philanthropy program. – ID 
I think it’s expectations of investors and also other stakeholders. I think it does illustrate to 
an outsider how seriously you take it. So, if all of your annual reports… are talking about 
how safety is the most important thing but yet it’s not reflected in the compensation, there’s 
a bit of a disconnect there. So, I think it does show credibility. If you’re talking about these 
things, saying they’re important to your business strategy, it kind of has to go in the 
compensation so there is that kind of accountability piece. – ID 
 34 
I look at [the use of CSR performance-based incentives] as changing behaviours of our 
leaders and driving change within the organisation.  It’s one of the most effective change 
management tools in our toolbox…  That’s fundamentally what drives what we’re doing 
here with these incentives.  I think the people involved are… looking for different levers 
to pull in order to make the change, and, as I said, that’s a very good one. – CSO 
we’re managing primarily assets for the pension fund clients that we have, and so therefore 
we take a longer-term view of a company’s performance, and we would certainly believe, 
and it is built into our investment beliefs, that companies that manage their ESG risk are 
going to perform better in the long run.  So, if you have an issue like health and safety, or 
environmental performance that would be key for you to really succeed in fulfilling your 
strategy as a company, then we feel that it’s appropriate to incentivize management to pay 
attention to those factors because… I guess it’s the old [adage] what gets measured gets 
managed and with it built into the incentive package that you know that…there’s some 
budget attached and that it’s going to actually get some attention internally rather than 
being talked about but nobody really being held accountable for it. - ID 
7. Robustness tests  
 
It is possible that peer pressure also moderates the shareholder relationship.  To test this, 
we re-run our regressions using an interaction term between FF_Peer_Pressure and each of 
ST_OWN and LT_OWN.  The results, shown in Table 11, do not indicate any significance for 
either interaction. 
 
<Insert Table 11 about here> 
 
Additionally, of the 160 firms who use CSR performance-based incentives, 155 (96.88%) 
use a compensation consultant.  As such, it is entirely possible that certain consulting firms are 
driving the effect.  Using a dummy variable to represent the associated compensation consulting 
firm, we re-run our regression and do not find any significant association with a particular firm 




The main purpose of this paper is to investigate why firms are using CSR performance-
based incentives and who is influencing its use.  No significant results were found quantitatively 
for firms with long-term view institutional shareholders however some anecdotal support was 
provided from the qualitative interview data.  Specifically, firms with higher levels of long-term 
view institutional shareholders are no more or less likely to use CSR-performance based 
incentives.  Evidence was also provided by various interviewees that support the notions that a) 
different shareholders have differing time horizons, b) a variety of stakeholders put pressure on 
firms to align these time horizons and c) CSR performance-based incentives are perceived to be 
an effective tool to do this.  Institutional shareholders appear to feel pressure from their constituents 
to both invest in responsible firms, but also to ensure that long-term financial payouts will be 
available to match long-term financial needs.  Anecdotally, long-term view institutional 
shareholders, like pension funds, appear to put pressure on firms to adopt metrics into the executive 
compensation plan to support their preferred time frame.  It is suggested that this perspective often 
comes up against those with different time frames and views; the stakeholder with greater power 
succeeds.  Further research is needed to understand the other factors that could be influencing this 
given that the interview data appears to indicate pressure to use these incentives by long-term view 
institutional shareholders.   
Results suggest that short-term view institutional shareholders are influencing firms not to 
use CSR performance-based incentives.  This is consistent with, and provides support for, 
hypothesis 2.  Short-term view institutional shareholders appear adept at focusing the management 
on financial issues (non-CSR issues) and keeping the incentives aligned to this short-term focus.    
Finally, our third hypothesis predicted that firms in industries with high usage of CSR 
performance-based incentives would be more likely to use them and the results also provide 
support for this.  If a firm faces industry peer pressure, there is a significant chance that they too 
will adopt them.  This is in line with both imitation and our knowledge of CSR practices.  CSR 
remains a dynamic issue with no clear superior directions available for firms to follow.  By 
mimicking their peers, it appears that firms are attempting to best deal with these uncertainties.   
Overall, we interpret these results as providing support for the idea that different 
stakeholder groups exert pressure on the executive compensation setting process.  In this case, 
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short-term view institutional shareholders seeking short-term financial performance are pressuring 
firms not to use CSR performance-based incentives while long-term view institutional 
shareholders continue to push for the use of such incentives in line with a longer-term view 
although the latter show no significant results.  Additionally, peer pressure from industry peers 
significantly increases the probability that firms will use CSR performance-based incentives.  As 
the popularity of CSR performance-based incentives rises amongst their competitors, companies 
feel pressured to adopt the ‘latest innovation’. 
9. Conclusions and Future Research 
 
Stakeholders are exerting their influence over firm activities and we should be aware of the 
power they wield.  Assuming that the executive compensation process is ultimately efficient 
ignores the likelihood that power and influence affect the process.  This research provides further 
evidence that different stakeholders wield power and they use this power to influence corporate 
governance and firm activities.  In response to peers using CSR performance-based incentives, 
firms adopt them in greater numbers as the pressure rises.  Additionally, those stakeholders seeking 
a short-term focus pressure firms not to use CSR performance-based incentives.  Unfortunately, 
this may result in stakeholders that negatively influence firm activities seeking short-term financial 
gain and then capitalize on their position leaving the firm vulnerable in the long run.  The 
remaining stakeholders should be wary of such short-term initiatives as the long-term impact of 
this is not yet known but would be interesting for future research.   
This research has certain limitations.  First, there are many dimensions which may affect 
how boards look at CSR, but it is difficult to see which ones are most impactful, this remains a 
possible confounding factor.  Our sample is one year only and more could be learned from a multi-
year sample.  It is possible that correlated omitted variables are driving the effects and other 
theoretical alternatives do exist that could have been used to explore the questions at hand.  Our 
interviews sought perspectives on our U.S. context however our interviewees often had 
international experience, while we focused on the U.S. setting, it is possible that some international 
perspectives may have emerged.  Additionally, we do not consider the real effects of the use of 
CSR performance-based incentives.  Regardless, we do not feel that these limitations negate the 
findings from this work. 
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It would be useful to investigate the longer-term performance consequences of these 
incentives to ascertain if, or when, positive CSR and financial performance is achieved.  How do 
the various timeframes relate to the time needed for positive CSR performance?  How do other 
stakeholder groups, like employees or investment fund constituents, play a role in the use of CSR 
performance-based incentives?  Are there geographic differences in use or impact?  This is also 
likely dependent upon the specific types of CSR performance-based incentives adopted as it is 
likely that not all incentives are created equally, and further research could help to clarify this.  It 
would also be interesting to determine how different time frame perceptions change how 
stakeholders engage with firms over time.  It would also be useful to investigate the differences in 
the types of pressure felt by the board such as whether there are different effects if the pressure is 
real vs. perceived.  Arguably, competitive firms’ actions may cause boards to feel perceived 
pressure while the pressure exerted by shareholders may be more direct (e.g. real).  With regards 
to imitation, future research can explore further why this pressure exists: are managers seeing that 
their peers are receiving bonuses for CSR performance and pressuring boards to provide them?  
Or are directors within these industries bringing expertise on CSR performance-based incentives 
from other boards to the subject firms to improve their monitoring and advising role?  In this 
regard, it may be seen as ‘best practice’.  This last point may be at least partially supported by the 
recent publication from the Canadian Coalition for Good Governance who recently published ‘The 
Directors’ E&S Guidebook’ (2018) which advocates for the use of CSR performance-based 
incentives.  Do firms simply copy ‘leader’ firms adopting their CSR performance-based incentives 
verbatim?  Or do firms adjust and adapt to their own circumstances?  What factors affect this?  
How does this mimicking transpire?  What agents bring this knowledge to the other firms and how 
do these individuals affect the use of CSR performance-based incentives? 
Additionally, it remains to be investigated what kinds of firms use CSR performance-based 
incentives, what impact these have and what corporate governance structures best support their 
use.  Going beyond solely investigating large firms, it would be interesting to know if smaller, 
private firms also use CSR performance-based incentives or if other mechanisms are used as 
substitutes.  Finally, sustainability is a long-term issue and yet the metrics under study are short-
term.  This brings up an interesting point and one that could be dealt with in future research: why 
is a long-term concept using short-term metrics?  Is this the best way to deal with moving firms 
towards sustainability?  How do these metrics relate to the United Nations Sustainability 
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Development goals?  These are empirical questions that deserve study.  As this is an emerging 
trend, we do not yet have a strong understanding of what motivates firms to use such incentives.  
While we are beginning to learn more about the use and prevalence of CSR performance-based 




























Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1: Descriptive data incentive plans 
  Number % of total (#/487) 
Companies with only financial metrics in bonus plans 164 33.68% 
Companies with non-financial metrics (but not CSR 
performance-based metrics) 163 33.47% 
Companies with CSR performance-based incentives in 
bonus plans 160 32.85% 
 487 100.00% 
 
 
Table 2: Simple Statistics 
Variables N Mean Std Dev Min Max 
CSR_INC 487 0.33 0.47 0 1 
LT_OWN 475 3.37 1.16 0.48 10.35 
ST_OWN 475 5.42 5.94 0.17 49.33 
FF_Peer_Pressure 487 0.09 0.05 0.01 0.18 
ESI 487 0.25 0.43 0 1 
LN_REV 481 9.18 1.20 6.24 13.09 
CSR_COMM 487 0.16 0.37 0 1 
ENV_SCORE_2014 347 28.10 18.48 0 75.97 
SOC_SCORE_2014 416 28.06 15.67 3.33 77.19 
 
 
Table 3: Two Sample t-tests Split by CSR Performance-Based Incentive Use 
VARIABLE  
CSR_INC Means 
Dif. t value Pr > |t| 0 1 
LT_OWN 3.35 3.39 -0.04 -0.40 0.69 
ST_OWN 5.81 4.64 1.17 2.37 0.02 
FF_Peer_Pressure 0.08 0.11 -0.02 -5.05 <0.0001 
ESI  0.14 0.49 -0.35 -7.95 <0.0001 
LN_REV  8.99 9.56 -0.57 -5.00 <0.0001 
CSR_COMM 0.10 0.28 -0.18 -4.49 <0.0001 
ENV_SCORE_2014  24.40 33.92 -9.52 -4.83 <0.0001 




















































































































CSR performance-based incentive use by Fama-French 12 industry 
categorization
CSR performance-based incentive use % total
Raw # % total
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Table 4: Pearson Correlation Table 
  CSR_INC LT_OWN ST_OWN 
FF_Peer 





CSR_INC         
LT_OWN 0.02        
ST_OWN -0.09** -0.23***       
FF_Peer_Pressure 0.24*** 0.18*** -0.07      
ESI 0.38*** -0.05 -0.03 0.25***     
LN_REV 0.22*** -0.13*** -0.15*** -0.10** 0.04    
CSR_COMM 0.23*** -0.02 -0.03 0.06 0.26*** 0.14***   
ENV_SCORE_2014 0.25*** -0.04 -0.17*** -0.07 0.19*** 0.33*** 0.22***  
SOC_SCORE_2014 0.30*** -0.01 -0.13*** -0.02 0.26*** 0.29*** 0.23*** 0.70*** 
***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels respectively    
 
The dependent variable is CSR_INC which is a dummy variable where 1 indicates the use of CSR performance-based incentives and 0 does not.  
The independent variables are as follows:  LT_OWN is calculated as the number of shares owned by pension funds divided by the total number 
of shares outstanding; ST_OWN is calculated as the number of shares owned by hedge funds divided by the total number of shares outstanding; 
FF_Peer_Pressure is calculated by determining the number of firms using CSR performance-based incentives within each industry code and 
divided this by the total number of firms within that industry, subtracting the subject firm if it already uses these incentives.  The control 
variables are as follows: ESI is a dummy variable where 1 indicates that the firm is in an environmentally sensitive industry 0 does not; LN_REV 
is the natural logarithm of firm revenue; CSR_COMM is a dummy variable where 1 indicates the presence of a CSR or Sustainability committee 






Table 5: Model Fit Statistics – Basic model 




Square DF Pr>ChiSq 
Model fit statistics 
AIC 463.92 395.70    
SC 467.77 430.32    
-2 Log L 461.92 377.70    
Testing Global Null 
Hypothesis 
Likelihood Ratio   84.22 
8 
<.0001 
Score   78.86 <.0001 




   9.99 8 0.27 






















Table 6: Binary Logistic Regression Results – Basic Model, No Interactions 
Parameter Predicted sign Estimate (Wald Chi-Square) 
Intercept  -6.39*** (20.77) 
LT_OWN + 0.05 (0.19) 
ST_OWN - 0.01 (0.32) 
FF_Peer_Pressure + 10.17*** (12.57) 
ESI  1.33*** (21.45) 
LN_REV  0.37*** (8.99) 
CSR_COMM  0.53 (2.59) 
ENV_SCORE_2014  0.02 (2.50) 
SOC_SCORE_2014  0.01 (0.58) 
   
Max-rescaled R-square  0.29 
Likelihood Ratio  84.22*** 
N  346 
***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels 
respectively; p-values are based on one-tailed tests where the prediction is directional, and two-
tailed tests otherwise. 
 
The dependent variable is CSR_INC which is a dummy variable where 1 indicates the use of CSR 
performance-based incentives and 0 does not.  The independent variables are as follows:  LT_OWN 
is calculated as the number of shares owned by pension funds divided by the total number of shares 
outstanding; ST_OWN is calculated as the number of shares owned by hedge funds divided by the 
total number of shares outstanding; FF_Peer_Pressure is calculated by determining the number 
of firms using CSR performance-based incentives within each industry code and divided this by 
the total number of firms within that industry, subtracting the subject firm if it already uses these 
incentives.  The control variables are as follows: ESI is a dummy variable where 1 indicates that 
the firm is in an environmentally sensitive industry 0 does not; LN_REV is the natural logarithm 
of firm revenue; CSR_COMM is a dummy variable where 1 indicates the presence of a CSR or 
Sustainability committee on the Board of Directors and 0 does not; ENV_SCORE_2014 is the 










Table 7: Association of Predicted Probabilities and Observed Responses 
Description Result 
Percent Concordant 76.9 
Percent Discordant 23.1 
Percent Tied 0.0 
Pairs 28408 
Somers' D 0.54 
Gamma 0.54 
Tau-a 0.26 
c  0.77 
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Table 8: Model Fit Statistics – Interaction Model 




Square DF Pr>ChiSq 
Model fit statistics 
AIC 463.92 395.70    
SC 467.77 438.01    
-2 Log L 461.92 373.70    
Testing Global Null 
Hypothesis 
Likelihood Ratio   88.22 
10 
<.0001 
Score   82.13 <.0001 




   10.72 8 0.22 























Table 9: Binary Logistic Regression Results 
Parameter Predicted sign Estimate (Wald Chi-Square) 
Intercept  -6.32*** (19.83) 
LT_OWN  0.03 (0.07) 
ST_OWN  0.03 (1.37) 
FF_Peer_Pressure + 10.18*** (12.40) 
LT_OWN*CSR_COMM + 0.27 (0.38) 
ST_OWN*CSR_COMM - -0.14** (2.97) 
ESI  1.38*** (22.56) 
LN_REV  0.35*** (7.97) 
CSR_COMM  0.24 (0.02) 
ENV_SCORE_2014  0.02 (2.31) 
SOC_SCORE_2014  0.01 (0.99) 
   
Max-rescaled R-square  0.31 
Likelihood Ratio  88.22*** 
N  346 
***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels 
respectively; p-values are based on one-tailed tests where the prediction is directional, and two-
tailed tests otherwise. 
 
The dependent variable is CSR_INC which is a dummy variable where 1 indicates the use of CSR 
performance-based incentives and 0 does not.  The independent variables are as follows:  LT_OWN 
is calculated as the number of shares owned by pension funds divided by the total number of shares 
outstanding; ST_OWN is calculated as the number of shares owned by hedge funds divided by the 
total number of shares outstanding; FF_Peer_Pressure is calculated by determining the number 
of firms using CSR performance-based incentives within each industry code and divided this by 
the total number of firms within that industry, subtracting the subject firm if it already uses these 
incentives.  The control variables are as follows: ESI is a dummy variable where 1 indicates that 
the firm is in an environmentally sensitive industry 0 does not; LN_REV is the natural logarithm 
of firm revenue; CSR_COMM is a dummy variable where 1 indicates the presence of a CSR or 
Sustainability committee on the Board of Directors and 0 does not; ENV_SCORE_2014 is the 










Table 10: Association of Predicted Probabilities and Observed Responses 
Description Result 
Percent Concordant 77.5 
Percent Discordant 22.5 
Percent Tied 0.0 
Pairs 28408 
Somers' D 0.55 
Gamma 0.55 
Tau-a 0.26 

























Table 11: Binary Logistic Regression Results – Peer Pressure and Shareholder Interaction 
Parameter 
Predicted 
sign Estimate (Wald Chi-Square) 
Intercept  -7.26*** (15.62) 
LT_OWN  0.34 (0.80) 
ST_OWN  0.01 (0.04) 
FF_Peer_Pressure + 18.28** (2.65) 
LT_OWN*FF_Peer_Pressure + -2.39 (0.64) 
ST_OWN*FF_Peer_Pressure - -0.00 (0.00) 
ESI  1.31*** (20.42) 
LN_REV  0.36*** (8.56) 
CSR_COMM  0.53 (2.59) 
ENV_SCORE_2014  0.02 (2.55) 
SOC_SCORE_2014  0.01 (0.57) 
   
Max-rescaled R-square  0.30 
Likelihood Ratio  84.87*** 
N  346 
***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels 
respectively; p-values are based on one-tailed tests where the prediction is directional, and two-
tailed tests otherwise. 
 
The dependent variable is CSR_INC which is a dummy variable where 1 indicates the use of CSR 
performance-based incentives and 0 does not.  The independent variables are as follows:  LT_OWN 
is calculated as the number of shares owned by pension funds divided by the total number of shares 
outstanding; ST_OWN is calculated as the number of shares owned by hedge funds divided by the 
total number of shares outstanding; FF_Peer_Pressure is calculated by determining the number 
of firms using CSR performance-based incentives within each industry code and divided this by 
the total number of firms within that industry, subtracting the subject firm if it already uses these 
incentives.  The control variables are as follows: ESI is a dummy variable where 1 indicates that 
the firm is in an environmentally sensitive industry 0 does not; LN_REV is the natural logarithm 
of firm revenue; CSR_COMM is a dummy variable where 1 indicates the presence of a CSR or 
Sustainability committee on the Board of Directors and 0 does not; ENV_SCORE_2014 is the 
environmental disclosure score; SOC_SCORE_2014 is the social disclosure score.
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This paper examines one of the possible motivations for the use of CSR-based incentives: whether 
top management teams are using their power to obtain excess cash compensation (excess is defined 
as being beyond that to which we would expect them to receive) by including CSR performance-
based incentives in their executive compensation contract. On the one hand, under efficient 
contracting, an executive compensation contract is deemed efficient and as such, no excess 
compensation would be obtained in the course of using such incentives.  On the other hand, a 
growing body of research shows that executives do wield their power for their own benefit. 
Focusing on a sample of large firms, results indicate that top management teams appear to be 
influencing the use of CSR performance-based incentives to obtain excess bonus cash 
compensation of about 18% higher for the management team than what would be expected 
otherwise.  Additionally, these results are not more common in environmentally sensitive 
industries and appear to be mitigated by the presence of a CSR committee or long-term view 
institutional shareholders.  This paper breaks new ground in addressing the use of CSR 
performance-based incentives in relation to excess compensation.   
 




1. Introduction  
 
The use of CSR performance-based incentives has grown in recent years but our 
understanding of what they are, why are they are used and what effects they have is limited.  While 
superficially it may appear to be a ‘good thing’ that firms are incorporating consideration for social 
and environmental goals in the bonus plans of executives, there is an extensive literature that firms 
often engage in ‘greenwashing’ or ‘organized hypocrisy’ (Cho, Laine, Roberts and Rodrigue, 
2015).  Recent years have seen increasing numbers of firms disclosing information regarding its 
social and environmental initiatives and performance.  This is not surprising perhaps, given that 
such disclosures provide additional legitimacy for firms and are considered useful by analysts 
(Cormier & Magnan, 2015).  One recent trend in relation to executive compensation disclosures 
relates to social and environmental issues.  Firms worldwide are incorporating social and 
environmental metrics into compensation contracts.  For example, Shell has made a number of 
announcements in recent years regarding the inclusion of sustainable goals in the executive 
compensation contract (Gopalan, Horn & Milbourn, 2018; Bousso & Schaps, 2016).  In the U.S., 
it has been noted that upwards of 40% of firms in the S&P 500 are currently using some form of 
CSR performance-based incentive (IRRC & Sustainable Investments Institute, 2013).   
While its use is growing, our understanding is quite limited.  Initial research finds that the 
use of such incentives is not determined by past poor CSR performance (Maas, 2018) but is 
associated with positive financial performance (Flammer, Hong & Minor, 2019; Hong, Li & 
Minor, 2015; Abdelmotaal & Abdel-Kader, 2016).  Additionally, it is associated with greater CSR 
disclosure levels (Grabner, Renders & Yang, 2016) and is one mechanism to align the interests of 
shareholders with management as to which set of stakeholders they should focus on (Flammer, 
Hong & Minor, 2019).  It is as of yet unclear however, what role top management teams may play 
in the use of CSR performance-based incentives.     
On the one hand, there is a long line of research that argues executive compensation 
contracts are efficient and designed to optimize firm value (see Murphy, 2012 for a thorough 
discussion).  Therefore, the use of CSR performance-based incentives must be to optimize firm 
value in some way.  Further, it could be argued that as long as CSR is embedded into the 
compensation plan, then this must be better than not having CSR performance-based measures.  
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Consequently, we should not see any difference in excess3 compensation between similar firms 
who use CSR performance-based incentives and those who do not.   
On the other hand, the managerial hegemony perspective would suggest that top 
management teams will use their power to obtain extra benefits.  Furthermore, management 
continues to be under pressure to exhibit greater responsibility toward society. When considering 
this alongside the organized hypocrisy perspective, it suggests that management may work at 
appearing to satisfy stakeholders while simultaneously acting in a hypocritical way by obtaining 
additional compensation.  As such, it is possible that CSR performance-based incentives may 
simply be a tool to both extract additional, and unjustified, wealth from the firm and to manage 
the external pressures from ‘responsible’ investors seeking ‘evidence’ of ‘responsible’ action.  
Additionally, measurement of CSR performance is rather tricky, with metrics with debatable 
reliability.  The selection of such metrics gives much discretion to management, even if the board 
agrees, as management is more likely to be knowledgeable about the metrics, their pros and cons, 
etc.  These metrics are beginning to be subject to more rigour but not yet to the extent of GAAP 
reporting-based measures derived from audited financial statements.  Thus, it remains to be seen 
whether the use of CSR performance-based incentives is purposeful with the intention to improve 
the corporate social responsibility performance of the firm or whether other factors are at play. 
 The study addresses three research questions: 1) are top management teams influencing 
the use of CSR performance-based incentives in the executive compensation contract as a way to 
obtain excess compensation?  2) is this driven by presence in environmentally sensitive industries? 
and 3) do corporate governance mechanisms, such as a CSR committee or the influence of long-
term view institutional shareholders, mitigate any effect on excess compensation?  
  The CSR performance-based incentives information is hand collected for the 2014 
performance year from the 2015 proxy statements.  The final sample comprises 487 distinct firms 
that comprise the S&P 500 index.  We collect information from the Bloomberg, Execucomp, 
BoardEx and FactSet databases to gather appropriate CSR performance, ownership, power and 
performance information.  We use least squares regression analysis in SAS to explore four unique 
groupings of firms: those with (without) CSR performance-based incentives and where top 
management power has (does not have) power. 
 
3 Excess here is defined as being beyond that to which we would expect them to otherwise receive. 
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Results show that top management teams do receive approximately 18% more in excess 
annual short-term compensation, beyond that to which we would expect on a normalized model, 
when CSR performance-based incentives are used in the compensation contract.  Contrary to 
expectation though, it does not appear that top management teams in environmentally sensitive 
firms are using these to obtain excess compensation in a significant way. Additionally, the use of 
a CSR committee appears to reduce excess compensation in some way as does the presence of 
long-term view institutional shareholders although more research is necessary to understand this 
further. 
This study contributes to the executive compensation research, non-financial performance 
metrics research, and to the emerging literature on CSR corporate governance.  Specifically, this 
research continues the enquiry into whether or not the use of such incentives is a form of window 
dressing (Kolk & Perego, 2014).  To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to examine 
the use of CSR performance-based metrics in executive compensation contracts as a vehicle for 
top management teams to obtain additional pay beyond that to which we would expect.  Second, 
previous research has taken a mostly positive view of the presence of CSR performance-based 
incentives; our work shows a more nuanced picture in this respect. Third, we build upon both 
Maas’ (2018) and Flammer, Hong & Minor’s (2019) work by examining a previously unexplored 
explanation that the use of CSR performance-based incentives may relate to maintaining high 
executive compensation packages as well as how membership in an environmentally sensitive 
industry (ESI), the existence of a CSR committee or the relative power of long-term view 
institutional shareholders may mitigate this effect.  Fourth, this research adds to our knowledge on 
annual incentive plans and behavioural implications in executive compensation, both areas where 
we lack knowledge currently (Edmans and Gabaix, 2016).  Fifth, our research extends the 
executive compensation literature by including a theory previously applied in the CSR literature 
but not to the executive compensation literature: organized hypocrisy (Brunsson, 1989; e.g. Cho, 
Laine, Roberts and Rodrigue , 2015).  Practically, our research provides evidence that will help 
boards to better understand management’s motivations for the inclusion of CSR performance-
based incentives in the executive compensation contract and could have policy implications for 
regulators, shareholders and other stakeholders seeking for a better understanding of why such 
incentives are being used. 
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2. CSR Performance-Based Incentives And Executive Compensation 
 
2.1.  Management and Firms Under Fire 
According to a recent report by the Economic Policy Institute, a non-profit and non-
partisan think tank based out of Washington, D.C., the ratio of pay for chief executive officers to 
an average worker has risen ten-fold from approximately 20 or 30:1 in the 60s and 70s to between 
200 and 300:1 today (Baker, Bivens & Scheider, 2019).  As Murphy (2012) notes, while this is 
proportionate to the increase in market capitalization for the period between 1980 and 2003, 
revenues grew by only 50% after inflation while CEO pay saw a six-fold rise.  Magnan and Martin 
(2018) recount the various ways that this rise in executive pay has been justified over the years 
and find that the explanations put forth are applied differently to executives than to other 
employees.  It is the dramatic increase, and its enduring rise, that continues to intrigue and perplex 
researchers and stakeholders alike while drawing the ire of many.    
One response to this dramatic rise in pay is the advent of ‘Say on Pay’.  This mechanism 
evolved to allow shareholders to vote on the executive compensation packages put forth by the 
board of directors, the traditional designers of the contract.  Originally a voluntary initiative, it 
soon was mandated in the United States in 2011 requiring that publicly traded firms be required to 
hold a shareholder vote on the compensation plan.  Shortly after implementation, concerns were 
raised that other stakeholders’ interests may not be considered and that disclosures may be 
manipulated to facilitate shareholder approval (Mangen & Magnan, 2012). These debates are 
ongoing, and the full impact of Say on Pay is not fully reconciled yet. Correa and Lel (2016) argue 
that Say on Pay has begun to reign in the pace of wage growth for executives, particularly in firms 
with high excess pay.  Meanwhile, Ferri and Oesch (2016) find that management still influences 
the process, successfully negotiating for longer time between votes and reducing the likelihood of 
a change in pay due to a negative Say on Pay vote.  As shareholders and other stakeholders take 
stock of rising executive pay and the (in)effectiveness of Say on Pay, the debate shows no signs 
of stopping. 
At the same time that concern about rising executive compensation is growing, there is 
increasing pressure on firms to demonstrate ‘good’ corporate social responsibility.  With calls for 
major investors and banks to divest ‘poor’ CSR firms (McKibben, 2019), particularly those in 
environmentally sensitive industries, firms are feeling the pressure to respond.  At least $11 trillion 
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has been divested from fossil fuel stocks and the trend is showing no signs of abating (ibid).  This 
divestiture is shown to negatively affect stock prices as well as investor sentiment (Dordi & Weber, 
2019).  Larry Fink, Chairman and CEO of Blackrock, the world’s largest investment management 
firm, with nearly $7 trillion in assets under management, recently announced that his firm would 
be divesting from fossil fuel intensive firms and continued his call for firms to address climate 
change and become more sustainable (Fink, 2020).  Millions of students and those who are 
sympathetic to the climate crisis are following the lead of Greta Thunberg and striking in the streets 
to call attention to the climate crisis, demanding that governments and businesses make changes 
now (BBC News, 2019).  The calls for change continue to grow louder and show no signs of 
dissipating.  
The use of CSR performance-based incentives may be the convergence of these two 
concerns: executive compensation and corporate social responsibility. As the general public 
continues to focus on issues like wealth and income inequality and climate change, they will 
continue to seek solutions to ease the impact of these issues on their lives.  It is possible, as we 
investigate here, that the use of CSR performance-based incentives is, in part, a response by firms 
to the increase in pressure felt in both of these areas.     
 
2.2.   Executive Compensation 
The field of executive compensation research is too vast to review in its entirety here 
however there are a number of good reviews which provide excellent recent summaries of the state 
of the literature (e.g. Murphy, 2012; Edmans & Gabaix, 2016; Edmans, Gabaix & Jenter, 2017).  
Broadly, two main theories continue to dominate the research in this stream, namely efficient 
contracting and managerial power, with the first making the assumption that compensation 
contracts are efficient by nature and the latter assuming that management influences the design to 
their own benefit (Murphy, 2012).  Neither theory, Murphy notes, is sufficient to fully explain 
executive compensation. In fact, Murphy notes that the managerial power approach rose in part 
due to the anomalies seen when viewing executive compensation through the efficient contracting 
lens.  This debate has not been settled yet.  While Bebchuk and Fried (2006) may be the most well-
known critics of the efficient contracting approach, others continue to question the usefulness of 
efficient contracting as a framework without considering other factors at play.  Magnan and Martin 
(2018) recently discuss this idea revisiting the concept of ‘efficient’ which has not yet been 
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rigorously defined.  Additionally, they note that the frameworks used to justify executive pay are 
incoherent or are used differently for executives as compared to the remaining employees; new 
approaches are needed to widen our understanding of executive compensation.  
While the majority of executives receive similar components in their pay (base salary, a 
short-term and long-term incentive plan, pension and other benefits), the long-term incentive plans, 
specifically equity-based incentives, arguably dominate the literature (Edmans and Gabaix, 2016).  
However, while the equity-based components of the executive compensation contract provide for 
significant wealth accumulation, it is the annual incentive plan that provides for the liquid needs 
of the management, especially early in their tenure (Guay, Kepler & Tsui, 2017). Additionally, the 
authors conclude that these bonus payments are important to the incentivization of management 
(ibid). Additionally, the annual incentive plan provides landmarks for executives in the pursuit of 
longer-term objectives. However, prior research focuses predominantly on equity-based 
incentives. Thus, our knowledge of cash-based incentives is less developed despite it comprising 
a significant portion of the annual compensation of an executive.  As such, more research is needed 
on this important executive compensation area (ibid).  In this regard, Murphy (2012) notes that:  
“from a behavioural perspective, annual and multi-year bonus plans based on accounting  
measures may be as important as equity in actually directing the activities of CEOs and  
other executives… Most bonus plans are settled in cash soon after the results are tallied  
(e.g., after the year-end  audited  financials).  The  immediacy  and  tangibility  of  these   
cash  awards  may  well  provide  stronger  incentives  than  the  distant  and  uncertain   
paper  gains  in  unvested equity plans.” (p. 33). 
 
Edmans and Gabaix (2016) discuss the need for further work on the behavioural aspects of 
the setting of executive compensation contracts.  They note that ‘rational’ models dominate the 
executive compensation literature while other fields, like finance, have been successful in 
expanding our knowledge by considering behavioural considerations. In subsequent work, 
Edmans, Gabaix and Jenter (2017) concur with Murphy’s (2012) assessment that no single factor 
can fully explain executive compensation considering shareholder value maximization, managerial 
hegemony, and institutional influences.  Edmans, Gabaix and Jenter (2017) highlight that much of 
the research focuses exclusively on the CEO and not on the top management team as a whole but 




2.3.   CSR performance-based incentives in executive compensation 
John Elkington’s 1997 book ‘Cannibals with Forks’ exemplifies one of the most common 
current approaches to CSR outlining the now ubiquitous ‘triple bottom line’ (Elkington, 1997).  
The triple bottom line approach guides firms to focus not just on financial performance but also 
on social and environmental performance.  This has arguably become the dominant framework 
used by firms today to pursue corporate social responsibility inclusive of both social and 
environmental considerations. One major stream of research in this area relates to the 
organization’s use of CSR information to legitimize itself in view of stakeholders (Patten, 2019).  
Firms will use this strategy to say one thing while doing another (Cho, Guidry, Hageman and 
Patten, 2012).  This poses a serious problem for stakeholders to assess the ‘real’ performance of 
the firm as it relates to the CSR of the firm.  With the rise of CSR performance-based incentives, 
at the intersection of executive compensation and CSR, it remains to be seen if legitimacy concerns 
will be extended to this line of research.    
Performance metrics are typically found in both the long- and short-term compensation 
plans for management. While the short-term compensation plan typically provides annual bonuses 
to management that are traditionally smaller than long-term bonuses, this is not to be discounted 
in terms of its influence on management. Guay, Kepler & Tsui (2017) find that annual cash bonuses 
continue to be instrumental in influencing management and important in the build-up of wealth, 
particularly for newer executives. In fact, the authors argue that “the pay-performance sensitivity 
of CEO cash compensation is much greater than prior estimates” (p. 1) making it an important 
component to incentivizing management.  The annual basis of the cash payments also provides for 
immediate feedback on the executive’s performance. Since, as Murphy (2012) notes, individuals 
must be able to connect their actions with the reward for an effective incentive, cash bonus 
payments have an important role to play.  In recent history, these plans have predominantly used 
financial metrics to provide the targets for bonus payments (Edmans, Gabaix & Jenter, 2017).  
Given that non-financial incentives are a leading indicator for financial performance (Davis & 
Albright, 2004), and recognizing the current and varied pressures faced by management and the 
board, it is imperative to investigate how new forms of non-financial performance-based incentives 
are being used.  
With the growing importance of CSR, recent evidence suggests that upwards of 40% of 
firms in the S&P 500 are currently providing bonuses to management based on social and 
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environmental metrics (IRRC & Sustainable Investments Institute, 2013).  However, we are just 
beginning to understand why such incentives are being used.  Most of the literature to date explores 
the use of financial metrics in the compensation or a broad definition of non-financial metrics (e.g. 
Ittner et al, 1997).  With the rise of the Balanced Scorecard in the 90’s (Kaplan & Norton, 1992), 
much of the focus was on the use of non-financial metrics to drive financial results. However, it is 
not clear why CSR performance-based incentives are being used.   
There is a limited line of research beginning to explore why CSR performance-based 
incentives are being used.  Flammer, Hong & Minor (2019) propose that such incentives may be 
used to align shareholder’s preferences with management’s preferences with regards to which 
stakeholders shareholders’ feel are important.  While the authors find that these incentives reduce 
short-termism, increase firm value and improve CSR performance, it is unclear why certain 
stakeholders would be more important to one group as compared to the other.  This is consistent 
with another study that finds firms using CSR performance-based incentives have better financial 
performance (Hong, Li & Minor, 2015).  The authors of this study also find that the use of CSR 
performance-based incentives is associated with short tenure directors, more block-holder owners 
and positive existing CSR performance (ibid). Maas (2018) explores whether firms use CSR 
performance-based incentives to improve upon past poor sustainability performance but does not 
find any evidence to support this. She finds that prior CSR performance is not a good predictor of 
the use of CSR performance-based incentives. Grabner, Renders & Yang (2016) propose that CSR 
performance-based incentives are a communication mechanism and find that firms with greater 
CSR disclosure are more likely to provide such incentives.  Finally, the use of CSR performance-
based incentives is associated with firm size, compensation committee independence, 
sustainability committees, resource efficiency policies, inclusion on a sustainability index and 
financial performance (Abdelmotaal & Abdel-Kader, 2016).   
Additionally, it is unclear that CSR performance metrics are reliable.  As recommended by 
Maines, Bartov, Fairfield, Hirst, Iannaconi, Mallett, Schrand, Skinner & Vincent (2002), non-
financial performance measures should be relevant, predictive, reliable, comparable and 
consistent.  As CSR performance-based incentives are a subset of non-financial performance 
indicators, one would assume the same criteria should apply. However, there are numerous 
challenges to creating such indicators. Boiral & Henri (2015) find that it is impossible to compare 
the performance of firms even within the same industry using the performance measures provided 
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in their GRI reports. This is due to a variety of reasons including, among others, a lack of 
compliance and ambiguous information (ibid). Further, only 67% of sustainability reports obtain 
some form of independent assurance, which still leaves a large portion untouched (Blasco & King, 
2017). Presumably, firms seeking independent assurance on these reports would also exhibit 
higher reliability if the same metrics are used in the executive compensation contract. Using a case 
study of four firms, Kolk & Perego (2014) examine the verifiability and controllability of CSR 
performance-based incentives plans as well as how the targets were categorized from short-term 
to long-term and find a range of results. They find that it is too early to tell if these incentives are 
a form of window-dressing or real initiatives to improve corporate sustainability (ibid).  Maas 
(2018) also ponders whether these incentives are simply symbolic and whether or not these 
incentives supplement (of interest here) or replace financial incentives.   As such, it is not yet 
evident that the metrics of CSR performance-based incentives have reached the standards set out 
to ensure a sufficient level of rigour and to mitigate concerns of management manipulation.     
3. Theory and Hypotheses Development 
 
This research addresses the questions: 1) are top management teams influencing the use of 
CSR performance-based incentives as a way to obtain excess compensation?; 2) is this driven by 
presence in environmentally sensitive industries?; and 3) do corporate governance mechanisms, 
such as a CSR committee or the influence of long-term view institutional shareholders, mitigate 
any effect on excess compensation?  
  On the one hand, the efficient contracting literature that argues that the board is not subject 
to the desires of management and designs optimal contracts that serve stakeholder interests (e.g. 
Core, Guay and Larcker, 2003).  Applying this to the research questions at hand would imply that 
since the contracts are efficient by design then no excess compensation should be obtained, on 
average, for firms using CSR performance-based incentives.   
Conversely, a long line of literature beginning with Bebchuk and Fried (2006) and recently 
reaffirmed by van Essen, Otten and Carberry (2015) in a meta-analytical study, shows that 
executives use their relative power to obtain extra benefits for themselves; this is the managerial 
hegemony perspective. This is thought to occur by executives leveraging their close relationships 
with the board with the aim of influencing its compensation decisions.  Bebchuk & Fried (2006) 
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find that the presence of independent directors helps to mitigate, but does not completely eliminate, 
the effect of management power.  Here, we extend the idea of management power by incorporating 
organized hypocrisy (Brunsson, 1989)4.  This is a theoretical framework proposing that firms often 
make decisions that are inconsistent at some point in the decision-making process.  Consequently, 
what is said may not be consistent with what is decided nor with what is done.  The reasons 
underlying this may relate to the organization having to respond to multiple pressures and 
conflicting demands.  Firms are under increasing pressure to consider a variety of stakeholders in 
their decision-making (Stout, 2012; Borduas & Vrtkova, 2019; Buckstein, 2019) and this can make 
these decisions complex, and, at times, hypocritical.  In the context of the use of CSR performance-
based incentives, executives are facing increased criticism of rising executive compensation levels 
while firms are being pressured to show they are ‘responsible’ citizens.  Reconciling these 
demands may lead to decisions in which hypocrisy may exist.   
As suggested by Kolk and Perego (2014), executives may be using such incentives as a 
way to serve their own interests, for example to supplement bonuses in a way that appears pleasing 
to stakeholders seeking more responsible firms.  By incorporating social and environmental 
metrics into the compensation plan, the firm signals that it is taking stakeholder concerns seriously 
by ‘risking’ compensation to achieve better CSR performance.  At the same time, top management 
teams are looking to justify ever growing executive compensation levels and the inclusion of 
palatable CSR targets may help to provide that justification.  Organized hypocrisy in combination 
with the managerial hegemony perspective would suggest that top management teams may be able 
to obtain extra compensation vis-à-vis the use of CSR performance-based incentives if they hold 
power and are able to influence the board in the setting of executive compensation contracts.  Thus, 
it is possible that executives may have found a palatable way to ‘justify’ increased levels of pay 
while also satisfying external demands for shows of responsibility.    
This leads to our first hypothesis.  When management of the firm has power, and wishes 
to increase their own pay, it is expected that they will use their relationships with the board to 
negotiate favourable compensation contracts.  This will provide management with higher levels of 
pay than would otherwise be expected.  In this case, we expect to see that the use of CSR 
 
4 There is a debate about whether or not organized hypocrisy is a theory in its’ own right or a distinction of 
legitimacy theory (e.g. Patten, 2019); the authors acknowledge the debate but proceed here with the use of organized 
hypocrisy as it best represents the authors’ perception of the multi-stakeholder pressure and possible hypocritical 
decisions that may result.  
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performance-based incentives is associated with an increase in excess executive compensation in 
the bonus plan:   
 
H1: When top management teams hold the balance of power, the use of CSR performance-based 
incentives for management is associated with an increase in excess bonus pay. 
 
Maas and Rosendaal (2016) outline that the use of CSR performance-based incentives is 
associated with ‘dirty’ industries.  It has been long known that environmentally-sensitive industries 
engage in a variety of legitimacy strategies including publishing higher levels of disclosure for the 
purposes of obfuscating true performance (Cho, Guidry, Hageman and Patten, 2012) and therefore 
we also consider whether environmentally-sensitive industries use CSR performance-based 
incentives differently here as well.  This leads to the second hypothesis: 
 
H2: The environmental sensitivity of a firm’s industry moderates the relation between managerial 
power and the use of CSR performance-based incentives for the purpose of receiving excess 
compensation. 
    
 It is possible that other corporate governance mechanisms moderate the effects on excess 
compensation of top management power where CSR performance-based incentives are in use.  For 
our third hypothesis, we consider how two mechanisms, the CSR committee and long-term view 
institutional shareholders, might moderate such an effect.  The development of the CSR committee 
is a relatively recent phenomenon and as such there is still a dearth of information on how they 
work and what control effect they have.  Recent evidence tells us that CSR committees are 
associated with the use of CSR performance-based incentives (Abdelmotaal & Abdel-Kader, 
2016) however, how this works, why some firms adopt these committees and others do not as well 
as the control effect these committees have is still unknown.  Typically, the use of a committee at 
the board level will focus the board’s attention to those particular issues.  For example, the audit 
committee is responsible for, amongst other things, overseeing the audit of the firm’s financial 
statements.  It is possible that by closely monitoring CSR issues, the board, in its formation of a 
CSR committee, may pay closer attention to such issues.  Consequently, when a CSR committee 
is in place, there may be a reduction in the amount of excess compensation paid to the senior 
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management team.  This would be consistent with an efficient contracting approach that manages 
the various compensation contract designs to maximize firm value.  As such, we could expect that 
the use of a CSR committee will moderate excess compensation when using CSR performance-
based incentives.   
On the other hand, it is possible under organized hypocrisy, that a CSR committee at the 
board level may simply be another mechanism to signal to stakeholders that these issues are taken 
seriously.  Organized hypocrisy would predict then that there may be no connection between the 
use of a CSR committee at the board level and the level of excess compensation in the bonus plans 
of management.  The overall effect of the CSR committee on the excess compensation of 
management as it relates to the use of CSR performance-based incentives is unclear, so we posit: 
 
H3a: Use of a CSR committee at the board level moderates excess compensation when using CSR 
performance-based incentives.  
 
Long-term view institutional shareholders, like pension plans, are shown to have different 
time horizons than other shareholders and tend to hold the shares for longer periods of time 
(Neubaum & Zahra, 2006; David, O’Brian, Yoshikawa & Delios, 2010; Connelly, Tihanyi, Certo, 
& Hitt, 2010).  Additionally, investors have been shown to influence performance indicator 
adoption by firms (Rodrigue, Magnan & Boulianne, 2013).  This may provide a moderating effect 
when considering the longer-term for the firm and their investment.  The pressure from this 
particular group of shareholders could influence the actions of management by pushing them to 
address their concerns.  If the pressure is sufficient, this may force management to address their 
concerns in a real way by reducing the excess compensation they are taking.  This is consistent 
with an organized hypocrisy approach where the top management team responds to specific 
pressures in a narrow way to manage these pressures.  Alternatively, if the efficient contracting 
approach is correct, we should see no excess compensation regardless of the corporate governance 
mechanisms used or the pressures the firm faces.  As such, we posit:  
 
H3b: The presence of long-term view institutional shareholders moderates excess compensation 
when using CSR performance-based incentives. 
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Ultimately, if the contract is efficient (the efficient contracting perspective on its own fully 
predicts the behaviour of the firm), it will not matter if the top management team has power.  
Managerial power and organized hypocrisy should not influence the size of the bonus received by 
management and no excess compensation will be found.  In this case, the inclusion of CSR 
performance-based incentives will be interpreted as part of the efficient contracting process.  
However, if there is variation in the usage of CSR performance-based incentives and the 
corresponding bonus level anticipated in relation to the level of power held by the top management 
team, then the inclusion of CSR performance-based incentives can be interpreted as potential 
evidence of managements’ influence on their executive compensation contracts as well as evidence 
of organized hypocrisy in responding to external pressures. 
4. Method 
4.1.   Sample Selection 
 
To facilitate comparison with previous studies, we use the firms in the S&P 500. CSR 
performance-based incentive data for firms in the S&P 500 are hand collected from the CD&A 
section of the 2015 proxy statements which details the 2014 performance. A total of 505 firms are 
listed in the S&P 500 however, some companies have multiple listings. Losing the firms with 
multiple listings and firms with missing variables leaves a final sample of 487 firms.  To test 
hypotheses, we rely on SAS and follow Craighead, Magnan & Thorne (2004) to conduct a contrast 
analysis to determine if there is a relationship between the excess bonus of management and the 
use of CSR performance-based incentives.  Least squares regression analysis is conducted to test 
the remaining hypotheses. 
    
4.2.   Models 
 
The first empirical model to test H1 is as follows: 
Excess compensation = B0 + B1*CSR_INC + B2*TMT_PWR + B3*CSR_INC*TMT_PWR + 




The second empirical model to test H2 is as follows: 
Excess compensation = B0 + B1*CSR_INC + B2*TMT_PWR + B3*ESI + 
B4*CSR_INC*TMT_PWR + B5*CSR_INC*TMT_PWR*ESI + controls + e 
 
The first part of the third empirical model to test H3a is as follows: 
Excess compensation = B0 + B1*CSR_INC + B2*TMT_PWR + B3*CSR_COMM + 
B4*CSR_INC*TMT_PWR + B5*CSR_INC*TMT_PWR*CSR_COMM + controls + e 
 
Finally, the second part of our third model to test H3b is as follows: 
Excess compensation = B0 + B1*CSR_INC + B2*TMT_PWR + B3*LT_OWN + 
B4*CSR_INC*TMT_PWR + B5*CSR_INC*TMT_PWR*LT_OWN + controls + e 
 
4.3.  Variable Construction 
 
Excess Bonus (EXCESS_BONUS) – The dependent variable is determined using the bonus 
amounts granted to the entire top management team (TMT) and are obtained from Compustat - 
Capital IQ: Execucomp – Monthly Updates: Annual Compensation: Non-Equity Incentive Plan 
Compensation.  We modify Larcker, Ormazabel & Taylor (2011) to calculate the excess bonus 
received utilizing the natural log of the annual top management team bonuses less the natural log 
of the median top management team bonuses from the same Fama-French industry group utilizing 
the 12 categories provided by Fama-French and also categorizing the firms by quintile.  This leads 
to 60 different size/industry categories. 
 
CSR performance-based incentives (CSR_INC) – The first of the independent variables is the 
presence or absence of CSR performance-based incentives.  If the firm used CSR performance-
based incentives in 2014, a dummy variable of 1 is used while 0 is used if no CSR performance-
based incentives are used. 
 
TMT_PWR – We use the tenure in years for the CEO as obtained from BoardEx and compare this 
to the tenure in years of the longest standing director on the board of directors as obtained from 
BoardEx.  If the tenure of the CEO exceeds the tenure of the longest standing director on the board 
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of directors, the dummy variable is coded 1.  If the tenure of the CEO does not exceed that of the 
longest standing board member, the dummy is coded 0. 
 
Ownership (LT_OWN & ST_OWN) – Power is deemed to be increasing in increasing ownership 
holdings.  We obtain ownership data from FactSet as the database gives the category of ownership 
and the % of shares owned.  We use the categories ‘hedge fund ownership’ for our short-term view 
institutional shareholder proxy (ST_OWN) and ‘pension fund ownership’ is used as our proxy for 
long-term view institutional shareholder proxy (LT_OWN). 
 
CSR Performance – We utilize the social disclosure score (SOC_SCORE_2014) from Bloomberg 
to proxy for social performance and the environmental disclosure score (ENV_SCORE_2014) 
from Bloomberg to proxy for environmental performance. 
 
Other independent variables - size is log revenue (LN_REV), ROA is the return on assets for the 
firm and is calculated for 2014; all are obtained from Compustat Capital IQ.  Environmentally 
sensitive industries (ESI) are determined as including those 2-digit SIC codes as follows: Forestry 
(08), Metal, Mining (10), Coal Mining (12), Oil & Gas Extraction (13), Non-metallic Minerals, 
Except Fuels (14), Paper & Allied Products (26), Chemical & Allied Products (28), Petroleum & 
Coal Products (29), Primary Metal Industries (33), Fabricated Metal Industries (34), Water 
Transportation (44), Pipelines, Except Natural Gas (46), Electric, Gas & Sanitary Services (49).  
MTB is calculated as the market to book value of common shares outstanding for fiscal 2015 with 
information gathered from CompuStat.  The CSR committee (CSR_COMM) was determined by 
reviewing the committees on the board and indicating with a dummy variable of 1 any committee 
that appeared to be a CSR Committee including, for example, Health, Safety & Environmental 








5.1.   Sample and descriptive statistics 
 
The data in Table 12 shows that approximately 32.85% of the sample firms are currently 
using CSR performance-based incentives.  This is slightly lower than found in previous studies 
although it is at least partially explained by the stricter criteria applied to identify such incentives. 
Specifically, metrics based on customer service satisfaction and employee engagement, while 
relating to stakeholders, have been traditionally associated with a direct relationship to financial 
performance and therefore were excluded from the CSR performance-based metrics here.   
 
<Insert Table 12 about here> 
 
Table 13 shows the descriptive statistics for all variables.  On average, the proxy for top 
management team power, CEO tenure, was about 8.44 years as compared to the tenure of the 
longest standing board member of 18.30 years.  When converted to a dummy variable where 1 
indicates that the CEO has more tenure than the longest standing board member, TMT_PWR shows 
a mean value of 0.13.  The median for EXCESS_BONUS is 0 and consistent with Table 12, the 
mean for CSR_INC is 0.3285, rounded to 0.33 here. 
 
<Insert Table 13 about here> 
 
 Table 14 is a two-sample t-test that explores the data as split between firms that use CSR 
performance-based incentives and those that do not.  There is a significant difference in the key 
variables TMT_PWR with a difference of 0.09 (p-value 0.00) and ST_OWN (dif. 1.17, p-value 
0.02).  Additionally, firms using CSR performance-based incentives have significantly better CSR 
performance as proxied by ENV_SCORE_2014 (dif. -9.52, p-value <0.0001) and 
SOC_SCORE_2014 (dif. -9.79, p-value <0.0001).  Finally, firms using CSR performance-based 
incentives are larger (LN_REV, dif. -0.57, p-value <0.0001) and include more environmentally 
sensitive firms (ESI dif. -0.35, p-value <0.0001). 
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<Insert Table 14 about here> 
 
Figure 4 provides the industry breakdown according to the Fama-French 12-industry 
classification system.  While previous research documents the use of CSR performance-based 
incentives predominantly in environmentally sensitive industries (ESI), overall the use of such 
incentives in this sample is spread across all categories. 
 
<Insert Figure 4 about here> 
 
There are a number of significantly correlated variables as shown in Table 15 although no 
correlations exceed 0.80 minimizing concerns of multicollinearity.  Of note, CSR_INC is 
significantly associated with all variables except LT_OWN and MTB.  TMT_PWR is negatively 
correlated to the EXCESS_BONUS, LN_REV, ENV_SCORE_2014, SOC_SCORE_2014 and 
CSR_COMM.  EXCESS_BONUS, the dependent variable in this study, is positively correlated to 
LT_OWN and with ESI with correlation of 0.09 and 0.10 respectively but negatively correlated to 
MTB, LN_REV, and TMT_PWR with correlations of -0.08, -0.08 and -0.11 respectively. 
 
<Insert Table 15 about here> 
 
5.2.   Linear regression results 
A Hausman specification test was run to determine whether 2SLS would provide more 
efficient results for testing the hypotheses.  The results (untabulated) show that the use of OLS is 
efficient for our purposes; consequently, this is how we proceed.  The model was analyzed using 
linear regression in SAS.  Our first hypothesis was that if the top management team is using their 
power to influence the use of CSR performance-based incentives, then this would lead to an excess 
bonus beyond that which we would expect the executives to be entitled.  From the initial evidence 
in Table 16, there is a significant relationship between CSR_INC*TMT_PWR and 
EXCESS_BONUS (1.21, p-value 0.02).  We can see from the table TMT_PWR on its own has a 
significantly negative relationship with the EXCESS_BONUS (-0.83, p-value < 0.01).   
 
<Insert Table 16 about here> 
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Following Craighead, Magnan & Thorne (2004), we explore the four distinct groupings of 
firms in Table 17 with a specific focus on those comparing those firms that have CSR performance-
based incentives (CSR_INC=1) but no top management power (TMT_PWR=0) with firms that have 
CSR performance-based incentives (CSR_INC=1) and top management power (TMT_PWR=1).   
Specifically, we examine the coefficients for B0 + B1 + B2 + B3, which represents the sum of the 
coefficients where CSR_INC and TMT_PWR equal 1.  We compare this to B0 + B1 alone CSR 
_INC equals 1 but TMT_PWR equals 0.  If B0 + B1 + B2 + B3 > B0 + B1, then we can conclude that 
this effect is stronger.  As detailed in Table 17, the sum of the coefficients where both CSR_INC 
and TMT_PWR is 0.17 which is greater than the sum of the coefficients where CSR_INC equals 1 
but TMT_PWR equals 0, -0.21; the result is significant with a p-value of 0.05.  This translates into 
a roughly 18.89% increase in the average level of excess bonus for top management teams with 
power using CSR performance-based incentives.  Given that the median bonus for all top 
management teams in the sample is $4,755,149, this results in $898,177 of excess compensation 
for the top management team, or approximately $180,000 each for a top management team of five 
individuals.  This provides evidence to support our first hypothesis that the top management team 
is obtaining excess compensation when CSR performance-based incentives are in use. Such a 
finding is consistent with the managerial hegemony/organized hypocrisy perspective. 
 
<Insert Table 17 about here> 
 
The second hypothesis is about top management teams with power in environmentally 
sensitive industries using CSR performance-based incentives to obtain excess bonuses, however 
the evidence does not support this hypothesis as the results are not significant.  While 
TMT_PWR*CSR_INC remains significant (1.30, p-value 0.04), CSR_INC*TMT_PWR*ESI is not 
significant in table 18.  This suggests that it is not firms in the ESI that are driving such excess 
bonuses. 
 
<Insert Table 18 about here> 
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The third hypothesis considers whether the presence of two different corporate governance 
mechanisms, a CSR committee or long-term view institutional shareholders, in conjunction with 
top management power and the use of CSR performance-based incentives will moderate the effect 
on excess bonuses for the top management team.  While the interaction term 
CSR_INC*TMT_PWR*CSR_COMM is not significant in Table 19, interestingly, the presence of a 
CSR committee alone (CSR_COMM = -0.59, p-value 0.07) has a significant effect on reducing 
excess bonuses.  Again, the main effect of CSR_INC*TMT_PWR retains its significance (1.07, p-
value 0.06).  
 
<Insert Table 19 about here> 
 
Finally, we explore whether long-term view institutional shareholders, those with a longer 
time horizon, may be able to mitigate the effect of top management power on their ability to use 
CSR performance-based incentives to obtain excess compensation.  Again, like the presence of a 
CSR committee, while CSR_INC*TMT_PWR*LT_OWN is not significant, but 
CSR_INC*TMT_PWR remains significant (2.54, p-value 0.10) in table 20.  
 
<Insert Table 20 about here> 
6. Robustness Tests 
 
It is possible that the effect of the excess compensation is driven not by the entire top 
management team but by the CEO alone.  I re-run the regression, including the contrast test, to see 
if the effect found is driven solely by excess compensation obtained by the CEO.  I do this by 
replacing the dependent variable with the excess compensation obtained only by the CEO using 
the same method outlined above for the determining the top management team excess 
compensation.  I find that the excess compensation obtained is not driven by solely the CEO as the  
model is not significant (untabulated).   
Further, given that the majority of firms rely on the use of compensation consultants, it is 
possible that particular compensation consultants drive the excess bonus.  The model is significant 
with higher explanatory power (adj. R2 of 0.11) and the results are substantially similar to the main 
76 
results (untabulated).  Interestingly, Compensation Advisory Partners (CAP), Exequity LLP 
(EXE), Farient Advisors LLC (FARIENT), are significantly and positively associated with excess 
compensation while PriceWaterhouseCoopers LLP (PWC) and those consultants that were 
unnamed are negatively associated with excess compensation. 
Last, it is possible that the presence or absence of independent directors on the board may 
affect top management power and thereby affect our results.  The main regression is re-run 
including a dummy variable for the presence or absence of independent directors on the board of 
directors.  The presence of outside directors on the board is associated with lower levels of excess 
compensation and the main results are substantially similar again (untabulated). 
7. Conclusions, Limitations and Future Research 
 
This research shows that when top management teams have power, there is a risk that CSR 
performance-based incentives may be used to obtain excess compensation.  This is consistent with 
the managerial hegemony and organized hypocrisy theories that predict the use of power to obtain 
extra benefits and the inconsistencies that can occur when trying to manage multiple stakeholders.  
The notion of excess compensation is inconsistent with the pursuit of corporate social 
responsibility and yet, we see here, that this is exactly what it is happening.  Through the use of 
CSR performance-based incentives, management teams with power are able to obtain addition 
individual compensation of over $180,000.  While this represents a small portion of overall pay, 
these funds when combined represents almost $900,000 for the top management team, funds that 
arguably could be put to better use.   
We further considered whether it was environmentally sensitive firms that were driving 
this effect since these firms are known to engage in greenwashing and hypocritical activities, but 
we find that leveraging one’s power and using CSR performance-based incentives to obtain excess 
compensation is not confined to the ESI.  Finally, we considered whether the use of a CSR 
committee or the pressure from long-term view institutional shareholders interested in sustainable 
firm performance, were able to mitigate this type of behaviour.  While the main interaction term 
is not significant, it did appear to reduce the significance of the effect of top management power 
using CSR performance-based incentives to obtain excess compensation.  Overall, we find support 
for our first hypothesis that top management teams are using their influence and CSR performance-
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based incentives to obtain additional compensation.  We find no support for our second hypothesis 
that these effects are being driven by firms in the ESI and mixed support for our third hypothesis 
that CSR committees and long-term view institutional shareholders may mitigate the effects.   
This research reaffirms that boards of directors should be aware that top management teams may 
be using their power to influence the use of CSR performance-based incentives to obtain extra 
benefits for themselves.  The use of CSR performance-based incentives is a relatively new 
phenomenon that boards themselves may still be getting familiar with.  Boards engaging with 
management on the setting of compensation should be cognizant of the motivations of 
management in this regard, particularly when new metrics like CSR performance-based incentives 
are put forth.  Additionally, it is possible that corporate governance mechanisms like CSR 
committees and long-term view institutional shareholders may mitigate management’s ability to 
obtain excess compensation, but further research is needed.   
A main limitation of this research is that it did not consider the effectiveness of such CSR 
performance-based incentives on CSR performance.  While we control for the firm’s CSR 
performance both environmentally and socially, it is possible that these external ratings do not 
accurately reflect the firm’s actual performance.  This would be useful to further investigate in 
future research.  Additionally, we do not test the actual motivations of the management team.  
Further, while the model specified used a dummy variable for the use of CSR performance-based 
incentives, it would be useful to investigate the specific kinds of metrics top management teams 
prefer and the ease with which some metrics are able to be manipulated versus others.  We also do 
not consider the use of CSR performance-based incentives without interactions; the sole effects 
could be explored in other work.  Further research could investigate the processes that are in place 
to vet the selection and measurement of such metrics, the role of the CSR committee, as well as 
how different metrics impact both firm financial and CSR performance.  Additionally, with the 
rise of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (UN SDGs), it would be useful to 
understand if and how firms are incorporating this framework into compensation plans.  Given the 
findings in the additional tests that some compensation consultants are associated with an increase 
in excess compensation while others are associated with a decrease, this would be interesting to 
research further.  This body of research is just beginning to understand how CSR performance-
based incentives are being used, why they exist and what the effects are.   
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Broadly, this research contributes to the executive compensation research, non-financial 
performance metrics research and to the emerging literature on CSR corporate governance.  In 
particular, this research contributes to the burgeoning literature on the determinants of CSR 
performance-based incentives by providing evidence towards resolving one of the key questions: 
does management influence the use of such incentives to obtain additional benefits?  The answer 
appears to be yes, they do.  This builds upon Kolk & Perego’s (2014) case study work on the use 
of sustainable bonuses into which they questioned whether or not the use of these bonuses was 
window dressing.  Much of the subsequent work in this area has taken a more positive approach 
with the implicit assumption that the use of CSR performance-based incentives is a ‘good thing’ 
whereas our research demonstrates that there may be aspects of the use of these incentives that 
might not be so ‘good’.  Additionally, this research explores some of the factors that may mitigate 
this effect by examining firms in the ESI as well as the use of CSR committees and the influence 
of long-term view institutional shareholders.  While firms in the ESI do not appear to abuse their 
power more than other firms, the use of CSR committees and the influence of long-term view 
institutional shareholders do appear to mitigate the effect on excess bonus, but further research is 
necessary to understand this relationship better.  This knowledge contributes to our lack of 
understanding of annual incentive plans as well as the behavioural implications in executive 
compensation (Edmans and Gabaix, 2016).  Finally, we apply the use of a novel theoretical 
perspective that has been applied in the CSR literature but not yet to the executive compensation 
literature to our knowledge: organized hypocrisy (Brunsson, 1989; e.g. Cho, Laine, Roberts and 
Rodrigue, 2015).  This paper is the first to our knowledge to address these questions.  From a 
practical perspective, this research may be of interest to boards of directors who wish to have better 
oversight of the use of CSR performance-based incentives and what corporate governance 
mechanisms may facilitate better oversight.  This research could have policy implications for 
regulators seeking to improve corporate accountability as well as shareholders and other 
stakeholders seeking a greater understanding of why such incentives are used how to best 






Tables and Figures 
 
Table 12: Descriptive data incentive plans 
  Number % of total (#/487) 
Companies with only financial metrics in bonus plans 164 33.68% 
Companies with non-financial metrics (but not CSR 
performance-based metrics) 163 33.47% 
Companies with CSR performance-based incentives in 
bonus plans 160 32.85% 





Table 13: Simple Statistics 
Variables N  Mean  
Standard 
Deviation Minimum  Maximum  Median  
EXCESS_BONUS 487 -0.37 1.58 -6.96 0.82 0.00 
CSR_INC 487 0.33 0.47 0 1 0 
TMT_PWR 467 0.13 0.34 0 1 0 
LT_OWN 475 3.37 1.16 0.48 10.35 3.23 
ST_OWN 475 5.42 5.94 0.17 49.33 3.45 
LN_REV  481 9.18 1.20 6.24 13.09 9.06 
ENV_SCORE_2014  347 28.10 18.48 0 75.97 27.59 
SOC_SCORE_2014  416 28.06 15.67 3.33 77.19 22.81 
ESI 487 0.25 0.43 0 1 0 
ROA  474 0.06 0.06 -0.32 0.35 0.06 
MTB 476 3932 21279 -448 276808 3.27 
CSR_COMM 487 0.16 0.37 0 1 0 
 
Table 14: Two Sample t-tests Split by CSR Performance-Based Incentive Use 
VARIABLE  
CSR_INC Means 
Dif. t value 0 1 
EXCESS_BONUS -0.42 -0.27 -0.15 -1.04 
TMT_PWR 0.16 0.07 0.09 3.02*** 
LT_OWN 3.35 3.39 -0.04 -0.40 
ST_OWN 5.81 4.64 1.17 2.37** 
LN_REV  8.99 9.56 -0.57 -5.00*** 
ENV_SCORE_2014  24.40 33.92 -9.52 -4.83*** 
SOC_SCORE_2014  24.76 34.55 -9.79 -6.29*** 
ESI  0.14 0.49 -0.35 -7.95*** 
ROA  0.07 0.05 0.02 2.77*** 
MTB 3174 5472 -2298 -0.88 

















Table 15: Pearson Correlation Table 
 
***,**,* denote statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels respectively 
 
The dependent variable, EXCESS_BONUS, is the natural log of the annual top management team bonuses less the 
natural log of the median top management team bonus for the same Fama-French industry group split by size quintile.  
The independent variables are as follows:  CSR_INC, is a dummy variable where 1 indicates the use of CSR 
performance-based incentives and 0 does not; TMT_PWR is a dummy variable where 1 is coded when the CEOs tenure 
in years exceeds the tenure of the longest-standing member of the board’s tenure in years; LT_OWN is calculated as 
the number of shares owned by pension funds divided by the total number of shares outstanding; ST_OWN is 
calculated as the number of shares owned by hedge funds divided by the total number of shares outstanding; LN_REV 
is the natural logarithm of firm revenue; ENV_SCORE_2014 is the environmental disclosure score; 
SOC_SCORE_2014 is the social disclosure score; ESI is a dummy variable where 1 indicates that the firm is in an 
environmentally sensitive industry 0 does not; ROA is the return on assets for the firm; MTB is the market-to-book 
value; and the CSR_COMM is a dummy variable where 1 indicates the presence of a CSR or Sustainability committee 
on the Board of Directors and 0 does not.  
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Table 16: Least Squares Regression – Determinants of Excess Bonus – H1 
Parameter Predicted sign Estimate (t-value) 
Intercept  -0.08 (-0.09) 
CSR_INC  -0.13 (-0.68) 
TMT_PWR  -0.83*** (-2.95) 
CSR_INC*TMT_PWR  + 1.21** (2.09) 
LT_OWN  0.10 (1.45) 
ST_OWN  0.03* (1.95) 
LN_REV  -0.10 (-1.31) 
ENV_SCORE_2014  -0.00 (-0.11) 
SOC_SCORE_2014  0.01 (1.19) 
ESI   0.42** (2.15) 
ROA  0.88 (0.61) 
MTB  -0.00 (-0.33) 
CSR_COMM  -0.61*** (-2.79) 
   
Adjusted R-square  0.06 
F statistic (p-value)  2.70*** (0.00) 
N  337 
***,**,* denote statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels 
respectively; p-values are based on one-tailed tests where the prediction is directional, and two-
tailed tests otherwise. 
 
The dependent variable, EXCESS_BONUS, is the natural log of the annual top management team 
bonuses less the natural log of the median top management team bonus for the same Fama-French 
industry group split by size quintile.  The independent variables are as follows:  CSR_INC, is a 
dummy variable where 1 indicates the use of CSR performance-based incentives and 0 does not; 
TMT_PWR is a dummy variable where 1 is coded when the CEOs tenure in years exceeds the 
tenure of the longest-standing member of the board’s tenure in years; LT_OWN is calculated as 
the number of shares owned by pension funds divided by the total number of shares outstanding; 
ST_OWN is calculated as the number of shares owned by hedge funds divided by the total number 
of shares outstanding; LN_REV is the natural logarithm of firm revenue; ENV_SCORE_2014 is 
the environmental disclosure score; SOC_SCORE_2014 is the social disclosure score; ESI is a 
dummy variable where 1 indicates that the firm is in an environmentally sensitive industry 0 does 
not; ROA is the return on assets for the firm; MTB is the market-to-book value; and the 
CSR_COMM is a dummy variable where 1 indicates the presence of a CSR or Sustainability 
committee on the Board of Directors and 0 does not.  
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Table 17: Four Distinct Groups of Firms Coefficients Results – H1 
 CSR_INC = 0 CSR_INC = 1 
TMT_PWR = 0 B0 -0.08 B0 + B1 -0.21 
TMT_PWR = 1 B0 + B2 -0.91 B0 + B1 + B2 + B3 0.17 




Parameter Estimate (t-value) 
CSR_INC*TMT_PWR vs. CSR_INC 1.08 (1.95**) 
 
The regression equation is: 
  
EXCESS_BONUS = B0 + B1 * CSR_INC + B2 * TMT_PWR + B3 *CSR_INC * TMT_PWR + 
controls. 
 
The dependent variable, EXCESS_BONUS, is the natural log of the annual top management team 
bonuses less the natural log of the median top management team bonus for the same Fama-French 
industry group split by size quintile.  The independent variables are as follows:  CSR_INC, is a 
dummy variable where 1 indicates the use of CSR performance-based incentives and 0 does not; 
TMT_PWR is a dummy variable where 1 is coded when the CEOs tenure in years exceeds the 
tenure of the longest-standing member of the board’s tenure in years; LT_OWN is calculated as 
the number of shares owned by pension funds divided by the total number of shares outstanding; 
ST_OWN is calculated as the number of shares owned by hedge funds divided by the total number 
of shares outstanding; LN_REV is the natural logarithm of firm revenue; ENV_SCORE_2014 is 
the environmental disclosure score; SOC_SCORE_2014 is the social disclosure score; ESI is a 
dummy variable where 1 indicates that the firm is in an environmentally sensitive industry 0 does 
not; ROA is the return on assets for the firm; MTB is the market-to-book value; and the 
CSR_COMM is a dummy variable where 1 indicates the presence of a CSR or Sustainability 










Table 18: Least Squares Regression Results – H2 
Parameter Predicted sign Estimate (t-value) 
Intercept  -0.01 (-0.02) 
CSR_INC  -0.09 (-0.38) 
TMT_PWR  -1.04*** (-3.31) 
CSR_INC*TMT_PWR  + 1.30** (1.73) 
CSR_INC*TMT_PWR*ESI  + -0.74 (-0.60) 
LT_OWN  0.10 (1.46) 
ST_OWN  0.03* (1.92) 
LN_REV  -0.12 (-1.38) 
ENV_SCORE_2014  -0.00 (-0.15) 
SOC_SCORE_2014  0.01 (1.29) 
ESI   0.33 (1.04) 
ROA  0.69 (0.47) 
MTB  -0.00 (-0.38) 
CSR_COMM  -0.62*** (-2.81) 
CSR_INC*ESI  -0.03 (-0.07) 
TWT_PWR*ESI  1.01 (1.46) 
   
Adjusted R-square  0.06 
F statistic (p-value)  2.32*** (0.00) 
N  337 
***,**,* denote statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels 
respectively; p-values are based on one-tailed tests where the prediction is directional, and two-
tailed tests otherwise. 
 
The dependent variable, EXCESS_BONUS, is the natural log of the annual top management team 
bonuses less the natural log of the median top management team bonus for the same Fama-French 
industry group split by size quintile.  The independent variables are as follows:  CSR_INC, is a 
dummy variable where 1 indicates the use of CSR performance-based incentives and 0 does not; 
TMT_PWR is a dummy variable where 1 is coded when the CEOs tenure in years exceeds the 
tenure of the longest-standing member of the board’s tenure in years; LT_OWN is calculated as 
the number of shares owned by pension funds divided by the total number of shares outstanding; 
ST_OWN is calculated as the number of shares owned by hedge funds divided by the total number 
of shares outstanding; LN_REV is the natural logarithm of firm revenue; ENV_SCORE_2014 is 
the environmental disclosure score; SOC_SCORE_2014 is the social disclosure score; ESI is a 
dummy variable where 1 indicates that the firm is in an environmentally sensitive industry 0 does 
not; ROA is the return on assets for the firm; MTB is the market-to-book value; and the 
CSR_COMM is a dummy variable where 1 indicates the presence of a CSR or Sustainability 
committee on the Board of Directors and 0 does not. 
 
85 
Table 19: Least Squares Regression Results – H3a 
Parameter Predicted sign Estimate (t-value) 
Intercept  -0.08 (-0.09) 
CSR_INC  -0.09 (-0.44) 
TMT_PWR  -0.86*** (-2.99) 
CSR_INC*TMT_PWR  + 1.07* (1.56) 
CSR_INC*TMT_PWR*CSR_COMM  - -0.60 (-0.32) 
LT_OWN  0.11 (1.47) 
ST_OWN  0.03* (1.89) 
LN_REV  -0.10 (-1.31) 
ENV_SCORE_2014  -0.00 (-0.08) 
SOC_SCORE_2014  0.01 (1.21) 
ESI   0.40** (2.00) 
ROA  0.95 (0.66) 
MTB  -0.00 (-0.25) 
CSR_COMM  -0.59* (-1.82) 
CSR_INC*CSR_COMM  -0.13 (-0.28) 
TWT_PWR*CSR_COMM  1.15 (0.75) 
   
Adjusted R-square  0.05 
F statistic (p-value)  2.20*** (0.01) 
N  337 
***,**,* denote statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels 
respectively; p-values are based on one-tailed tests where the prediction is directional, and two-
tailed tests otherwise. 
 
The dependent variable, EXCESS_BONUS, is the natural log of the annual top management team 
bonuses less the natural log of the median top management team bonus for the same Fama-
French industry group split by size quintile.  The independent variables are as follows:  
CSR_INC, is a dummy variable where 1 indicates the use of CSR performance-based incentives 
and 0 does not; TMT_PWR is a dummy variable where 1 is coded when the CEOs tenure in years 
exceeds the tenure of the longest-standing member of the board’s tenure in years; LT_OWN is 
calculated as the number of shares owned by pension funds divided by the total number of shares 
outstanding; ST_OWN is calculated as the number of shares owned by hedge funds divided by 
the total number of shares outstanding; LN_REV is the natural logarithm of firm revenue; 
ENV_SCORE_2014 is the environmental disclosure score; SOC_SCORE_2014 is the social 
disclosure score; ESI is a dummy variable where 1 indicates that the firm is in an 
environmentally sensitive industry 0 does not; ROA is the return on assets for the firm; MTB is 
the market-to-book value; and the CSR_COMM is a dummy variable where 1 indicates the 
presence of a CSR or Sustainability committee on the Board of Directors and 0 does not. 
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Table 20: Least Squares Regression Results – H3b 
Parameter Predicted Sign Estimate (t-value) 
Intercept  0.05 (0.06) 
CSR_INC  -0.36 (-0.55) 
TMT_PWR  -1.91*** (-2.60) 
CSR_INC*TMT_PWR  + 2.54* (1.27) 
CSR_INC*TMT_PWR*LT_OWN  - -0.41 (-0.63) 
LT_OWN  0.05 (0.60) 
ST_OWN  0.03* (1.93) 
LN_REV  -0.09 (-1.19) 
ENV_SCORE_2014  -0.00 (-0.19) 
SOC_SCORE_2014  0.01 (1.14) 
ESI  
 0.43** (2.18) 
ROA 
 0.92 (0.64) 
MTB 
 -0.00 (-0.44) 
CSR_COMM  -0.61*** (-2.78) 
CSR_INC*LT_OWN  0.06 (0.36) 
TWT_PWR*LT_OWN  0.32 (1.59) 
   
Adjusted R-square  0.06 
F statistic (p-value)  2.32*** (0.00) 
N  337 
***,**,* denote statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels 
respectively 
 
The dependent variable, EXCESS_BONUS, is the natural log of the annual top management team 
bonuses less the natural log of the median top management team bonus for the same Fama-French 
industry group split by size quintile.  The independent variables are as follows:  CSR_INC, is a 
dummy variable where 1 indicates the use of CSR performance-based incentives and 0 does not; 
TMT_PWR is a dummy variable where 1 is coded when the CEOs tenure in years exceeds the 
tenure of the longest-standing member of the board’s tenure in years; LT_OWN is calculated as 
the number of shares owned by pension funds divided by the total number of shares outstanding; 
ST_OWN is calculated as the number of shares owned by hedge funds divided by the total number 
of shares outstanding; LN_REV is the natural logarithm of firm revenue; ENV_SCORE_2014 is 
the environmental disclosure score; SOC_SCORE_2014 is the social disclosure score; ESI is a 
dummy variable where 1 indicates that the firm is in an environmentally sensitive industry 0 does 
not; ROA is the return on assets for the firm; MTB is the market-to-book value; and the 
CSR_COMM is a dummy variable where 1 indicates the presence of a CSR or Sustainability 
committee on the Board of Directors and 0 does not. 
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This research investigates whether knowledge transfer from the board of directors may affect a 
firm’s use of CSR performance-based incentives. Three possible knowledge transfer scenarios are 
put forward: 1) ‘linking pin’ directors who sit on both the CSR committee to the compensation 
committee within the same firm, 2) ‘linking pin’ directors who sit on the compensation committee 
at the firm of interest and a CSR committee elsewhere, and 3) directors with previous board-level 
experience at firms in environmentally sensitive industries.  Relying on hand collected 
compensation data from S&P 500 firms as well as on governance and financial data, Results show 
that directors who sit on both the CSR committee and the compensation committee within the same 
firm are associated with increased use of hard social performance-based metrics in the 
determination of executive incentives.  When directors sit on the compensation committee at the 
target firm and on the CSR committee at another firm, there is an increased use of hard social and 
environmental performance-based incentives.  Finally, it appears that directors with more 
experience in environmentally sensitive industries are associated with firms that use CSR 
performance-based incentives.  This research contributes to the executive compensation, CSR and 
knowledge transfer literatures by further clarifying the determinants of the use of CSR 
performance-based incentives and the role of the board of directors in this regard.  Boards of 
directors and other stakeholders will be interested in this research to better understand the corporate 
governance features that are associated with the use of such incentives.   
 
Keywords: Corporate social responsibility; board of directors; knowledge transfer; executive 










1. Introduction  
 
This paper investigates how knowledge transfer occurs on the board of directors as it relates 
to the use of CSR-based incentives in executive compensation. Three knowledge transfer vectors 
are considered: 1) directors who sit on the CSR and compensation committees with the same firm; 
2) directors who sit on the compensation committee at the firm of interest and the CSR committee 
elsewhere; and 3) directors with previous experience in environmentally sensitive industries.  
The focus on CSR-based incentives determination reflects the increasing pressure being 
put on corporations to demonstrate ‘corporate responsibility’ towards society.  From Larry Fink 
(Centre on Executive Compensation, 2017; Fink, 2018; Fink, 2019; Fink, 2020), CEO of 
BlackRock, the world’s largest asset manager to The Canadian Coalition for Good Governance 
(2018), there are a growing number of calls for businesses to address sustainability concerns.  The 
financial implications for failing to revisit practices and processes to make them environmentally 
and socially responsible are potentially severe (Financial Post, 2019).  An outcome of such societal 
trends is the rise in the use of corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance-based incentives 
appears for corporate executives (Ceres, 2018; IRRC & Sustainable Investments Institute, 2013). 
However, despite their widespread use, and the perceived attributes they carry, little is known 
about these incentives to date. 
A handful of papers examine some of the determinants and features of CSR performance-
based incentives.  Kolk & Perego (2014) describe the use of sustainable bonuses at four case study 
firms but highlight that it is too early to tell if these bonuses have a substantive impact or are just 
window dressing.  Maas & Rosendaal (2016) provide some initial descriptions of these incentives 
finding that are predominantly short-term and mainly used in ‘dirty’ industries.  Further, Maas 
(2018) examines the differing performance effect of hard and soft targets finding that only hard 
targets effect CSR performance (hard is defined as having clear-cut quantification while soft lacks 
this clear-cut quantification).  Her work builds on Clarkson, Li, Richardson and Vasvari (2008) 
who differentiate between objective and soft disclosure claims to infer performance.  Both Hong, 
Li & Minor (2016) and Maas (2018) examine a firm’s motivation for using such incentives with 
Hong et al. (2016) finding more shareholder friendly boards offering the incentives and Maas 
(2018) investigating whether poor previous CSR performance is driving their use.  Maas finds that 
prior poor CSR performance does not affect the likelihood of use and rules this out as an 
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explanation (ibid).  Haque (2017) finds that a sustainable compensation policy is associated with 
carbon reduction initiatives while Flammer, Hong & Minor (2019) conclude that CSR 
performance-based incentives reduce managerial short-termism, increase firm value and CSR 
performance. The authors conjecture the board uses these incentives to align those stakeholders 
which best serve the shareholders’ interest, with the interests of management.   
One possible determinant that has not been previously explored is that of knowledge 
transfer vis-à-vis ‘linking pin’ directors.  Boards rely on the competencies of their directors to 
perform both the monitoring and advising tasks (Armstrong, Guay & Weber, 2010).  The study of 
knowledge transfer within and between organizations is applied here relating this to the board of 
directors.  With tasks and responsibilities being assigned to boards becoming more complex, the 
use of sub-committees continues to rise.  Directors who connect two board sub-committees, so 
called ‘linking pin directors’, it is theorized, transfer their knowledge between committees.  In this 
regard, Kolev, Wangrow, Barker III & Schepker (2019) highlight that more work is needed to 
understand the implications of board committee overlap.  
To date, most of the work on committee overlap has focused on the audit and compensation 
committees.  Brandes, Dharwadkar & Suh (2016) explore the overlap between the audit and 
compensation committees theorizing it reduces information asymmetry and find support that these 
overlaps are important channels for knowledge transfer.  Additionally, linking pin directors are 
associated with lower executive compensation and better monitoring effectiveness (ibid).  
However, Sassen, Stoffel, Berhmann, Ceschinski & Doan (2018) conduct a meta-analytic review 
of committee overlap relating to the compensation and audit committees and find mixed results 
with respect to the monitoring effectiveness of the board.  
The development and evolution of the CSR Committee is relatively new, and we are still 
learning about the function and effect of such committees.  Rodrigue, Magnan & Cho (2013) find 
that environmental committees are associated with a more symbolic approach to environmental 
governance rather than having a substantive effect on the firm.  Peters and Romi (2014) examine 
the overlap of the CSR Committee with the audit committee and find that disclosure of greenhouse 
gas emissions is more likely where there is overlap due to a knowledge spillover effect from the 
directors.   
I examine the determinants underlying the use of CSR-based incentives among S&P 500 
firms.  I hand collect data about the use of CSR performance-based incentives and break this down 
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into its various sub-components: firms that use only social incentives, firms that use only 
environmental incentives and firms that use both social and environmental incentives.  Further, I 
code whether the incentives are ‘hard’ or ‘soft’ in line with Maas (2018). I gather information 
regarding the directors on the Compensation and CSR committees at each firm as well as each 
Compensation committee member’s previous five-year experience working as a director in 
environmentally sensitive industries.  I use logistic regressions in SAS to analyze the data. 
To understand the questions at hand, I employ two theoretical perspectives.  In the first, I 
explore a knowledge transfer perspective borrowed from organizational behaviour.  I rely on work 
by Argot & Fahrenkopf (2016) who outline how knowledge transfer works within and between 
organizations vis-à-vis ‘members’ and apply this to the context of the board of directors.  When 
faced with complex issues, such as CSR and compensation, having directors cross-posted between 
these board committees may work to facilitate knowledge transfer (Peters and Romi, 2014).  As 
such, I would expect to see increased use of CSR performance-based incentives as directors from 
the CSR committee transfer this knowledge with the compensation committee to use effective 
(hard) incentives.  Contrasting this perspective, it is possible that firms are simply engaging in 
organized hypocrisy (Brunnson, 1989; Cho, Laine, Roberts & Rodrigue, 2015)5.  In this case, I 
would not expect to see increased use of effective CSR performance-based incentives when 
directors sit on both the CSR and compensation committees since this would simply be an exercise 
of hypocrisy but may see increased use of soft CSR performance-based incentives since these are 
known to be ineffective (Maas, 2018).  I also consider a director’s environmental experience under 
both of these perspectives as well and would expect to find a positive relationship with effective 
CSR performance-based incentives under the knowledge transfer perspective or no relationship if 
organized hypocrisy dominates.   
The first hypothesis, that directors' knowledge transfers when the directors sit on both the 
CSR committee and the compensation committee to influence the use of CSR performance-based 
incentives, is supported with the analyses.  When directors sit on these committees within the firm, 
this is significantly associated with the use of hard social performance-based incentives; this is 
consistent with the knowledge transfer perspective.  This may be due to greater knowledge of the 
 
5 There is a debate about whether or not organized hypocrisy is a theory in its’ own right or a distinction of 
legitimacy theory (e.g. Patten, 2019); the authors acknowledge the debate but proceed here with the use of organized 
hypocrisy as it best represents the authors’ perception of the multi-stakeholder pressure and possible hypocritical 
decisions that may result. 
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firm’s social needs since the director sits on both committees within the same firm.  Further, when 
directors sit on the compensation committee in the target firm and on a CSR committee at another 
firm, these directors are associated with the use of hard social and environmental incentives within 
the target firm; this is consistent with the knowledge transfer perspective for the second hypothesis.  
By sitting on a CSR committee elsewhere, the directors may be bringing in a broader view of CSR 
and pressing for the use of hard social and environmental incentives at the same time.  Finally, a 
director’s experience sitting on boards in environmentally sensitive industries over the previous 
five-year period is also positively associated with the use of CSR performance-based incentives.  
Overall, the results support the hypotheses tested and are all consistent with the knowledge transfer 
perspective. 
To the best of my knowledge, this paper is the first to explore: 1) knowledge transfer as a 
determinant of the use of CSR performance-based incentives; 2) the effects of linking pin directors 
between the CSR committee overlapping with the compensation committee as a possible 
determinant of CSR performance-based incentive use; and 3) the relationship between this 
knowledge transfer and the sub-components of such incentives.  This extends work from Peters 
and Romi (2014) who explore CSR and audit committee overlap, as well as Brandes et al. (2016) 
who explore compensation and audit committee overlap.  This work also extends the knowledge 
transfer work of Argote & Fahrenkopf (2016) into CSR performance-based incentives 
determinants.  Previous literature provides some descriptive information on the composition of 
CSR incentives and Maas (2018) codes the variables as hard or soft.  Furthermore,  the paper fills 
a gap in prior research by connecting some of the determinants of CSR performance-based 
incentives to the use of different sub-categories of these incentives.  This work refines our 
knowledge of the determinants of CSR performance-based incentives which will be of interest to 
boards, management, shareholders and other stakeholders alike.  Practically, this research will help 
to shape our understanding of why firms and boards select and use different categories of CSR 
performance-based incentives.  Additionally, it is important for firms, boards and other 
stakeholders to begin to delineate between those practices that are hypocritical and those that are 
effective in order to better understand the conditions that support both as well as to better identify 
firms engaging in effective vs. ineffective practices.   
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2. Literature Review: CSR Performance-Based Incentives and Executive Compensation 
 
The pressure on corporations to demonstrate ‘corporate responsibility’ towards society 
continues to grow stronger daily.  Larry Fink, CEO of BlackRock, the world’s largest asset 
manager with nearly $7 trillion in assets under management, has called for several years now  for 
corporations to become more sustainable (Centre on Executive Compensation, 2017; Fink, 2018; 
Fink, 2019; Fink, 2020).  The Canadian Coalition for Good Governance includes explicit guidance 
for directors in ‘The Directors’ E&S Guidebook’ (2018) to include social and environmental 
metrics in the compensation plan for management.  Mark Carney, former Governor of the Bank of 
England and former Governor of the Bank of Canada, has warned that many assets could become 
worthless as society transitions to a low carbon economy in light of the climate crisis (Financial 
Post, 2019).  Additionally, CSR and corporate governance are connected and have an effect on 
capital markets whereby good corporate governance and good CSR attract analysts (Cormier & 
Magnan, 2014).  In short, stakeholders are demanding information and change, the world is 
changing rapidly, and businesses need to respond. 
The use of corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance-based incentives is an area 
in which there is scant knowledge.  It is unclear what is the exact prevalence of their use since 
definitions vary, but estimates put the proportion of firms using of CSR performance-based 
incentives at between 24% and 43% (Ceres, 2018; IRRC & Sustainable Investments Institute, 
2013).   
 
2.1.   Performance metrics and executive compensation 
The literature on performance metrics underlying executive compensation contracts 
follows a variety of streams.  Of interest here are the determinants of performance metrics.  These 
metrics can be found in either the short- or long-term components of the executive compensation 
contract.  Edmans, Gabaix & Jenter (2017) note that accounting-based metrics are used more often 
than stock-based metrics and this is increasing over time.  Guay, Kepler & Tsui (2019) show that 
performance measures tend to be consistent for the entire top management team (about 2/3 of the 
time they have identical measures) and promote team-based focus and goal alignment.  
Additionally, the authors find that the performance sensitivity of these cash bonuses is about ten 
times greater than previously thought (ibid).  More often than not, firms use absolute measures as 
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opposed to relative measures (Edmans et al., 2017) and the use of multi-year accounting 
performance may be rising (Li & Wang, 2016).   
There is also growing body of research on the determinants of specific performance metrics 
in the executive compensation contract.  Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach (2013) give some insight as 
they find that when a private equity fund takes over a firm, executive compensation contracts are 
redesigned away from qualitative, non-financial as well as earnings-based metrics and instead 
replaced with cash-flow based metrics. The authors surmise that this may limit the executives’ 
ability to exercise discretion in accounting choices (ibid).  De Angelis & Grinstein (2015) find that 
firms use a wide array of measures but that firms in the same industry tend to use similar metrics.  
Larger firms use market-based measures more frequently and firms that have reached maturity 
tend to rely on accounting metrics (ibid).  Bettis, Bozjak, Coles & Kalpathy (2015) examine the 
vesting provisions of equity based incentives in executive compensation contracts and find that 
the use of performance vesting provisions increases with size and board independence amongst 
other features and, perhaps most importantly, is associated with a meaningful subsequent 
improvement in both accounting and stock performance suggesting that these features are effective 
in improving long-term performance.   
The advent of the Balanced Scorecard in the 90’s leads to a rise in the popularity of non-
financial performance targets in executive compensation, the assumption being that such 
performance measures are leading indicators of future financial performance. (Kaplan & Norton, 
1992). For example, O’Connell & O’Sullivan (2014) look at one non-financial measure in 
particular, customer satisfaction.  The authors find that when customer satisfaction is deemed to 
be a good lead indicator to financial performance, it is included as a measure in executive 
compensation contracts, thus indicating good understanding of the firm’s causal business model.  
Additionally, this also affects the relative weighting of the measure as an incentive tool in the 
contract (ibid).   
From another perspective, there is an emerging line of research on the effect of financial 
targets in executive compensation on CSR performance.  For example, Park & Chon (2015) 
examine how stock options affect a firm’s CSR activity and find that it does appear to focus an 
executive’s attention on future CSR activity.  More recently, Minor’s (2016) working paper makes 
an interesting proposition: that the CEO’s treatment of the environment varies in relation to 
whether or not he or she is compensated with stock or stock options.  The logic is this: stock grants 
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carry both upside and downside potential, but stock options carry only upside potential since the 
downside potential is not borne by the CEO, as he or she does not need to exercise the options 
(ibid).  Consequently, he finds that this change in composition of CEO compensation results in a 
60% increase in the odds that a firm will engage in environmental harm and that this harm will be 
double in magnitude to that of a CEO with only stock compensation (ibid).  Finally, another recent 
example of a working paper in the area finds that firms treat CSR like a deposit to an insurance-
like capital account from which they can draw on in the future (Dunbar, Li & Shi, 2016).  As this 
account grows, it allows firms to grant CEO’s incentives for additional risk-taking (ibid).  The 
composition of the bonus plan matters. 
 
2.2.   CSR performance-based incentives in executive compensation 
Maas (2018) builds upon her previous descriptive work of CSR performance-based 
incentives (Maas & Rosendaal, 2016) to examine how the use of hard and soft targets within such 
incentives affect performance.  Maas (2018) defines hard targets as those with clear-cut 
quantification while soft targets are those without such clear-cut quantification.  This adds some 
clarity to Hong et al.’s (2016) work, in that it separates out two separate elements of CSR 
performance-based incentives, the hard and soft targets, and she finds that these do affect CSR 
performance differently.  Like Hong et al. (2016), Maas (2018) examines a firm’s motivation for 
using CSR incentives. However, she explores the possibility that a firm’s previous CSR 
performance may affect its likelihood of adopting such incentives.  As such, she examines whether 
poor CSR performance in the previous year affects the likelihood of adopting CSR incentives in 
the current year and examines the effect of the CSR incentives on performance.  Finally, she posits 
that the use of hard (quantitative) or soft (qualitative) CSR incentives will affect performance 
differently and finds evidence this is the case.  Maas show that a firm’s prior year CSR performance 
does not affect the likelihood of adoption and effectively rules this out as an explanation.  While 
she shows that the CSR incentives do influence CSR performance, disaggregated results reveal 
that this is driven entirely by the hard targets in the CSR incentives and the soft targets have no 
significant effect (ibid). 
Haque (2017) takes a slightly different approach to examine how a sustainability-based 
compensation policy affects the carbon performance of a firm. Additionally, Haque examines 
some of the corporate governance features that support these incentives and performance.  He finds 
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that both independence and gender diversity on the board are associated with reductions in carbon 
emissions, thus supporting the monitoring and advising roles of the board.  Finally, he finds that 
the compensation policy is associated with carbon reduction initiatives (ibid).   
Flammer, Hong & Minor (2019) examine the corporate governance features that are 
associated with CSR performance-based incentives but posit a different explanation than Maas 
(2018) for why firms may be motivated to use them.  Specifically, the authors propose that CSR 
performance-based incentives are provided to focus a firm’s attention to the stakeholders which 
are of most interest to the shareholders under the assumption that, if left to their own devices, 
management would pay attention to different stakeholders in line with their own interests and not 
those of the shareholders.  The authors conclude that CSR performance-based incentives reduce 
managerial short-termism and increase firm value as well as increase CSR performance and green 
innovations while reducing emissions.  The authors make the implicit assumption that the board 
understands the cause and effect nature of the relationship between specific stakeholders and, 
ultimately, firm performance and with this understanding, construct incentives based on those 
stakeholders which best serve the shareholders’ interest, namely firm financial performance.   
Flammer et al. (2017) take a shareholder centric view of the firm and its motivations despite 
evidence that firms do in fact consider stakeholders (Rodrigue, Magnan & Boulianne, 2013).  One 
final example comes from Abdelmotaal & Abdel-Kader (2016) who examine the use of CSR 
incentives on firm performance utilizing a dummy variable for CSR incentives.  The authors 
proceed to examine firm characteristics and returns finding that, amongst other features, large 
firms and those with sustainability committees are more likely to offer CSR incentives; they also 
find evidence to support a positive effect on shareholder returns (ibid).   
The work to date provides a solid beginning to understand the variety of determinants 
driving firms to use CSR performance-based incentives.  What remains unclear however is 
whether knowledge transfer from directors plays a role here and how this may affect different sub-
categories of CSR performance-based incentives. To further develop  our understanding, I 
investigate how linking pin directors, and their experience, may influence the use of hard and soft 
targets as well as the use of only social performance-based incentives, only environmental 
performance-based incentives or a combination of the two.   
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2.2.1. Determinants of incentive use – linking pin directors 
As boards’ tasks and responsibilities grow and become more complex, there is increasing 
reliance on the use of sub-committees.  Some initial work has been done exploring the effect of 
knowledge transfer between committees. Kolev, Wangrow, Barker III & Schepker (2019) provide 
an overview of research relating to board committees and find that, on the topic of committee 
overlap, there is a dearth of research.  Most of the work to date examines overlaps between the 
audit committee and the compensation committee.  In these studies, directors that connect 
committees are referred to as ‘linking pin’ directors (e.g. Brandes, Dharwadkar & Suh, 2016).  It 
is thought that these linking pin directors will transfer their knowledge between committees 
providing reduced information asymmetry and possible positive effects.  Brandes et al. (2016) 
explore this overlap between the audit and compensation committees theorizing that it would 
reduce information asymmetry. The authors outline how these linking pin directors bring their 
knowledge from each committee to enhance the performance of the other and find support for the 
premise that these overlaps are important channels for knowledge transfer (ibid).  Additionally, 
the authors find that these directors are associated with lower executive compensation and better 
monitoring effectiveness (ibid). Sassen, Stoffel, Berhmann, Ceschinski & Doan (2018) conduct a 
meta-analytic review of committee overlap relating to the compensation and audit committees.  
They find mixed results regarding the impact of committee overlap on the monitoring effectiveness 
of the board.  
The development and evolution of the CSR Committee is relatively new, and we are still 
learning about why these committees are adopted, what these committees do, how they function 
and what spillover effects they may have onto the firm.  Rodrigue, Magnan & Cho (2013) find that 
environmental committees are associated with a more symbolic approach to environmental 
governance rather than having a substantive effect on the firm.  Peters and Romi (2014) examine 
the overlap of the CSR Committee with another board committee and find that disclosure of 
greenhouse gas emissions is more likely where there is overlap between the environmental and 
audit committee due to a knowledge spillover effect from the directors. Thus, despite their growing 
presence within boards of directors, there is still scant knowledge about CSR committees and their 
role in knowledge transfers. 
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2.2.2. Determinants of incentive use – director experience 
There is extensive prior work on how a director’s experience affects decisions on the board 
of directors.  Directors are assigned a variety of duties depending on the committees they 
participate in. Broadly speaking, directors oversee and advise management (Armstrong, Guay & 
Weber, 2010).  Boards vary greatly on the diversity of skills of their directors (Adams, Akyol & 
Verwijmeren, 2018).  In this regard, director experience is very valuable to the firm as it provides 
another vehicle for knowledge transfer to the firm.  Faleye, Hoitash & Hoitash (2018) find that 
firms with directors with industry experience have higher value, in part due to an ability to generate 
the same levels of patents as other firms but with lower R&D expenditures.  Fedaseyeu, Linck & 
Wagner (2018) find that directors receive higher pay, and this is associated with their expertise 
being operationalized into greater use on the board of directors.  However, Rodrigue, Magnan & 
Cho (2013) find that a director’s environmental experience is mainly symbolic. As such, it is 
unclear what role a director’s experience may play in the use of CSR performance-based incentives 
as granted by the compensation committee.  
3. Theory and Hypotheses Development 
 
3.1.   Linking Pin Directors and Committee Overlap 
Directors are screened, in part, for the board of directors by comparing the competencies 
they have with the perceived competencies required by the board of directors; in fact, boards are 
preparing and disclosing these matrices with increasing frequency (EY Center for Board Matters, 
2019).  Competencies are defined by Lawson, Blocher, Brewer, Cokins, Sorensen, Stout, Sundem, 
Wolcott & Wouters (2014) as  
“the set of knowledge, skills, and abilities required for professional success ...  Knowledge 
is the intellectual content …, skills are the capacity to apply the knowledge to achieve 
specific goals and objectives, and abilities are the application of knowledge and skills in a 
professional work environment” (p. 296).    
Of interest here are the competencies of the directors in applying knowledge of CSR in a 
compensation environment.  The organizational behaviour literature refers to this as ‘knowledge 
transfer’ where it is studied extensively.  Argote and Fahrenkopf (2016) refer to knowledge transfer 
as “the process through which one social unit learns from or is affected by the experience of 
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another unit” (p. 146).  The authors outline that such knowledge transfer occurs more easily within 
an organization or where organizational contexts are similar and with much more difficulty 
between organizations (ibid).  While the authors outline a model that includes members, tasks and 
tools, here the focus of interest are the members, or directors in this context.  There are a variety 
of theoretical models that have been posed on knowledge transfer.  By having directors who sit on 
multiple committees, boards may reduce their information asymmetry with management.  These 
directors may facilitate knowledge transfer between committees, and this may have a positive 
effect on various aspects of the boards functioning.  For example, Brandes et al. (2016) find that 
such linking pin directors between the audit committee and the compensation committee do reduce 
information asymmetry and are an important channel for knowledge transfer. Given that the 
development of CSR Committees is relatively new, and growing, it is possible that linking pin 
director overlap with the compensation committee may be associated with the use of CSR 
performance-based incentives as an intersection of CSR and compensation.  In a similar vein, 
Peters and Romi (2014) find a knowledge spillover effect between the environmental and audit 
committees and as such, we may find the same here.  Firms are under no obligation to cross-post 
directors on either the compensation or CSR committee and so it is likely that these choices are, 
on average, intentional.  In the context of complex business environments, dealing with CSR and 
increased scrutiny on compensation, having directors sit on both the CSR and compensation 
committees may increase the knowledge transfer and thus be associated to a greater extent with 
the use of effective (hard) CSR performance-based incentives.    
However, Rodrigue, Magnan & Cho (2013) find that environmental committees are more 
symbolic and consequently may not have sufficient knowledge to spillover to the compensation 
committee.  Additionally, a metanalytic review of committee overlap between the audit and 
compensation committees find mixed results when exploring the effect of such overlap on 
monitoring effectiveness; further, some research has found a negative effect from committee 
overlap on firm performance in certain circumstances (Sassen et al., 2018).  It is possible, that 
these negative effects could manifest in biases against CSR performance-based incentives.   
In contrast to the knowledge transfer approach, it is possible that the CSR committees are 
symbolic and may not have sufficient knowledge to transfer with the compensation committee 
consistent with an organized hypocrisy approach.  Within an organized hypocrisy perspective 
(Brunsson, 1989; Cho, Laine, Roberts, Rodrigue, 2015), firms may make decisions that appear to 
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be inconsistent, in this case having a CSR committee with shared members on the compensation 
committee but because the CSR committee may not be substantive, there is no significant 
knowledge to transfer.  Under this perspective, I would expect either no relationship with the use 
of effective CSR performance-based incentives or a relationship with ineffective incentives.  While 
it has been well documented that firms engage in hypocritical activities, it is unlikely that this is 
the case for all firms at all times.  Given that previous work (Brandes et al, 2016; Peters & Romi, 
2014) has found a positive relationship between committee overlap and knowledge transfer, I 
predict that the knowledge transfer approach will dominate in these circumstances helping us to 
differentiate between those engaged in organized hypocrisy.  As such, I predict the following:        
 
H1: Effective CSR performance-based incentives are more likely to be used in firms where 
directors sit on both the CSR Committee and the Compensation Committee within the same 
firm. 
 
H2: Effective CSR performance-based incentives are more likely to be used in firms where 
directors sit on the Compensation Committee at the firm of interest and a CSR Committee 
elsewhere. 
 
 A director’s experience has a direct, positive effect on the board and committees (e.g. 
Carcello, Hermanson & Ye, 2011).  A director’s experience is sought after and given the tumultous 
times we are in as it relates to CSR, with greater calls for attention in this area, a director’s 
experience in this regard may be more valuable.  Walls & Hoffman (2013) find that environmental 
experience is positively associated with environmental practices that go above and beyond the 
minimum.  Further, taking a resource-based view, Cowden, Alhorr & Bendickson (2015) find that 
the environmental experience of board members contributes positively to the firm’s environmental 
performance.  Additionally, while the use of CSR performance-based incentives are used 
throughout many industries, firms in environmentally sensitive industries (ESI) are associated to 
a greater extent with the use of these incentives (Maas & Rosendaal, 2016).  To this end, to reduce 
information asymmetry and respond to stakeholders’ demands to address a firm’s corporate social 
responsibility, directors with greater levels of experience in environmentally sensitive industries 
may transfer this knowledge to the board.  If the knowledge transfer perspective is true, I would 
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expect to see a positive relationship between past ESI experience and the use of effective (hard) 
CSR performance-based incentives.   
In contrast, experience in the ESI may be associated to a greater extent with hypocritical 
activities (Rodrigue, Magnan & Cho, 2013; Cho, Laine, Roberts & Rodrigue, 2015).  This 
experience may not bring anything of value to the firm of interest in terms of setting compensation 
based on CSR objectives.  Worse, this could in fact be associated with greater use of ineffective 
CSR performance-based incentives.  This is consistent with a long line of research about firms 
activities being mainly to legitimize themselves and not for substantive effect (e.g Patten, 2019).  
Consequently, I would expect to see either no relationship with the use of effective CSR 
performance-based incentives or a positive relationship with the use of ineffective CSR 
performance-based incentives.  On the balance of the two theories, I predict that given the 
increased scrutiny in the area and recent findings on environmental experience, that when these 
directors sit on the compensation committee, this knowledge may spillover into greater use of 
effective CSR performance-based incentives.  To that end, I predict: 
 
H3: Effective CSR performance-based incentives are more likely to be used where directors 
have experience in the ESI. 
4. Method 
 
4.1.   Sample 
The study focuses on S&P 500 firms.  I obtained the 2015 proxy statements for each firm 
in the S&P 500 and then hand collect the CSR performance-based incentive data from the 
Compensation Discussion & Analysis (CD&A) section of the statement.  This section details the 
use of such incentives during the previous year (2014).  This provides an initial starting sample of 






4.2.  Empirical Model 
To test the first two hypotheses,  the empirical model is as follows: 
 
CSR_INC = B0 + B1*OVERLAPIN + B2*OVERLAPOUT + controls + e, 
 
where OVERLAPIN is a dummy variable representing a firm where at least one director sits on 
both the CSR and compensation committees and OVERLAPOUT represents a firm where the 
directors sit on the compensation committee at the firm of interest but also sits on a CSR committee 
at another firm.  I then repeat the regressions replacing CSR_INC with CSR_HARD and 
CSR_SOFT to determine if any effect is only on hard or soft metrics.  I then repeat the process 
again, replacing the dependent variable with SOC_HARD, SOC_SOFT, ENV_HARD, ENV_SOFT, 
SOCENV_HARD and SOCENV_SOFT. 
 
 The second empirical model testing H3 is as follows: 
 
CSR_INC = B0 + B1*OVERLAPIN + B2*OVERLAPOUT + B3*ESI_EXP + controls + e, 
 
where ESI_EXP is a variable representing the maximum number of boards in the ESI the director 
with the most experience on the compensation committee has.  All regressions are run using the 
generic category of CSR performance-based incentives and then re-run to test the social, 
environmental and combined incentives.  Maas (2018) differentiate between hard and soft targets 
by distinguishing between those firms with and without clear-cut quantification6.  Upon review of 
the data, there appear to be at least five different categories of targets: a) those that include an 
explicit target for the social and/or environmental CSR performance-based incentive either 
individually or grouped (e.g. 10% for safety target or 30% for safety combined with other non-
financial, non CSR-related goals), b) explicit use of CSR goals to modify the bonus upwards 
without a formal % (e.g. the board considered specific diversity improvements to increase the 
bonus upwards by 10%), c) those that include consideration of a CSR concept but no clear 
modification upwards or downwards, d) use of CSR as a negative solely with downward potential 
 
6 Maas (2018) gives as examples: hard – clear-cut quantification (e.g. reduction of CO2 emissions by 20% next year) 
and soft – no clear-cut quantification (e.g. reduce CO2 emissions next year) (emphasis added). 
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(e.g. unnamed CSR goals were not met and therefore the bonus was reduced) and e) reference 
made to CSR concepts but no breakdowns were provided for any of the bonus elements.  For 
purposes of this study, I use the first category (a) as a restrictive definition of a ‘hard’ metric and 
re-run all the regressions using a broader, more general definition of ‘hard’ incorporating both of 
the first two categories (a & b).  Consequently, ‘soft’ metrics are interpreted as including all 
categories except the first in the most restrictive definition of ‘hard’ (b, c, d & e) and in the more 
general definition, ‘soft’ includes the last three categories (c, d & e). 
 
4.3.  Variable Construction 
Since the necessary data for the CSR performance-based incentives is currently unavailable 
in major databases, I hand collect this data from the Definitive Proxy Statement (DEF 14A) for all 
of the S&P 500 companies listed for the year 2015 which provides the details, in varying formats, 
of whether or not social and/or environmental performance-based incentives were provided in the 
previous year.  
 
CSR performance-based incentives (CSR_INC) – If the use of CSR performance-based incentives 
is present, a dummy variable of 1 is used while 0 is used if no CSR performance-based incentives 
are present. 
 
CSR_HARD – A dummy variable of 1 is used to indicate the presence of a hard CSR performance-
based metric in the short-term incentive plan.  I utilize two versions of hard variables.  The first 
takes a more restrictive interpretation and as such an ‘R’ is added to the variable descriptor (e.g. 
CSR_HARDR).  In this case, the ‘R’ indicates that a formal % weighting in the plan for a social 
and/or environmental metric (e.g. 10% weighting for specific safety target) is provided or that an 
explicit social and/or environmental weighting is provided but is grouped with other elements (e.g. 
30% of the bonus is for items including social and/or environmental metrics, but no specific 
breakdown is provided for the social and/or environmental proportion).  This is in contrast to the 
use of a ‘G’ which denotes a broader interpretation of hard (e.g. CSR_HARDG).  In this 
interpretation, the ‘G’ indicates a hard metric as defined in CSR_HARDR but also includes those 
cases where the CSR performance-based incentive is explicitly used as a modifier (e.g. the 
performance on social and/or environmental goals was used to increase/decrease the bonus by 10% 
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or if the board indicated the social and/or environmental goals formed an important role in the 
determination of the bonus). 
 
CSR_SOFT – A dummy variable of 1 is used to indicate the presence of a soft CSR performance-
based metric in the short-term incentive plan.  Again here the two letters added to the end signify 
a restrictive ‘R’ interpretation or ‘G’ broader interpretation as described above (e.g. CSR_SOFTR 
or CSR_SOFTG).  Specifically, a 1 indicates that the plan does not contain a hard social and/or 
environmental metric as defined in the restrictive definition above.  In the restrictive setting, the 
soft CSR performance-based incentives include: a) those cases where a modifier is applied as in 
CSR_HARDG; b) where the board considers social and/or environmental performance in 
determining the bonus but provides no specific modifiers or made no modifications based on this 
performance; c) metrics where the CSR performance-based incentives is used solely as a negative 
without any potential for upwards adjustments (stick vs. carrot); and d) where the discussion 
references CSR elements but the plan provides no breakdown for any elements in the plan. For the 
‘G’ version, a 1 indicates that the plan does not contain a hard social and/or environmental metric 
as defined in the broad definition above.  In the broad setting, the soft CSR performance-based 
incentives include: b) where the board considers social and/or environmental performance in 
determining the bonus but provides no specific modifiers or made no modifications based on this 
performance; c) metrics where the CSR performance-based incentives is used solely as a negative 
without any potential for upwards adjustments (stick vs. carrot); and d) where the discussion 
references CSR elements but the plan provides no breakdown for any elements in the plan. 
 
SOC_INC – A dummy variable where 1 indicates that ONLY social incentives (e.g. safety, 
diversity) are being used. 
 
ENV_INC – A dummy variable where 1 indicates that ONLY environmental incentives (e.g. 
greenhouse gas emissions) are being used. 
 
SOCENV_INC – A dummy variable where 1 indicates that both social AND environmental 
incentives (e.g. safety, diversity, greenhouse gas emissions) are being used. 
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The hard, soft, ‘R’ and ‘G’ notations are also applied to each category of incentive (e.g. 
SOC_HARDR, SOC_HARDG, etc.) 
 
ESI_EXP – I first determine all members of the compensation committee for each firm in the 
sample from BoardEx.  Then, I match each director’s unique id to all boards of directors that the 
director has sat on for the previous five-year period (2009-2013).  I determine which of those firms 
are in the ESI and calculate a cumulative experience score by granting 1 point for each ESI board 
the director has sat on in the past five years.  This information is compiled and the maximum score 
for the firm in my sample is used as a proxy for environmental experience.  For example, if a 
director sat on four boards in the ESI beyond the target firm in the past five years, this director 
would receive four points.  In examining the compensation committee of the target firm, if one 
director had an ESI experience score of 1, and another director had an experience score of 4, the 
score of 4 would be used as the ESI_EXP variable in the regression. 
 
CSR Performance – I utilize the social disclosure score for 2014 (SOC_SCORE_2014) from 
Bloomberg to proxy for social performance, the environmental disclosure score for 2014 
(ENV_SCORE_2014) from Bloomberg to proxy for environmental performance. 
 
OVERLAPIN – A dummy variable where 1 indicates that at least one director on the board sits on 
both the CSR Committee AND the Compensation Committee at the firm of interest; this 
information is obtained from BoardEx. 
 
OVERLAPOUT – A dummy variable where 1 indicates that at least one director on the board sits 
on the Compensation Committee at the firm of interest AND sits on a CSR Committee at another 
firm. 
 
Shareholders (ST_OWN & LT_OWN) – I obtain shareholder data from FactSet and use the 
categories ‘hedge fund ownership’ for a short-term view institutional shareholder proxy and 
‘pension fund ownership’ is used as a proxy for long-term view institutional shareholder proxy. 
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Other variables – FF_Peer_Pressure is calculated following Keddie (2019): each firm in 
the S&P 500 is categorized using the Fama-French 12 industry codes.  Next, the number of firms 
using CSR performance-based incentives within each industry code is determined and this is 
divided by the total number of firms within the industry.  For firms already using CSR 
performance-based incentives, these were subtracted from the industry total.  These percentages 
represent the pressure firms face to conform to their peers and use CSR performance-based 
incentives.  Size is log revenue (LN_REV), obtained from Compustat Capital IQ.  CSR_COMM is 
a dummy variable where 1 indicates the presence of a CSR or Sustainability committee on the 
Board of Directors and 0 does not; ESI is a dummy variable where 1 indicates that the firm is in 
an environmentally sensitive industry 0 does not.   
5. Results 
 
5.1.   Sample and descriptive statistics 
The initial sample comprises a total of 505 firms. However, due to dual listings and missing 
information, the sample is reduced to 487 unique firms.  Table 21 shows that of these firms, 164 
(33.68%) used only financial metrics in the short-term incentives plan, 163 (33.47%) used non-
financial metrics other than CSR performance-based incentives and 160 (32.85%) used some form 
of CSR performance-based incentive.  Table 22 breaks the CSR performance-based incentives 
down further with 95 of the 160 (59.38%) using only social indicators, 6 (3.75%) using only 
environmental indicators and the remaining 59 (36.88%) using a combination of social and 
environmental indicators. 
 
<Insert Tables 21 and 22 about here> 
  
Table 23 provides sample statistics.  CSR_INC has a mean of 0.33 while CSR_HARDR has a mean 
of 0.15 and CSR_HARDG has a mean of 0.22.  OVERLAPIN has a mean of 0.12 while 
OVERLAPOUT has a mean of 0.05.  The mean ESI_EXP is 0.74. 
 There are significant differences between many of the variables when a two-sample t-test 
is performed. Table 24 shows that firms using CSR performance-based incentives are significantly 
different than those without on a number of key variables including OVERLAPIN (dif. -0.18, p-
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value <0.01), OVERLAPOUT (dif. -0.05, p-value <0.05), ESI_EXP (dif. -0.48, p-value <0.01) 
ENV_SCORE_2014 (dif. -9.52, p-value <0.01) and SOC_SCORE_2014 (dif. -9.79, p-value <0.01).  
Some differences emerge in the use of hard and soft metrics as well, for example, there is a 
significant difference OVERLAPIN (dif. -0.22, p-value <0.01) in the use of hard metrics but not 
for soft metrics. 
 Table 25 breaks down these differences further by CSR performance-based incentive type.  
Here we see again differences emerging between the two groups, for example, OVERLAPIN is 
significantly different for SOC_INC (dif. -0.10, p-value <0.05) and SOCENV_INC (dif. -0.21, p-
value <0.01) but not for ENV_INC. 
 
<Insert Tables 23, 24 and 25 about here> 
 
 Figure 5 shows the use of CSR performance-based incentives throughout the twelve 
identified Fama-French industry categories.  It is apparent that these incentives are used throughout 
a variety of industries but do appear to be used with greater frequency in finance, utilities and the 
oil and gas extraction industries. 
 
<Insert Figure 5 about here> 
 
5.2.   Pearson Correlation Table 
The Pearson correlation table in Table 26 does reveal a number of variables with correlations 
exceeding 0.8, an indicator of multicollinearity.  The regression models are tested for the variance 
inflation factors (VIFS) and none of the VIFs exceed 3.36 (untabulated) which is below the 
standards of 5 for moderate multicollinearity and well below 10 which is the benchmark for high 
multicollinearity. 
 
5.3.   Binary logistic regression 
The Hausman specification test conducted confirms that a binary regression technique is 
efficient for the study (untabulated).  Table 27 shows the results from the first four model equations 
exploring the first two hypotheses.  Where CSR_INC are used generally, Model 1, we see that the 
estimate for OVERLAPIN is significant (1.45, p-value 0.04), which is consistent with the 
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knowledge transfer prediction in H1.  However the estimate for OVERLAPOUT is not significant 
(-0.39, p-value 0.60).  Breaking this down further by examining the use of hard CSR performance-
based incentives, Model 2, with the dependent variable CSR_HARDR also shows OVERLAPIN as 
significant (2.12, p-value 0.01).  These results are consistent when replacing the dependent variable 
with CSR_HARDG (where the criteria for hard is interpreted more broadly) (OVERLAPIN: 1.77 
p-value 0.01).  In Model 4, which has CSR_SOFTR as dependent variable, OVERLAPIN loses its 
significance (-0.04 p-value 0.48).  FF_Peer_Pressure, ESI and LN_REV are significant and 
positive in the first three models but again, not in the model using the soft incentives (dependent 
variable CSR_SOFTR).  The previous year’s environmental score (ENV_SCORE_2014) is 
significant and positive (0.02 p-value 0.10) for the dependent variable CSR_INC and also 
CSR_SOFTR (0.03 p-value 0.01).  The model using CSR_SOFTG is not significant and is 
untabulated.  Table 28 shows that the first three models show strong levels of concordance (77.5%, 
81.4% and 77.8%).   Model 4 is slightly less with and 67.7% concordant.  Overall, the generic 
CSR performance-based model as well as the hard models show significant and positive 
associations with directors who sit on both the CSR and compensation committees within the 
same; the soft CSR performance-based model shows no significant results and there are no 
significant results for directors who sit on the compensation committee at the firm of interest as 
well the CSR committee at a firm elsewhere.  
 
<Insert Table 27 and 28 about here> 
 
 Table 29 shows the results from the regressions using social performance-based incentives 
as the dependent variables exploring the first two hypotheses by breaking down the incentives into 
their sub-categories. In Model 1, with a dependent variable based on hard social performance-
based incentives (SOC_HARDR) we see that the estimate for OVERLAPIN is not significant and 
neither is the estimate for OVERLAPOUT.  Further, in Model 2, with the dependent variable 
SOC_HARDG, where the criteria for hard is interpreted more broadly, OVERLAPIN is positive 
and significant (2.33 p-value 0.02) consistent with the knowledge transfer prediction in H1.  
OVERLAPOUT remains insignificant for all models tested here.  Again, OVERLAPIN loses its 
significance when looking at the use of soft social performance-based incentives in models 3 and 
4.   LN_REV is only significant for the soft models (SOC_SOFTR and SOC_SOFTG) (0.28, p-
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value 0.06; 0.36, p-value 0.07) as is ENV_SCORE_2014 (0.03 p-value 0.01; 0.04 p-value 0.03).  
Conversely, FF_Peer_Pressure (7.88, p-value 0.06) and ESI (1.14, p-value 0.01) are significant 
and positive for SOC_HARDR; ESI remains significant for SOC_HARDG (0.82, p-value 0.02).  Of 
note, ESI becomes significant and negative for SOC_SOFTG (-1.00 p-value 0.10).  Table 30 shows 
that models 1 & 4 are robust while models 2 & 3 show slightly lower levels of robustness but are 
still acceptable.  Overall, directors who sit on the CSR committee and compensation committee 
within the same firm are positively associated with the use of hard social performance-based 
incentives; both the soft models and directors who sit on the compensation committee at the firm 
of interest and the CSR committee elsewhere are not significant. 
 
<Insert Table 29 and 30 about here> 
 
Table 31 continues to explore H1 and H2 by breaking down the CSR performance-based 
incentives into their sub-categories.  Due to the limited number of observations for environmental 
CSR performance-based incentives (3 observations used in the regression), it is difficult to come 
to any meaningful conclusions.  Overall, neither the ENV_HARDR nor the ENV_SOFTR show any 
significance for the key variables OVERLAPIN or OVERLAPOUT in Table 31.  However, 
LT_OWN is significant and positive (0.69 p-value 0.04) indicating possible focused pressure on 
firms to use soft, environmental performance-based incentives.  The models using ENV_HARDR 
and ENV_SOFTG were not significant and are untabulated. 
While both models (SOCENV_HARDR and SOCENV_HARDG) show OVERLAPIN and 
OVERLAPOUT as positive in the predicted direction, only the more broadly interpreted definition 
of hard social and environmental performance-based incentives (SOCENV_HARDG) show 
OVERLAPOUT as significant (1.38 p-value 0.06) consistent with the knowledge transfer 
prediction in H2.  Contrary to the use of ENV_SOFTR, here LT_OWN is significant and negative 
(-0.57 p-value 0.06). FF_Peer_Pressure is significant only for SOCENV_HARDG (8.81, p-value 
0.04), but both ESI (2.86, p-value <0.01; 2.44, p-value <0.01) and LN_REV (0.52, p-value 0.02; 
0.49, p-value 0.02) are significant for models 3 and 4 respectively.  The models using 
SOCENV_SOFTR and SOCENV_SOFTG were not significant and are untabulated.  Table 32 
shows that the models are robust.  Caution is warranted though for the environmental incentives 
as the number in the sample is very small.  Overall, only directors who sit on the compensation 
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committee at the firm of interest and a CSR committee elsewhere are positively associated with 
the use of both hard social and environmental performance-based incentives. 
 
<Insert Table 31 and 32 about here> 
 
 Tests for H3 begin in Table 33 where the initial regression using CSR_INC do not show 
significant results however, when this is broken down further, ESI_EXP is significant and positive 
in the predicted direction for knowledge transfer for both CSR_HARDR (0.29, p-value 0.04) and 
CSR_HARDG (0.27, p-value 0.04).  OVERLAPIN remains significant and positive for the first 
three models (1.31, p-value 0.03; 2.14, p-value 0.01; 1.71, p-value 0.01) however loses its 
significance in the soft model CSR_SOFTR.  OVERLAPOUT is not significant for any models 
shown.  For the first three models, FF_Peer_Pressure (10.21, p-value 0.00; 8.52, p-value 0.02, 
10.10, p-value 0.00), ESI (1.27, p-value <0.01; 2.01, p-value <0.01; 1.53, p-value <0.01)and 
LN_REV (0.36, p-value 0.01; 0.31, p-value 0.07; 0.30, p-value 0.04) are all significant and positive.  
Only LN_REV retains its significance in the CSR_SOFTR model (0.23, p-value 0.10); in this model 
ENV_SCORE_2014 is also significant and positive (0.03, p-value 0.02).  Table 34 shows the 
models are generally robust while the fourth model is slightly less robust but still acceptable.  
Overall, director experience in the ESI is associated with the use of hard CSR performance-based 
incentives; directors who sit on both the compensation committee and CSR committee within the 
same firm are still positively associated with the use of CSR performance-based incentives, this is 
driven by the use of hard incentives. 
 
<Insert Table 33 and 34 about here> 
 
Finally, table 35 shows positive and significant results for the key H3 variable, ESI_EXP 
in relation to dependent variables SOC_HARDR (0.27, p-value 0.08), SOC_HARDG (0.32, p-value 
0.02), SOCENV_HARDR (0.31, p-value 0.09).  This is consistent with the knowledge transfer 
perspective.  Of note, SOCENV_SOFTR shows a significant and negative relationship to ESI_EXP 
(-0.54, p-value 0.07) and is insignificant for SOCENV_HARDG.  OVERLAPIN retains its 
significance only for SOC_HARDG (2.14, p-value 0.03) while OVERLAPOUT is significant for 
SOCENV_HARDG (1.38, p-value 0.07).  LT_OWN is significant and negative  for 
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SOCENV_HARDG (-0.53, p-value 0.08) similar to the earlier model without ESI_EXP.  Table 36 
shows all models are robust.  Overall, a director’s experience in the ESI is positively associated 
with the use of hard social as well as hard social and environmental performance-based incentives 
and negatively associated with the use of soft social and environmental performance-based 
incentives.  Directors sitting on both the compensation committee and CSR committee within the 
same firm continue to be associated with the use of hard social performance-based incentives while 
compensation committee directors who sit on a CSR committee elsewhere continue to be 
associated with the use of both hard social and environmental performance-based incentives. 
Results are substantially consistent throughout.  On the whole, the results suggest support 
for H1, firms where linking pin directors who sit on both the CSR and compensation committees 
are more likely to use CSR performance-based incentives.  Specifically, these firms are more likely 
to use hard social performance-based incentives where directors sit on both committees within the 
same firm.  For H2, where directors sit on the compensation committee at the firm of interest and 
on the CSR committee at a different firm, these firms are more likely to use both social and 
environmental hard CSR performance-based incentives at the same time.  Finally, for H3, that a 
director’s experience in environmentally sensitive industries may make it more likely that they 
will use CSR performance-based incentives, there is also support.  The results for H1 and H2 are 
robust even when a director’s experience is brought into the model suggesting two different modes 
of knowledge transfer are at play.  It is interesting to note that overall, the knowledge transfer 
appears strong for hard CSR performance-based incentives but there is a clear delineation where 
there is no support for the soft CSR performance-based incentives.  With regards to soft social and 
environmental incentives in fact, a director’s experience in the ESI is clearly negatively associated 
indicating a possible application of knowledge to avoid the use of such soft incentives. 
6. Robustness Tests 
 
It is possible that the results found may be affected by the presence or absence of 
independent directors on the board.  I re-run all the regressions but find only limited circumstances 
where independent directors have an effect.  Specifically, for the use of both social and 
environmental hard (with the restrictive definition) performance-based incentives, independent 
directors are negatively associated with the use of these and OVERLAPOUT is now significant and 
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positive at the 10% level both with and without controlling for director environmental experience 
(untabulated).  All other results remain substantially similar.  
It is also possible that particular compensation consultants may be responsible for the use 
of CSR performance-based incentives or particular sub-categories of use as examined here.  
Therefore, I re-run all the regressions including dummy variables for all of the compensation 
consultants for all firms.  The results (untabulated) do not show any association between any of 
the compensation consultants and the dependent variable tested. 
7. Discussion 
 
The results show support for hypotheses that directors’ knowledge is associated with the 
use of CSR performance-based incentives.  This knowledge spills over when the directors sit on 
both the CSR committee and the compensation committee to influence the use of CSR 
performance-based incentives and is supported with the analyses.  What the data shows is that 
when directors sit on these committees within the firm, there is a significant influence to use hard 
CSR performance-based incentives.  This effect appears to be solely driven by the use of hard 
social CSR performance-based incentives.  It is possible that this is due to greater knowledge of 
the firm’s social needs since the director sits on both committees within the same firm; this 
knowledge may press the director to push for further social change within the firm and to insist 
upon the use of hard social targets in the executive compensation contract to achieve this.  
Additionally, the data show that when directors sit on the compensation committee in the target 
firm but sit on a CSR committee elsewhere, these directors are associated with the use of hard 
social and environmental incentives within the target firm.  By sitting on a CSR committee 
elsewhere, the directors may be bringing in a broader view of CSR and pressing for the use of hard 
social and environmental incentives at the same time.  Finally, a director’s experience in 
environmentally sensitive industries is associated positively with the use of hard incentives and 
negatively with the use of soft incentives suggesting active engagement by the directors on the 
subject.  The results show support for the information knowledge transfer perspective as opposed 
to the organized hypocrisy perspective; a director’s knowledge supports the use of effective CSR 
performance-based incentives.     
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8. Conclusions and Future Research 
 
We are only beginning to understand the determinants of CSR performance-based 
incentives.  This research has shown that linking pin directors can be critical to the use of such 
incentives by facilitating knowledge transfer both within and between firms.  Additionally, the 
more experience a director has in the ESI, the greater the likelihood the firm will use CSR 
performance-based incentives suggesting additional knowledge transfer.  This suggests that 
directors have an important role to play in the use of CSR performance-based incentives.   
It is interesting to note that while we are learning more about what is associated with the 
use of hard incentives, our knowledge of soft incentives is lacking.  Related to this, it’s curious 
that the firm’s past environmental performance score is associated with CSR performance-based 
incentives broadly, but broken down this appears to be driven by the soft incentives only.  It is 
warranted to investigate further as to why this is as it may reveal a weakness in the rating systems 
for these firms. 
This research will be of interest to boards of directors as they navigate the use of these 
incentives as well as in the design of their committees.  Given that the research is showing 
knowledge transfer vis-à-vis committee overlap, boards should give this serious consideration in 
terms of how and where the firm needs such overlap.  A board that chooses to provide CSR 
performance-based incentives may be well served by ensuring that some of the members of the 
compensation committee also sit on the CSR committee.  Should a CSR committee not already 
exist, it may be a worthwhile exercise to create one for the purposes of monitoring CSR more 
closely.  Regulators and shareholders may be interested in additional disclosure about how the 
CSR performance-based incentives have come to be in the compensation plan and what supports 
their use.  Greater scrutiny of the substance of such incentives may provide additional information 
to assess whether or not they are appropriate and/or effective given the firm’s circumstances.   
This research is subject to certain limitations.  Given the dearth of research on CSR 
performance-based incentives, it is possible that some of the effects found are actually from 
correlated omitted variables.  Further research will help to refine the associated factors.   
Future research should examine the materiality of the metrics chosen as well as how the 
weighting of these metrics in the overall plan plays a role in the performance of the firm.  
Additionally, given the fuzzy definitions around determining soft and hard metrics, it would be 
interesting to further delineate different categories and determine the performance effect of these.  
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Further, exploring any changes that have occurred over time and whether or not firms are 
beginning to incorporate such concepts as the UN Sustainable Development goals into their plans 
would also be interesting.  Additionally, determining what kinds of businesses are using these 
incentives and how they may be using them differently categorizing firms by low or high carbon 
may also be helpful to understand how these incentives may contribute (or not) to movement 
towards a low carbon economy.  It would be interesting to investigate why firms choose to use 
solely social- or environmental-based incentives in the executive contract as opposed to a 
combination and what effect this has on CSR performance and financial performance.  Furthering 
the work on knowledge transfer, additional investigation into the mechanisms of knowledge 
transfer would be fruitful.  In particular, investigating more deeply the model put forth by Argote 
& Fahrenkopf (2016), members, tasks and tools, would help to gain a deeper understanding of 
what facilitates this knowledge transfer and what inhibits it as well as looking at the performance 
effects of each.  Finally, an interesting takeaway from this research is that the results for the models 
examining the use of soft incentives were consistently less robust than those using hard incentives 
suggesting that there is a difference in the determinants of these types of incentives specifically.  
Future research could further examine some of these differences to help to better delineate those 
















Tables and Figures 
 
Table 21: Descriptive data incentive plans 
  Number % of total (#/487) 
Companies with only financial metrics in bonus plans 164 33.68% 
Companies with non-financial metrics (but not CSR 
performance-based metrics) 163 33.47% 
Companies with CSR performance-based incentives in 
bonus plans 160 32.85% 
 487 100.00% 
 
 
Table 22: Descriptive data CSR performance-based incentives 
 Number % of total (#/160) 
Bonus plans with only social indicators 95 59.38% 
Bonus plans with only environmental indicators 6 3.75% 
Bonus plans with both social and environmental 
indicators 59 36.88% 

















Table 23: Simple Statistics 
Variables N Mean Std Dev Min Max 
CSR_INC 487 0.33 0.47 0 1 
CSR_HARDR 487 0.15 0.36 0 1 
CSR_HARDG 487 0.22 0.42 0 1 
CSR_SOFTR 487 0.17 0.38 0 1 
SOC_HARDR 487 0.08 0.27 0 1 
SOC_HARDG 487 0.13 0.34 0 1 
SOC_SOFTR 487 0.11 0.32 0 1 
SOC_SOFTG 487 0.07 0.25 0 1 
ENV_HARDG 487 0.01 0.08 0 1 
ENV_SOFTR 487 0.01 0.10 0 1 
SOCENV_HARDR 487 0.08 0.26 0 1 
SOCENV_HARDG 487 0.09 0.28 0 1 
SOCENV_SOFTR 487 0.05 0.22 0 1 
OVERLAPIN 487 0.12 0.32 0 1 
OVERLAPOUT 487 0.05 0.21 0 1 
LT_OWN 475 3.37 1.16 0.48 10.35 
ST_OWN 475 5.24 5.94 0.17 49.33 
FF_PEER_PRESSURE 487 0.09 0.05 0.01 0.18 
CSR_COMM 487 0.16 0.37 0 1 
ESI 487 0.25 0.43 0 1 
LN_REV 481 9.18 1.20 6.24 13.09 
ENV_SCORE_2014 347 28.10 18.48 0 75.97 
SOC_SCORE_2014 416 28.06 15.67 3.33 77.19 









Table 24: Two Sample t-tests Split by CSR Performance-Based Incentive Use 
 
CSR_INC 
Means   
CSR_HARDR 
Means   CSR_SOFTR Means   
0 1 Dif. t-value 0 1 Dif. t-value 0 1 Dif. t-value 
OVERLAPIN 0.06 0.24 -0.18 -4.86*** 0.09 0.31 -0.22 -4.01*** 0.11 0.18 -0.07 -1.57 
OVERLAPOUT 0.03 0.08 -0.05 -2.14** 0.04 0.11 -0.07 -1.90* 0.04 0.06 -0.01 -0.55 
LT_OWN 3.35 3.39 -0.04 -0.40 3.38 3.31 0.07 0.74 3.35 3.47 -0.13 -0.90 
ST_OWN 5.80 4.64 1.17 2.37** 5.52 4.92 0.60 1.01 5.64 4.40 1.25 2.39** 
FF_PEER_PRESSURE 0.08 0.11 -0.02 -5.05*** 0.09 0.12 -0.03 -6.09*** 0.09 0.10 -0.01 -0.95 
CSR_COMM 0.10 0.28 -0.18 -4.49*** 0.13 0.33 -0.20 -3.53*** 0.15 0.24 -0.09 -1.79* 
ESI 0.14 0.49 -0.35 -7.95*** 0.17 0.68 -0.51 -8.81*** 0.24 0.32 -0.08 -1.52 
LN_REV 8.99 9.56 -0.57 -5.00*** 9.11 9.51 -0.40 -2.64*** 9.09 9.60 -0.51 -3.59*** 
ENV_SCORE_2014 24.40 33.92 -9.52 -4.83*** 27.37 31.40 -4.02 -1.57 26.00 36.13 -10.13 -4.24*** 
SOC_SCORE_2014 24.76 34.55 -9.79 -6.29*** 26.85 34.69 -7.84 -3.74*** 26.63 34.43 -7.80 -3.99*** 
ESI_EXP 0.59 1.07 -0.48 -4.81*** 0.62 1.45 -0.83 -6.58*** 0.75 0.72 0.02 0.18 
 
 
Table 25: Two Sample t-tests Split by CSR Performance-Based Incentive Type 
VARIABLE  
SOC_INC Means   ENV_INC Means Dif. t-value 
SOCENV_INC 
Means Dif. t-value 
0 1 Dif. t-value 0 1   0 1   
OVERLAPIN 0.10 0.20 -0.10 -2.29** 0.12 0.17 -0.05 -0.36 0.09 0.31 -0.21 -3.41*** 
OVERLAPOUT 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.26 0.05 0.00 0.05 4.91*** 0.03 0.15 -0.12 -2.50** 
LT_OWN 3.36 3.40 -0.04 -0.40 3.35 5.10 -1.75 -3.73*** 3.39 3.21 0.18 1.43 
ST_OWN 5.64 4.51 1.13 2.17** 5.44 3.85 1.60 0.65 5.49 4.92 0.57 0.92 
FF_PEER_PRESSURE 0.09 0.10 -0.01 -2.06** 0.09 0.12 -0.03 -1.67* 0.09 0.12 -0.03 -4.36*** 
CSR_COMM 0.15 0.23 -0.09 -1.83* 0.16 0.33 -0.17 -1.14 0.14 0.36 -0.22 -3.39*** 
LN_REV 9.08 9.58 -0.51 -3.74*** 9.18 9.11 0.06 0.13 9.12 9.56 -0.44 -2.61*** 
ESI 0.22 0.37 -0.14 -2.92*** 0.25 0.33 -0.08 -0.46 0.19 0.69 -0.50 -8.99*** 
ENV_SCORE_2014 26.75 32.47 -5.72 -2.47*** 27.95 36.87 -8.92 -1.17 26.85 36.08 -9.22 -3.22*** 
SOC_SCORE_2014 27.16 31.40 -4.34 -2.30** 27.86 41.19 -13.32 -2.08** 26.60 39.19 -12.58 -5.41*** 
ESI_EXP 0.69 0.98 -0.29 -2.33** 0.75 0.50 0.25 0.59 0.67 1.27 -0.60 -3.66*** 
 
***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels respectively T-values and p-values are reported based on 
the Satterthwaite method where the Folded F equality of variances test indicates a significance of <0.05 and the Pooled method otherwise. 
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CSR performance-based incentive use by Fama-French 12 industry 
categorization
CSR performance-based incentive use % total
Raw # % total
124 
Table 26: Pearson Correlation Table 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 CSR_INC 1.00            
2 CSR_HARDR 0.61*** 1.00           
3 CSR_HARDG 0.77*** 0.79*** 1.00          
4 CSR_SOFTR 0.66*** -0.20*** 0.20*** 1.00         
5 SOC_HARDR 0.42*** 0.69*** 0.55*** -0.14*** 1.00        
6 SOC_HARDG 0.55*** 0.50*** 0.72*** 0.21*** 0.77*** 1.00       
7 SOC_SOFTR 0.52*** -0.15*** 0.18*** 0.78*** -0.11** 0.32*** 1.00      
8 SOC_SOFTG 0.38*** -0.11*** -0.14*** 0.58*** -0.08* -0.10** 0.74*** 1.00     
9 ENV_HARDG 0.11*** 0.04 0.15*** 0.10** -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 1.00    
10 ENV_SOFTR 0.15*** -0.04 0.04 0.22*** -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 0.51*** 1.00   
11 SOCENV_HARDR 0.40*** 0.65*** 0.52*** -0.13*** -0.08* -0.11** -0.10** -0.07* -0.02 -0.03 1.00  
12 SOCENV_HARDG 0.44*** 0.57*** 0.58*** 0.01 -0.09** -0.12*** -0.11*** -0.08* -0.02 -0.03 0.89*** 1.00 
13 SOCENV_SOFTR 0.33*** -0.10** 0.06 0.50*** -0.07 -0.09** -0.08* -0.06 -0.02 -0.02 -0.06 0.20*** 
14 OVERLAPIN 0.26*** 0.25*** 0.27*** 0.08* 0.15*** 0.16*** 0.03 -0.02 -0.03 0.03 0.19*** 0.22*** 
15 OVERLAPOUT 0.11*** 0.12*** 0.14*** 0.03 0.01 0.03 -0.02 -0.06 -0.02 -0.02 0.16*** 0.17*** 
16 LT_OWN 0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.04 -0.02 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.17*** 0.13*** -0.04 -0.07* 
17 ST_OWN -0.09** -0.04 -0.07 -0.08* -0.04 -0.06 -0.06 -0.04 -0.05 -0.02 -0.00 -0.02 
18 FF_PEER_PRESSURE 0.24*** 0.27*** 0.26*** 0.04 0.16*** 0.13*** -0.01 -0.01 0.08* 0.05 0.19*** 0.20*** 
19 CSR_COMM 0.23*** 0.20*** 0.23*** 0.09** 0.10** 0.11*** 0.03 -0.00 0.04 0.07 0.18*** 0.20*** 
20 ESI 0.38*** 0.42*** 0.40*** 0.07 0.19*** 0.18*** -0.00 -0.04 0.01 -0.01 0.37*** 0.37*** 
21 LN_REV 0.22*** 0.12*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.06 0.11*** 0.16*** 0.12*** -0.06 0.00 0.11** 0.12*** 
22 ENV_SCORE_2014 0.25*** 0.08 0.17*** 0.22*** 0.02 0.09* 0.14*** 0.09* 0.04 0.06 0.09* 0.13** 
23 SOC_SCORE_2014 0.30*** 0.18*** 0.25*** 0.19*** 0.05 0.11** 0.09* 0.03 0.12*** 0.08* 0.19*** 0.21*** 
24 ESI_EXP 0.22*** 0.30*** 0.28*** -0.01 0.16*** 0.17*** -0.00 -0.05 -0.06 -0.01 0.25*** 0.23*** 
 














Table 26: Pearson Correlation Table Continued… 
  13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
13 SOCENV_SOFTR 1.00            
14 OVERLAPIN 0.09 * 1.00           
15 OVERLAPOUT 0.08 * 0.52 *** 1.00          
16 LT_OWN -0.03 -0.02 0.01 1.00         
17 ST_OWN -0.04 -0.08 * -0.03 -0.23*** 1.00        
18 FF_PEER_PRESSURE 0.06 0.03 0.01 0.18 *** -0.07 1.00       
19 CSR_COMM 0.08 * 0.84 *** 0.51 *** -0.02 -0.03 0.06 1.00      
20 ESI 0.13 *** 0.24 *** 0.12 *** -0.05 -0.03 0.25 *** 0.26 *** 1.00     
21 LN_REV 0.05 0.16 *** 0.07 -0.13*** -0.15*** -0.10 ** 0.14 *** 0.04 1.00    
22 ENV_SCORE_2014 0.14 *** 0.20 *** 0.25 *** -0.04 -0.17*** -0.07 0.22 *** 0.19 *** 0.33 *** 1.00   
23 SOC_SCORE_2014 0.16 *** 0.20 *** 0.14 *** -0.01 -0.13*** -0.02 0.23 *** 0.26 *** 0.29 *** 0.70 *** 1.00  
24 ESI_EXP -0.00 0.18*** 0.09* -0.07 -0.01 0.27*** 0.18*** 0.33*** 0.03 0.02 0.12** 1.00 
***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels respectively.   
 
The dependent variables are CSR_INC is a dummy variable where 1 indicates the presence of CSR performance-based incentives and 0 indicates the absence of 
such variables; CSR_HARDR (CSR_SOFTR) is a dummy variable where 1 indicates firms are using a hard (soft) metric for the CSR performance-based incentive 
with a restrictive definition of hard; CSR_HARDG is a dummy variable where 1 indicates firms are using a hard metric for the CSR performance-based incentive 
with a more broad definition of hard; SOC_HARDR (SOC_SOFTR) is a dummy variable where 1 indicates firms are using a hard (soft) metric and are using only 
social performance-based incentives with a restrictive definition of hard; SOC_HARDG (SOC_SOFTG) is a dummy variable where 1 indicates firms are using a 
hard (soft) metric and are using only social performance-based incentives with a more broad definition of hard; ENV_HARDG is a dummy variable where 1 
indicates firms are using a hard metric and are using only environmental performance-based incentives with a more broad definition of hard; ENV_SOFTR is a 
dummy variable where 1 indicates firms are using a soft metric and are using only environmental performance-based incentives with a restrictive definition of a 
hard metric; SOCENV_HARDR (SOCENV _SOFTR) is a dummy variable where 1 indicates firms are using a hard (soft) metric and are using both social and 
environmental performance-based incentives with a restrictive definition of hard; SOCENV _HARDG is a dummy variable where 1 indicates firms are using a 
hard metric and are using both social and environmental performance-based incentives with a more broad definition of hard.  The remaining variables are as 
follows:  OVERLAPIN is a dummy variable where 1 indicates that at least one director on the board sits on both the CSR Committee AND the Compensation 
Committee within the same firm; OVERLAPOUT is a dummy variable where 1 indicates that at least one director on the board sits on the Compensation Committee 
at the firm of interest AND sits on a CSR Committee at another firm; LT_OWN is calculated as the number of shares owned by pension funds divided by the total 
number of shares outstanding; ST_OWN is calculated as the number of shares owned by hedge funds divided by the total number of shares outstanding; 
FF_Peer_Pressure is calculated by determining the number of firms using CSR performance-based incentives within each industry code and divided this by the 
total number of firms within that industry, subtracting the subject firm if it already uses these incentives; CSR_COMM is a dummy variable where 1 indicates the 
presence of a CSR or Sustainability committee on the Board of Directors and 0 does not; ESI is a dummy variable where 1 indicates that the firm is in an 
environmentally sensitive industry 0 does not; LN_REV is the natural logarithm of firm revenue; ENV_SCORE_2014 is the environmental disclosure score for 
the year 2014; SOC_SCORE_2014 is the social disclosure score for the year 2014; ESI_EXP is calculated as an experience score for the CSR committee at the 
firm of interest based on the max. ESI experience of its directors. 
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Table 27: Binary Logistic Regression Results 
















Intercept  -6.34*** (20.35) -6.67*** (12.77) -5.61*** (13.07) -4.78*** (10.36) 
OVERLAPIN + 1.45** (4.40) 2.12*** (5.24) 1.77*** (5.49) -0.04 (0.00) 
OVERLAPOUT + -0.39 (0.28) 0.23 (0.08) 0.33 (0.19) -0.50 (0.46) 
LT_OWN  0.05 (0.21) -0.00 (0.00) -0.03 (0.05) 0.08 (0.35) 
ST_OWN  0.02 (0.60) 0.01 (0.16) 0.00 (0.01) 0.01 (0.11) 
FF_Peer_Pressure  10.54*** (13.21) 9.63*** (7.91) 10.28*** (11.35) 3.79 (1.48) 
CSR_COMM  -0.39 (0.46) -1.10 (1.72) -0.75 (1.31) 0.40 (0.46) 
ESI  1.36*** (21.74) 2.13*** (34.70) 1.68*** (30.61) -0.25 (0.55) 
LN_REV  0.35*** (8.11) 0.31* (3.62) 0.26* (3.64) 0.21 (2.52) 
ENV_SCORE_2014  0.02* (2.65) -0.02 (1.19) -0.00 (0.00) 0.03*** (7.32) 
SOC_SCORE_2014  0.01 (0.51) 0.02 (1.10) 0.02 (1.37) -0.00 (0.05) 
Max-rescaled R-
square  0.31 0.35 0.32 0.10 
Likelihood Ratio  88.86*** 82.61*** 87.58*** 22.46*** 
N  346 346 346 346 
***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels respectively; p-
values are based on one-tailed tests where the prediction is directional, and two-tailed tests otherwise. 
 
The dependent variables are CSR_INC is a dummy variable where 1 indicates the presence of CSR 
performance-based incentives and 0 indicates the absence of such variables; CSR_HARDR (CSR_SOFTR ) 
is a dummy variable where 1 indicates firms are using a hard (soft) metric for the CSR performance-based 
incentive with a restrictive definition of hard; CSR_HARDG is a dummy variable where 1 indicates firms 
are using a hard metric for the CSR performance-based incentive with a more broad definition of hard.  The 
independent variables are as follows:  OVERLAPIN is a dummy variable where 1 indicates that at least one 
director on the board sits on both the CSR Committee AND the Compensation Committee within the same 
firm; OVERLAPOUT is a dummy variable where 1 indicates that at least one director on the board sits on 
the Compensation Committee at the firm of interest AND sits on a CSR Committee at another firm.  The 
control variables are as follows: LT_OWN is calculated as the number of shares owned by pension funds 
divided by the total number of shares outstanding; ST_OWN is calculated as the number of shares owned 
by hedge funds divided by the total number of shares outstanding; FF_Peer_Pressure is calculated by 
determining the number of firms using CSR performance-based incentives within each industry code and 
divided this by the total number of firms within that industry, subtracting the subject firm if it already uses 
these incentives; CSR_COMM is a dummy variable where 1 indicates the presence of a CSR or 
Sustainability committee on the Board of Directors and 0 does not; ESI is a dummy variable where 1 
indicates that the firm is in an environmentally sensitive industry 0 does not; LN_REV is the natural 
logarithm of firm revenue; ENV_SCORE_2014 is the environmental disclosure score for the year 2014; 





Table 28: Association of Predicted Probabilities and Observed Responses 
 CSR_INC CSR_HARDR CSR_HARDG CSR_SOFTR 
Percent Concordant7 77.5 81.4 77.8 67.7 
Percent Discordant 22.5 18.6 22.2 32.3 
Percent Tied 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Pairs 28408 17608 23688 19728 
Somers' D 0.551 0.628 0.556 0.353 
Gamma 0.551 0.628 0.556 0.353 
Tau-a 0.262 0.185 0.221 0.117 






















7 The percent concordant is a measure of model fitness; the higher the concordance ratio, the better the model. 
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Table 29: Binary Logistic Regression Results 
















Intercept  -4.08** (3.86) -3.78** (5.31) -5.35*** (9.82) -6.77*** (8.82) 
OVERLAPIN + 13.30 (0.00) 2.33** (4.40) 0.19 (0.06) -0.25 (0.06) 
OVERLAPOUT + -0.54 (0.34) -0.39 (0.27) -0.97 (1.14) -13.82 (0.00) 
LT_OWN  -0.07 (0.13) -0.02 (0.03) 0.07 (0.24) 0.07 (0.13) 
ST_OWN  -0.00 (0.01) -0.00 (0.01) 0.02 (0.43) 0.03 (0.67) 
FF_Peer_Pressure  7.88* (3.50) 5.28 (2.52) 1.56 (0.18) 3.16 (0.40) 
CSR_COMM  -12.10 (0.00) -1.27 (1.44) 0.35 (0.25) 0.72 (0.72) 
ESI  1.14*** (7.00) 0.82** (5.71) -0.41 (1.05) -1.00* (2.65) 
LN_REV  0.10 (0.26) 0.13 (0.78) 0.28* (3.62) 0.36* (3.40) 
ENV_SCORE_2014  0.00 (0.00) 0.01 (0.65) 0.03*** (6.00) 0.04** (4.65) 
SOC_SCORE_2014  -0.01 (0.17) -0.01 (0.27) -0.02 (1.51) -0.03 (1.94) 
Max-rescaled R-
square  0.17 0.12 0.08 0.12 
Likelihood Ratio  28.10*** 25.62*** 15.99* 17.51* 
N  346 346 346 346 
***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels respectively; p-
values are based on one-tailed tests where the prediction is directional, and two-tailed tests otherwise. 
 
The dependent variables are SOC_HARDR (SOC_SOFTR) is a dummy variable where 1 indicates firms are 
using a hard (soft) metric and are using only social performance-based incentives with a restrictive 
definition of hard; SOC_HARDG (SOC_SOFTG) is a dummy variable where 1 indicates firms are using a 
hard (soft) metric and are using only social performance-based incentives with a more broad definition of 
hard.  The independent variables are as follows:  OVERLAPIN is a dummy variable where 1 indicates that 
at least one director on the board sits on both the CSR Committee AND the Compensation Committee 
within the same firm; OVERLAPOUT is a dummy variable where 1 indicates that at least one director on 
the board sits on the Compensation Committee at the firm of interest AND sits on a CSR Committee at 
another firm.  The control variables are as follows: LT_OWN is calculated as the number of shares owned 
by pension funds divided by the total number of shares outstanding; ST_OWN is calculated as the number 
of shares owned by hedge funds divided by the total number of shares outstanding; FF_Peer_Pressure is 
calculated by determining the number of firms using CSR performance-based incentives within each 
industry code and divided this by the total number of firms within that industry, subtracting the subject firm 
if it already uses these incentives; CSR_COMM is a dummy variable where 1 indicates the presence of a 
CSR or Sustainability committee on the Board of Directors and 0 does not; ESI is a dummy variable where 
1 indicates that the firm is in an environmentally sensitive industry 0 does not; LN_REV is the natural 
logarithm of firm revenue; ENV_SCORE_2014 is the environmental disclosure score for the year 2014; 





Table 30: Association of Predicted Probabilities and Observed Responses 
 SOC_HARDR SOC_HARDG SOC_SOFTR SOC_SOFTG 
Percent Concordant 70.9 69.2 65.9 71.6 
Percent Discordant 29.1 30.8 34.1 28.4 
Percent Tied 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Pairs 10329 16240 14304 8025 
Somers' D 0.419 0.385 0.317 0.432 
Gamma 0.419 0.385 0.317 0.432 
Tau-a 0.072 0.105 0.076 0.058 
























Table 31: Binary Logistic Regression Results 




Model 1 Estimate 
(Wald Chi-Square) 
Model 2 Estimate 
(Wald Chi-Square) 
Model 3 Estimate 
(Wald Chi-Square) 
Model 4 Estimate 
(Wald Chi-Square) 
Intercept  -2.95 (0.05) -11.05* (3.05) -9.76*** (13.26) -7.96*** (1.28) 
OVERLAPIN + -11.27 (0.00) 0.16 (0.01) 0.19 (0.04) 0.44 (0.21) 
OVERLAPOUT + -4.77 (0.00) -12.34 (0.00) 1.18 (1.40) 1.38* (2.30) 
LT_OWN  0.81 (1.74) 0.69** (4.36) -0.17 (0.30) -0.57* (3.67) 
ST_OWN  -0.28 (0.63) 0.05 (0.20) 0.04 (0.69) 0.02 (0.13) 
FF_Peer_Pressure  6.42 (0.05) 8.64 (0.43) 5.79 (1.67) 8.81** (4.29) 
CSR_COMM  3.90 (2.47) 1.98 (2.18) 0.01 (0.00) -0.28 (0.11) 
ESI  -1.14 (0.17) -1.50 (1.01) 2.86*** (21.83) 2.44*** (22.94) 
LN_REV  -1.30 (1.07) 0.04 (0.01) 0.52** (5.21) 0.49** (5.50) 
ENV_SCORE_2014  -0.05 (0.59) 0.03 (0.71) -0.02 (1.62) -0.01 (0.55) 
SOC_SCORE_2014  0.17** (3.80) 0.03 (0.63) 0.03* (2.70) 0.03 (2.17) 
Max-rescaled R-
square  0.59 0.24 0.35 0.36 
Likelihood Ratio  20.05** 11.73* 56.02*** 65.97** 
N  346 346 346 346 
***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels respectively; p-values are based on one-tailed tests where 
the prediction is directional, and two-tailed tests otherwise. 
 
The dependent variables are ENV_HARDG is a dummy variable where 1 indicates firms are using a hard metric and are using only environmental 
performance-based incentives with a more broad definition of hard; ENV_SOFTR is a dummy variable where 1 indicates firms are using a soft metric 
and are using only environmental performance-based incentives with a restrictive definition of a hard metric; SOCENV_HARDR is a dummy variable 
where 1 indicates firms are using a hard metric and are using both social and environmental performance-based incentives with a restrictive definition 
of a hard metric; SOCENV_HARDG is a dummy variable where 1 indicates firms are using a hard metric and are using both social and environmental 
performance-based incentives at the same time with a more broad definition of hard.  The independent variables are as follows:  OVERLAPIN is a 
dummy variable where 1 indicates that at least one director on the board sits on both the CSR Committee AND the Compensation Committee within 
the same firm; OVERLAPOUT is a dummy variable where 1 indicates that at least one director on the board sits on the Compensation Committee at 
the firm of interest AND sits on a  CSR Committee at another firm.  The control variables are as follows: LT_OWN is calculated as the number of 
shares owned by pension funds divided by the total number of shares outstanding; ST_OWN is calculated as the number of shares owned by hedge 
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funds divided by the total number of shares outstanding; FF_Peer_Pressure is calculated by determining 
the number of firms using CSR performance-based incentives within each industry code and divided this 
by the total number of firms within that industry, subtracting the subject firm if it already uses these 
incentives; CSR_COMM is a dummy variable where 1 indicates the presence of a CSR or Sustainability 
committee on the Board of Directors and 0 does not; ESI is a dummy variable where 1 indicates that the 
firm is in an environmentally sensitive industry 0 does not; LN_REV is the natural logarithm of firm 
revenue; ENV_SCORE_2014 is the environmental disclosure score for the year 2014; SOC_SCORE_2014 
is the social disclosure score for the year 2014.  
 
Table 32: Association of Predicted Probabilities and Observed Responses 
 ENV_HARDG ENV_SOFTR SOCENV_HARDR SOCENV_HARDG 
Percent Concordant 99.0 84.5 88.9 87.0 
Percent Discordant 1.0 15.5 11.1 13.0 
Percent Tied 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Pairs 1029 1705 8904 10885 
Somers' D 0.98 0.69 0.78 0.74 
Gamma 0.98 0.69 0.78 0.74 
Tau-a 0.02 0.02 0.12 0.14 
















Table 33: Binary Logistic Regression Results 




Model 1 Estimate 
(Wald Chi-Square) 
Model 2 Estimate 
(Wald Chi-Square) 
Model 3 Estimate 
(Wald Chi-Square) 
Model 4 Estimate 
(Wald Chi-Square) 
Intercept  -6.73*** (21.05) -6.89*** (12.59) -6.58*** (15.78) -5.22*** (11.25) 
ESI_EXP + 0.16 (1.25) 0.29** (3.03) 0.27** (3.25) -0.05 (0.09) 
OVERLAPIN + 1.31** (3.50) 2.14*** (5.11) 1.71*** (4.79) -0.22 (0.10) 
OVERLAPOUT + -0.28 (0.14) 0.13 (0.03) 0.34 (0.20) -0.25 (0.11) 
LT_OWN  0.09 (0.53) 0.04 (0.06) 0.02 (0.01) 0.09 (0.49) 
ST_OWN  0.03 (1.49) 0.02 (0.38) 0.02 (0.24) 0.02 (0.44) 
FF_Peer_Pressure  10.21*** (10.39) 8.52** (5.19) 10.10*** (8.90) 4.08 (1.40) 
CSR_COMM  -0.42 (0.56) -1.13 (1.78) -0.78 (1.34) 0.37 (0.39) 
ESI  1.27*** (16.50) 2.01*** (28.38) 1.53*** (21.86) -0.28 (0.58) 
LN_REV  0.36*** (7.65) 0.31* (3.24) 0.30** (4.40) 0.23* (2.76) 
ENV_SCORE_2014  0.02 (2.54) -0.01 (0.42) 0.00 (0.01) 0.03** (5.22) 
SOC_SCORE_2014  0.01 (0.92) 0.01 (0.43) 0.02 (1.91) 0.00 (0.10) 
Max-rescaled R-square  0.32 0.37 0.36 0.10 
Likelihood Ratio  87.33*** 84.73** 92.56** 21.75** 
N  327 327 327 327 
***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels respectively; p-values are based on one-tailed tests where 
the prediction is directional, and two-tailed tests otherwise. 
 
The dependent variables are CSR_INC is a dummy variable where 1 indicates the presence of CSR performance-based incentives and 0 indicates 
the absence of such variables; CSR_HARDR (CSR_SOFTR ) is a dummy variable where 1 indicates firms are using a hard (soft) metric for the CSR 
performance-based incentive with a restrictive definition of hard; CSR_HARDG is a dummy variable where 1 indicates firms are using a hard metric 
for the CSR performance-based incentive with a more broad definition of hard.  The independent variables are as follows:  ESI_EXP is calculated 
as an experience score for the CSR committee at the firm of interest based on the max. ESI experience of its directors; OVERLAPIN is a dummy 
variable where 1 indicates that at least one director on the board sits on both the CSR Committee AND the Compensation Committee within the 
same firm; OVERLAPOUT is a dummy variable where 1 indicates that at least one director on the board sits on the Compensation Committee at the 
firm of interest AND sits on a CSR Committee at another firm.  The control variables are as follows: LT_OWN is calculated as the number of shares 
owned by pension funds divided by the total number of shares outstanding; ST_OWN is calculated as the number of shares owned by hedge funds 
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divided by the total number of shares outstanding; FF_Peer_Pressure is calculated by determining the 
number of firms using CSR performance-based incentives within each industry code and divided this by 
the total number of firms within that industry, subtracting the subject firm if it already uses these incentives; 
CSR_COMM is a dummy variable where 1 indicates the presence of a CSR or Sustainability committee on 
the Board of Directors and 0 does not; ESI is a dummy variable where 1 indicates that the firm is in an 
environmentally sensitive industry 0 does not; LN_REV is the natural logarithm of firm revenue; 
ENV_SCORE_2014 is the environmental disclosure score for the year 2014; SOC_SCORE_2014 is the 
social disclosure score for the year 2014.  
 
Table 34: Association of Predicted Probabilities and Observed Responses 
 CSR_INC CSR_HARDR CSR_HARDG CSR_SOFTR 
Percent Concordant 78.4 82.3 79.8 68.3 
Percent Discordant 21.6 17.7 20.2 31.7 
Percent Tied 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.00 
Pairs 25172 15812 20880 17030 
Somers' D 0.57 0.65 0.60 0.37 
Gamma 0.57 0.65 0.60 0.37 
Tau-a 0.27 0.19 0.23 0.12 



















Table 35: Binary Logistic Regression Results 




Model 1 Estimate 
(Wald Chi-Square) 
Model 2 Estimate 
(Wald Chi-Square) 
Model 3 Estimate 
(Wald Chi-Square) 
Model 4 Estimate 
(Wald Chi-Square) 
Model 5 Estimate 
(Wald Chi-Square) 
Intercept  -4.78** (4.83) -5.27*** (8.75) -9.64*** (11.48) -7.41*** (9.40) -2.75 (1.13) 
ESI_EXP + 0.27* (2.00) 0.32*** (4.28) 0.31* (1.75) 0.14 (0.40) -0.54* (2.24) 
OVERLAPIN + 13.24 (0.00) 2.14** (3.69) 0.05 (0.00) 0.42 (0.18) 0.06 (0.00) 
OVERLAPOUT + -0.60 (0.41) -0.33 (0.19) 1.18 (1.34) 1.38* (2.17) 1.29 (0.97) 
LT_OWN  -0.04 (0.04) 0.03 (0.04) -0.08 (0.06) -0.53* (3.00) -0.45 (2.07) 
ST_OWN  -0.00 (0.00) 0.01 (0.05) 0.06 (1.18) 0.03 (0.26) -0.05 (0.57) 
FF_Peer_Pressure  5.13 (1.26) 3.34 (0.81) 5.93 (1.45) 10.10** (4.72) 9.20 (2.50) 
CSR_COMM  -12.00 (0.00) -1.15 (1.17) -0.13 (0.02) -0.43 (0.25) -0.72 (0.38) 
ESI  0.90** (3.85) 0.49 (1.69) 2.92*** (18.83) 2.43*** (20.83) 0.74 (1.63) 
LN_REV  0.18 (0.89) 0.24 (2.45) 0.42* (3.00) 0.38* (3.15) -0.05 (0.05) 
ENV_SCORE_2014  -0.00 (0.00) 0.01 (0.32) -0.01 (0.30) -0.00 (0.01) 0.02 (0.52) 
SOC_SCORE_2014  -0.01 (0.28) -0.00 (0.01) 0.02 (1.30) 0.02 (1.02) 0.02 (1.22) 
Max-rescaled R-
square  0.17 0.14 0.39 0.39 0.14 
Likelihood Ratio  27.36*** 27.34*** 60.22*** 68.00*** 17.20* 
N  327 327 327 327 327 
***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels respectively; p-values are based on one-tailed tests where 
the prediction is directional, and two-tailed tests otherwise. 
 
The dependent variables are SOC_HARDR is a dummy variable where 1 indicates firms are using a hard metric and are using only social 
performance-based incentives with a restrictive definition of hard; SOC_HARDG is a dummy variable where 1 indicates firms are using a hard 
metric and are using only social performance-based incentives with a more broad definition of hard; SOCENV_HARDR (SOCENV_SOFTR) is a 
dummy variable where 1 indicates firms are using a hard (soft) metric and are using both social and environmental performance-based incentives 
with a restrictive definition of a hard metric; SOCENV_HARDG is a dummy variable where 1 indicates firms are using a hard metric and are using 
both social and environmental performance-based incentives at the same time with a more broad definition of hard.  The independent variables are 
as follows:  ESI_EXP is calculated as an experience score for the CSR committee at the firm of interest based on the max. ESI experience of its 
directors; OVERLAPIN is a dummy variable where 1 indicates that at least one director on the board sits on both the CSR Committee AND the 
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Compensation Committee within the same firm; OVERLAPOUT is a dummy variable where 1 indicates 
that at least one director on the board sits on the Compensation Committee at the firm of interest AND sits 
on a CSR Committee at another firm.  The control variables are as follows: LT_OWN is calculated as the 
number of shares owned by pension funds divided by the total number of shares outstanding; ST_OWN is 
calculated as the number of shares owned by hedge funds divided by the total number of shares outstanding; 
FF_Peer_Pressure is calculated by determining the number of firms using CSR performance-based 
incentives within each industry code and divided this by the total number of firms within that industry, 
subtracting the subject firm if it already uses these incentives; CSR_COMM is a dummy variable where 1 
indicates the presence of a CSR or Sustainability committee on the Board of Directors and 0 does not; ESI 
is a dummy variable where 1 indicates that the firm is in an environmentally sensitive industry 0 does not; 
LN_REV is the natural logarithm of firm revenue; ENV_SCORE_2014 is the environmental disclosure score 
for the year 2014; SOC_SCORE_2014 is the social disclosure score for the year 2014.  
 
Table 36: Association of Predicted Probabilities and Observed Responses 








Concordant 72.9 72.1 89.5 88.0 77.6 
Percent 
Discordant 27.1 27.9 10.5 12.0 22.4 
Percent Tied 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.00 0.0 
Pairs 9176 13850 8100 9962 5852 
Somers' D 0.46 0.44 0.79 0.76 0.55 
Gamma 0.46 0.44 0.79 0.76 0.55 
Tau-a 0.08 0.12 0.12 0.14 0.06 
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Discussion and Conclusion 
This dissertation explores the use of CSR performance-based incentives through the lens 
of corporate governance.  The first paper examines the research question: Who is influencing the 
use of CSR performance-based incentives?  This work does so from two theoretical angles, the 
first, stakeholder power expects that various stakeholders are influencing the use of CSR 
performance-based incentives in the executive compensation contract; the second theory, efficient 
contracting, presumes that the contracts are efficient in their design and consequently will not be 
affected by any particular stakeholder group. 
The second paper examines the following research question: Are top management teams 
influencing the use of CSR performance-based incentives as a way to obtain excess compensation?  
This paper uses organized hypocrisy and managerial hegemony to posit that top management 
teams may be obtaining excess compensation through the use of seemingly ‘good’ CSR 
performance-based incentives.  Any excess compensation is obtained vis-à-vis top management 
teams’ power over the board while the use of CSR performance-based incentives may be 
hypocritical, a way to ‘look good’ while obtaining extra benefits.  Contrasting this perspective is 
again efficient contracting which suggests that no excess compensation should be found simply 
from the use of a particular form of incentive.   
Finally, the third paper addresses the research question: Does knowledge transfer from the 
board of directors affect a firm’s use of CSR performance-based incentives?  Here, I use 
information asymmetry reduction as a possible means for how CSR performance-based incentives 
come to be in the executive compensation contract.  Specifically, that a director’s experience sitting 
on both the compensation committee and CSR committee or previous environmental experience 
may be associated with increased use of such incentives by way of knowledge transfer.  
Alternatively, it is possible that CSR committees and environmental experience add little value 
and are simply acts of show making the use of CSR performance-based incentives by directors 
with this experience more consistent with organized hypocrisy.  The remainder of this section will 
outline the findings for each paper, the contributions of the work, implications of the research, 





1.1.  Findings 
1.1.1. Succumbing To The Pressure?  An Investigation Of The Influence Of Stakeholder Power 
On CSR Performance-Based Incentives Use 
The first paper of the dissertation explores who is influencing the use of CSR performance-
based incentives.  The paper poses three hypotheses to explore this influence:  
H1: CSR performance-based incentives are more likely to be used in firms where long-
term oriented institutional investors have power and monitor CSR;  
H2: CSR performance-based incentives are less likely to be used in firms where short-term 
oriented institutional investors have power and monitor CSR; and, 
H3: CSR performance-based incentives will be more likely where peer competitors are 
using them, due to imitation. 
The hypotheses are studied through the lens of stakeholder power and efficient contracting.  
Under the stakeholder power approach, various stakeholders, here peers, short-term view 
institutional shareholders and long-term view institutional shareholders, exert influence on the 
executive compensation process.  If this perspective is true, I expect to see positive associations 
from tests of the hypotheses for the peers and long-term view institutional shareholders and 
negative associations from the influence of short-term view institutional shareholders.  Contrasting 
this perspective, the efficient contracting approach argues that boards create efficient contracts that 
reflect all stakeholders and I would expect to see no results from the tests of the hypotheses for 
any stakeholder should this perspective be true.   
To test these hypotheses, I rely mainly on quantitative analyses with S&P 500 firms, but I 
also conduct qualitative interviews with key executives to add context to the findings.  For the first 
hypothesis, no significant quantitative results are found.  However, the qualitative interviews 
conducted with some top executives and directors do provide some anecdotal support for this 
hypothesis. Those firms with greater levels of short-term view institutional investors are 
significantly less likely to use CSR performance-based incentives supporting the second 
hypothesis. This is also supported by the qualitative interviews which suggest that shareholders 
are non-homogenous and have differing time horizons for their investments; a variety of 
stakeholders put pressure on firms to align time horizons and deal with CSR issues; and the 




view institutional shareholders have power, it is suggested they use this to influence the 
compensation contract away from CSR performance-based incentives.  The quantitative analyses 
support the notion that firms are using such incentives due, in part, to peer pressure from their 
industry competitors in line with hypothesis H3.  Firms are significantly more likely to use CSR 
performance-based incentives when their peers do.  Qualitative interviews reveal that this may 
happen for a variety of reasons including significant monitoring of peer practices to deal with new 
issues/pressures that arise.   
Overall, results from the first paper show quantitative support for two of the three 
hypotheses. Qualitative comments are consistent with all three hypotheses.  I interpret these results 
as providing evidence of stakeholder power in the executive compensation design process in 
contrast to the efficient contracting theory, which would imply no results.  Short-term view 
institutional shareholders push to align management’s compensation plan with their own short-
term view, pressing to exclude CSR performance-based incentives from the compensation plan. 
Long-term view institutional shareholders are adept at resisting this pressure where they have 
power.  Finally, peer pressure from competitor firms seems to pressure companies to use CSR 
performance-based incentives as a possible means to deal with the uncertainty surrounding CSR 
issues. 
1.1.2. Who Is More Powerful: The Board Or Management? Exploring The Relationship 
Between CSR Performance-Based Incentives And Executive Compensation   
 The second paper in the dissertation explores the use of CSR performance-based incentives 
when the top management team has power to determine if any excess compensation is obtained.  I 
view this through the lens of managerial hegemony/organized hypocrisy and efficient contracting.  
If the managerial hegemony/organized hypocrisy perspective is true, I should see excess 
compensation where management has power whereas I would expect no results if the efficient 
contracting perspective is true.  The hypotheses put forth are as follows:  
H1: When top management teams hold the balance of power, the use of CSR performance-
based incentives for management is associated with an increase in excess bonus pay; 
H2: The environmental sensitivity of a firm’s industry moderates the relation between 
managerial power and the use of CSR performance-based incentives for the purpose of 




H3a: Use of a CSR committee at the board level moderates excess compensation when 
using CSR performance-based incentives; and 
H3b: The presence of long-term view institutional shareholders moderates excess 
compensation when using CSR performance-based incentives. 
 Results are consistent with the idea that when senior management has power, they do 
receive excess compensation when using CSR performance-based incentives, which in line with 
the managerial hegemony/organized hypocrisy perspective. Not only are top management teams 
associated with excess compensation when they have power (managerial hegemony) but they are 
doing this with a tool that appears to serve stakeholder interests producing an inherent conflict 
(organized hypocrisy).  This results in excess compensation of approximately $180,000 per top 
management team member or over $900,000 for the team as a whole.  These results support the 
first hypothesis. 
In the second hypothesis, I consider whether this effect is driven by presence in an 
environmentally sensitive industry (ESI). ESI’s are known to engage in a variety of 
‘greenwashing’ and hypocritical activities and thus it is of interest whether these incentives are the 
latest tool of choice.   I find no support for the effect being driven by firms in the ESI, thus 
supporting the notion that these activities are more widespread.  These results do not support the 
second hypothesis.  Last, I consider whether long-term view institutional shareholders or CSR 
committees are able to mitigate this type of behaviour.  While the interaction terms are not 
significant, these corporate governance mechanisms do appear to reduce the significance of the 
main effect.  Formally, I conclude that this provides mixed support for H3a and H3b.  Overall, 
while there is support for the idea that top management teams with power are using CSR 
performance-based incentives to obtain excess compensation, there is some evidence regarding 
the ability of two corporate governance mechanisms (CSR committees and long-term view 
institutional shareholders) to mitigate this effect.  
1.1.3. The Board Of Directors And CSR Performance-Based Incentives: What’s The ‘Link’?   
The third and final paper in the dissertation investigates whether directors’ knowledge 
transfers facilitate the use of CSR performance-based incentives.  To understand this, I use an 
information asymmetry perspective that posits that there is knowledge transfer among directors  to 




performance-based incentives.  This contrasts with the organized hypocrisy perspective which in 
this case would find the use of such incentives is not associated with directors’ knowledge and 
simply used ‘for show’.  I make the following hypotheses in line with the theories proposed: 
H1: Effective CSR performance-based incentives are more likely to be used in firms where 
directors sit on both the CSR Committee and the Compensation Committee within the same 
firm; 
H2: Effective CSR performance-based incentives are more likely to be used in firms where 
directors sit on the Compensation Committee at the firm of interest and a CSR Committee 
elsewhere; 
H3: Effective CSR performance-based incentives are more likely to be used where directors 
have experience in the ESI. 
 I expect that if the reduced information asymmetry perspective is true, I will see a positive 
association between ‘linking pin’ directors who sit on both the compensation and CSR committees 
and the use of effective CSR performance-based incentives.  Further, if this perspective is true, 
then a director’s experience in the ESI will also translate into increased use of such incentives.  
Alternatively, if the use of such incentives is simply an exercise in organized hypocrisy, then I 
would expect to see either no association with the use of effective CSR performance-based 
incentives or a positive association with the use of ineffective CSR performance-based incentives.   
Results provide evidence supporting the information asymmetry reduction perspective for 
the transfer of knowledge vis-à-vis directors for the use of effective, hard CSR performance-based 
incentives.  Specifically, when a director sits on both the CSR committee and the compensation 
committee, this is positively associated with the use of such incentives, in particular using only 
hard, social performance-based incentives in line with the first hypothesis.  It is unclear exactly 
why this may be the case, but it is possible that when a director has committee overlap within the 
board, this experience leads to greater knowledge of the social needs of the firm; further research 
could explore this possibility.  Moreover, directors sitting on the compensation committee at the 
firm of interest and who sit on a CSR committee elsewhere are associated with the use of hard 
social and environmental performance-based incentives consistent with the second hypothesis.  It 
is possible that this ‘external’ experience may broaden the view of the director leading to a push 
for both categories of CSR performance-based incentives use.  Future research may help to better 




this is also associated with the use of hard social performance-based incentives as well as the hard 
combined social and environmental performance-based incentives.  Notably, these directors are 
significantly and negatively associated with the use of soft social and environmental performance-
based incentives. Overall, the results are consistent with the information asymmetry reduction 
approach that directors’ knowledge is positively associated with the use of effective, hard CSR 
performance-based incentives and negatively associated with the use of ineffective, soft CSR 
performance-based incentives. 
 
1.2.  Contributions 
 
This dissertation contributes to research on executive compensation research, non-financial 
performance metrics, and on CSR corporate governance.  Each paper in the dissertation contributes 
to the literature in a unique way by examining why firms use CSR performance-based incentives 
and by exploring the related corporate governance mechanisms at work.  In particular, this research 
extends the work of Flammer, Hong & Minor (2019), Maas (2018), Grabner, Renders & Yang 
(2016), Hong, Li & Minor (2016) & Abdelmotaal & Abdel-Kader (2016) who all examine some 
of the determinants of the use of CSR performance-based incentives.   
To the best of my knowledge, the initial paper in the dissertation is the first to examine 
stakeholders’ influence on directors’ decision to use CSR performance-based incentives in 
executive compensation contracts. By employing a novel theoretical extension of efficient 
contracting, this work suggests that stakeholder power influences boards’ selection of performance 
metrics for executive compensation contracts, consequently moderating the executive 
compensation setting process.  This research extends the work by Flammer, Hong & Minor (2019) 
who explore the use of CSR performance-based incentives as a way to align shareholders’ 
preferences with that of management.  I do this by considering the influence of how non-
homogenous shareholders and peer stakeholders influence the compensation setting process with 
regard to these incentives.  I also extend the corporate governance literature into the determination 
of an emerging set of CSR-based metrics in executive incentive plans, particularly in the bonus 
plan (Guay et al., 2017).   
The second paper is a first step towards addressing Kolk & Perego’s (2014) concern that 




my knowledge, my study is the first to examine the use of CSR performance-based metrics in 
executive compensation contracts as a means for top management teams to attain extra 
compensation above and beyond that to which we would expect on a normalized model; this builds 
upon Maas’ (2018) and Flammer, Hong & Minor’s (2019) work by examining this previously 
unexplored explanation.  Previous research has taken a mostly positive view of the use of CSR 
performance-based incentives while my work here takes a more critical perspective.  Moreover, 
my research explores how membership in an environmentally sensitive industry (ESI), the 
presence of a CSR committee or long-term view institutional shareholders may lessen this 
compensation effect.  Additionally, this research enhances our knowledge of annual incentive 
plans as well as some of the behavioural implications in executive compensation, both areas where 
there is a scarcity of knowledge currently (Edmans and Gabaix, 2016).  My work extends the 
executive compensation literature by including a theory not previously applied to the executive 
compensation literature: organized hypocrisy (Brunsson, 1989; e.g. Cho, Laine, Roberts and 
Rodrigue, 2015).   
 To the best of my knowledge, the third paper in the dissertation is the first to explore: 1) 
knowledge transfer as a determinant of the use of CSR performance-based incentives; 2) the effects 
of ‘linking pin’ directors between the CSR committee overlapping with the compensation 
committee as a possible determinant of CSR performance-based incentive use; and 3) the 
relationship between this knowledge transfer and the sub-components of such incentives.  In 
addition to the executive compensation and CSR literatures, this work also contributes to the 
literature on committee overlap, an area of growing interest.  Further, this extends work from Peters 
and Romi (2014) and Brandes, Dharwadkar & Suh (2016) by examining the overlap of the 
Compensation and CSR Committees. This research further extends Maas (2018) by examining the 
breakdown of CSR performance-based incentives into sub-components of social and/or 
environmental metric sub-categories.  Additionally, the paper fills a gap in prior research by 
connecting some of the determinants of CSR performance-based incentives to the use of these 







1.3.  Implications 
 
Broadly, this dissertation helps us to understand who is influencing the use or avoidance 
of CSR performance-based incentives (peers and short-term view institutional shareholders), as 
well as when these incentives may be used well (when directors have experience and knowledge) 
and when they may be abused (when top management teams have power).  Practically, the first 
paper provides evidence that could have policy implications for regulators looking to better 
regulate the use of CSR performance-based incentives, as well as for shareholders and other 
stakeholders looking for a better understanding of why such incentives are being used and who is 
influencing the process.  Boards of directors should be aware that shareholders have differing time 
horizons and may pressure firms to use (or not use as the case may be) CSR performance-based 
incentives.  Additionally, boards should be aware of peer use of CSR performance-based 
incentives, but caution is warranted if the firm is simply using these because their peers are.  It is 
likely that the use of such incentives needs to be adapted to each firm’s unique circumstances and 
more research is necessary to understand under what circumstances the use of CSR performance-
based incentives are effective. 
The second paper provides evidence that will help boards to better understand 
management’s motivations for the inclusion of CSR performance-based incentives in the executive 
compensation contract.  Firms should ensure that if and when such incentives are implemented 
that they are appropriate to the firm’s circumstances and provide reasonable (as opposed to excess) 
compensation to management.  Regulators and shareholders may be interested to seek better 
disclosure about the use of such incentives such as having the metrics and goals outlined in advance 
to mitigate any type of manipulation.  Boards currently using these incentives would be warranted 
to review the use of CSR performance-based incentives to ensure that any compensation obtained 
from these is justified and that the plan is well designed to avoid or minimize manipulation.  
Additional oversight may be reasonable vis-à-vis corporate governance mechanisms like CSR 
committees though more work is necessary to understand its influence. Long-term view 
institutional shareholders and others concerned about the long-term sustainability of the firm 
would also serve the firm well by increasing the monitoring of the use of CSR performance-based 




The third and final paper in the dissertation will be of interest to regulators, shareholders 
and boards of directors.  Regulators and shareholders may wish to obtain additional disclosure 
about how CSR performance-based incentives have come to be used in the compensation plan and 
information about how they were selected.  Further enquiry into the use of such incentives may 
help regulators, shareholders and boards to assess whether they are appropriate and/or effective 
for the firm.  With knowledge transfer vis-à-vis committee overlap showing a positive relationship 
in the literature, boards should give this serious consideration when selecting members for each 
committee.  By ensuring that there is director overlap between the compensation committee and 
the CSR committee, a board could promote the sharing of knowledge between the two committees 
with the goal of improving the use of CSR performance-based incentives.  Firms without a CSR 
committee already may wish to create one to monitor CSR more closely; this is subject of course 
to filling this committee with appropriate directors and granting the committee sufficient oversight 
objectives to ensure it is effective.  
 
1.4.  Limitations 
One key limitation for this dissertation is that it does not consider the effectiveness of the 
use of CSR performance-based incentives on CSR performance.  While I control for the firm’s 
CSR performance both environmentally and socially, it is possible that these external ratings do 
not accurately reflect the firm’s actual performance.  This would be useful to further investigate in 
future research.  Additionally, since this is an area of the literature that is still emerging, it is 
possible that some of the effects found in the results are actually from correlated omitted variables.  
Further research will help to refine the associated factors.     
 
1.5.  Future Research 
 
Given that the research on CSR performance-based incentives is still in its infancy, there 
are a plethora of questions yet to be investigated.  It is critical to understand more about how CSR 
performance-based incentives affect the performance of the firm, in particular how various 
categories affect performance differently and whether the selection of particular metrics have 
greater or lesser effect.  Further work could be done to clarify the role non-homogenous 




first paper, understanding more about how long-term view institutional shareholders engage with 
firms on compensation.  The materiality of these incentives is another interesting stream for future 
research.  It would be useful to investigate whether firms are selecting measures and categories 
that are material to their operations and how this affects the performance of the firm.  
It would be interesting to investigate whether executives manipulate particular forms of incentives, 
whether particular metrics are red flags in this regard and what the performance effects are when 
executives obtain excess compensation.  Given that the dissertation finds what appears to be a 
gradient of hard to soft incentives, further work could clarify these categories and discriminate 
between any differing effects.  A key indirect learning that emerges from the third paper is that we 
know little about what drives firms to use soft CSR performance-based incentives.  Is this solely 
window-dressing?  Do these incentives serve other purposes?  What mechanisms drive the use of 
soft incentives?  Understanding more about the processes that the compensation committee and 
the board goes through to develop and implement CSR performance-based incentives would be 
helpful.  For example, why certain categories are chosen, how the metrics and targets are selected, 
as well as how and when the actual bonus is granted and under what circumstances is judgment 
applied to the granting of such bonuses.  How are these incentives evolving over time?  Are firms 
now incorporating the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (UN SDGs)?  And if so, 
are there any significant difference to the current plans under study?  How are firms addressing 
the transition to a low-carbon economy and is this reflected in their compensation plans?  Another 
interesting angle would be to examine whether these plans affect men and women differently in 
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